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LANDLORDS AS Cops: TORT,
NUISANCE & FORFEITURE
STANDARDS IMPOSING LIABILITY ON
LANDLORDS FOR CRIME ON THE
PREMISES
B. A. Glesner"
The author undertakes an exhaustive review of landlord liabil-
ity and the trend toward broadening landlord liability for criminal
activity on rental property. In particular, she reviews laws penaliz-
ing landlords through forfeiture of such property. Professor
Glesner also considers the philosophical shift that has accompanied
these legal developments. She concludes that the penalties imposed
on landlords are an inappropriate and ineffective response to crime
control, and she highlights alternatives to this emerging practice
which forces landlords to act like cops.
INTRODUCTION
In the Umted States, fear has reached epidermc proportions.
Crime rates continue to rise.' Reports of random violence m-
* Assoc. Prof. of Law, Umv. of Missouri, Kansas City. My thanks to Carolyn
Rowe for her outstanding research and editorial assistance; James Leslie and Nancy An-
derson for their research assistance m the early stages of the article; and Nancy Levit for
her thoughtful comments on the tort analysis. Errors are nobody's fault but my own.
1. John McCormck & Bill Turque, Big Cinmes, Small Cities, NEWSWEEK, June 10,
1991, at 16 (noting a 16 percent rise m violent crimes m cities with populations of
500,000 to 1 million m 1990); Tom Morganthau et al., The War at Home: How to Battle
Crime, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 25, 1991, at 35 (At least 19 U.S. cities eclipsed their previous
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creasingly dominate the daily news.2 A war has been declared
against crime in general and drugs in particular.' Congress has
considered and passed various pieces of legislation aned at con-
trolling thIs criminal epidemic4 and the Supreme Court has pro-
nounced new standards of criminal justice designed to increase the
efficiency of law enforcement.5 As a result, more people are mcar-
records for homicide last year, and Senate experts estimate that 23,200 Amencans-a
bleak new igh for the nation as a whole - were murdered in 1990."); Gary Spencer,
Community Courts, Lay Judges Urged, OCA Administrator's Strategy to Fight Crime,
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 27, 1990, at 1 (confirming that " the reported crime rate continues to
rise, as do arrest rates, indictment rates, and jail and prison populations in many places").
But see Gene Koretz, Crime May Not be as BEd as the Numbers Make it Look,
BUSINESS WEEK, Mar. 18, 1991, at 20 (citing Bureau of Justice statistics based on public
reports of crime showing "no clear trend in violent cnries from 1973 to 1981, an actual
decline in crime rates during most of the 1980s, and an apparent pickup in recent years
but with violence still below the levels recorded in the 1970s").
2. See, e.g., Sonsyrea Tate & Michael Cromwell, Drive-by Shooting Wounds 5 Pupils,
THE WASHINGTON TIMES, Dec. 21, 1990, at Al (four adolescents and a six year old
injured in drive-by shooting on their way home from school); Judith Games, Shots at
Houses Hit Neighborhood's Gut, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 12, 1990 at 36 ("nne drive-by
shootings have not injured anyone yet in a neighborhood area that has seen a rash of
'house shootings'"); McCormick & Turque, supra note 1, at 16 ("'The level of cruelty in
street crime is definitely rising - and so is the level of apathy, says Minneapolis Police
Lt. Robert Collins. 'People just want this to go away.'").
Especially disturbing is the increasing violence among young people. "We have
growing numbers of lads settling trivial disputes with deadly force [In Jacksonville,
Florida, a] sheriff's department that arrested two or three juvenile killers each year cap-
tured 12 in 1989 - and 26 in 1990." McCormick & Turque, supra note 1, at 18-19.
3. See Morganthau, supra note 1.
4. See, e.g., Gwen Infil, Broad, Tough Anti-Crime Measure Is Easily Approved by the
Senate, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1991, at Al (describing a crime bill which allows the states
to impose the death penalty for a broad range of federal offenses, limits the process of
legal appeals for death row inmates and introduces "good-faith" exceptions to current re-
strictions on the use of evidence by police and prosecutors); Tom Watson, Obscure Provi-
sions in Bush's Crime Bill Stir Debate, N.J.L.J., June 13, 1991, at 4 (exploring defense
attorneys' and civil libertarians' concerns over a bill which broadens access to juvenile re-
cords); Garry Sturgess, Mandatory Minimum Sentences Under Attack, NJ.L.J., June 13,
1991, at 11 (describing Congress' serious consideration of a layer of mandatory mminmum
sentences for violations of federal drug laws).
5. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991) (holding that inmate lost
the ability to bring a federal habeas corpus petition by failing to appeal in state court);
Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991) (holding that police officers' request to search
a bus passenger's luggage was not inherently coercive but must be viewed under the
"totality of circumstances" test); County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661
(1991) (permitting persons arrested without a warrant to be imprisoned for up to 48 hours
before a hearing to determine whether the arrest was proper); Califorma v. Hodan D., 111
S. Ct 1547 (1991) (holding drugs or evidence discarded by a fleeing suspect admissible
even though police may not have had reasonable suspicion to nitiate the chase);
McClesky v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991) (limiting the availability of successive habeas
corpus petitions); Arizona v. Fulmmante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991) (holding that the use of
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cerated m the United States than m any other industrialized na-
tion.6 Moreover, while most employment sectors are languishing in
the current recession, positions in the law enforcement and security
industries are growing.7
Notwithstanding the devotion of time and resources to the
problem of urban crime, the statistics continue to worsen and the
fear continues to grow One response has been to distribute the
burden of fighting crime among the citizenry From drug testing in
the work place8 to "America's Most Wanted" on television,9
American citizens have become an integral part of the process of
investigating and apprehending criminals."
a coerced confession in a criminal trial does not automatically warrant reversal).
6. U.S. Has Highest Rate of Imprisonment in World, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 7, 1991, at
A14 (specifically noting that the United States' incarceration rate was higher than those of
both South Africa and Soviet Union throughout the last decade); Morganthau, supra note
1, at 36 (reporting that 1.1 million Americans are currently imprisoned, a national mcar-
ceration rate of 426 inmates per 100,000 persons, and claiming that "America is on a
punishment binge"); Koretz, supra note 1, at 20 (noting that, since 1980, the American
prison population has doubled to more than I million and the bill for correctional systems
has tripled to well over $22 billion).
7. Private security and private investigation services are currently "one of the
country's true growth industries." Herb Robinson, Growing Need to Regulate "Rent-A-
Cops', SEATrLE TIMES, Mar. 9, 1990, at A10; see also Caryn E. Wiener, Small Business
Hired Guns; Merchants Turning to Private Security, NEWSDAY, Mar. 18, 1990, at 3
(business opportunities for private security services increasing); Tom Locke, Alarm Indus-
try Called Cable TV Biz of the '90s, 41 DENVER Bus. J., Sept. 10, 1990, § 1, at 1
(number of households with alarm systems growing from 10.5 million in 1988 to an
expected 17.5 million by 1992); Wes Smith, Jeepers Peepers, CHICAGO TRIB., July 17,
1989, at 1 (describing growth of industries specializmg in the installation or detection of
secret monitoring equipment).
8. See Steven 0. Todd, Employee Drug Testing - Issues Facing Private Sector Em-
ployers, 65 N.C. L. REv. 832, 832 (1987) (noting that more than 25% of American For-
tune 500 companies have implemented drug testing programs); Philip Shenon, Some G.L 's
in Gulf Vanquish an Old Foe: Drink or Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1991, at Al (stat-
ing that "[t]he Defense Department requires troops to undergo routine drug tests"); For
New Year, New Laws and Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1991, at A10 (reporting a new
Maryland law wluch permits vocational licensing boards to suspend licensees convicted of
drug violations and to condition retention of business licenses on the implementation of
drug testing or treatment programs).
9. Both the Fox network ("Fox") and the National Broadcast Company ("NBC") air
programs that reenact unsolved crimes and ask viewers to call with information regarding
the crimes. A glitzier television version of post office FBI posters, the Fox program,
"America's Most Wanted," attracts about 14.8 million viewers each week. See Kyle
Chadwick, Schlock that Works; America's Most Wanted, AM. LAW., July/Aug. 1990, at
83-84. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Marshals Service, Drug Enforcement
Administration, U.S. Customs Service and state and local police agencies now routinely
refer unsolved cases to these programs. Id. at 85.
10. See, e.g., Melinda Beck et al., Video Vigilantes, NEWSWEEK, July 22, 1991, at 42,
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While many citizens participate because of their interest in
public service or community involvement, some citizens' involve-
ment is motivated by legal rules that provide strong incentives for
policing others. For example, legal standards that place landlords at
risk of being held liable for failing to adequately control crininal
activity on leased property provide strong incentives for landlords
to become actively involved in the war on crime. Landlords have
been increasingly exposed to liability, both civil and criminal, for
the criminal activities occurring on their properties." This article
will explore that liability under a variety of theories.
Section One discusses the development of tort standards that
increase landlord responsibility for tenant safety These legal stan-
dards have evolved from narrow exceptions, to a general rule of
unmumty, to a broad duty of care. Tius evolution signifies a dra-
matic shift in the landlord's common law tort liability and provides
the foundation for reconceptualizing the landlord's overall respon-
sibility for criminal activities on leased premises.
Section Two explores three legal doctrines that impose a duty
on the landlord not only to protect, but also to police tenants. First,
the focus rests upon a landlord's common law tort duty to protect
tenants from one another. Second, this section discusses the use of
public nuisance statutes as devices for imposing private duties of
crime control.12 Unlike tort nuisance claims, these nuisance stat-
utes may impose either criminal or civil liability on landlords for
tenants' criminal activities. Enforcement of these standards may
force the landlord to surrender control of their property to the state.
Third, tus section addresses the controversial and increasing
44 (discussing citizens' use of video cameras to apprehend crimnals or to publicize crmu-
nal activities); Karen Freifeld, Police, 200 Execs Join to Fight Drugs, NEWSDAY, Feb. 27,
1991, at 46 (announcing the New York City Police Department's new public-private sector
initiative to -increase communication and coordination between the corporate and police
worlds").
11. Notably, public housing regulations have recently been altered to promote eviction
of drug users and sellers from public housing. See Lisa Weil, Current Topics, Drug-Relat-
ed Evictions in Public Housing: Congress' Addiction to a Quick Fix, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y
REv. 161 (1991) (describing recent problems m drug trafficking and abuse m public hous-
ing projects and criticizing past congressional efforts); David B. Bryson and Roberta L.
Youmnans, Crime, Drugs and Subsidized Housing, 24 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 435 (1990)
(surveying proposed strategies for combatting the drug problems m public housing pro-
jects). However, because these regulations apply only to government subsidized housing,
they are not dealt with herein.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 190-246 (summarizing the differences between
private and public nuisance actions m the context of landlord liability).
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use of state and federal forfeiture statutes to hold landlords respon-
sible for tenant conduct. Tins section focusses on the scienter re-
quirements under which landlords may lose their property due to
tenants' illegal conduct. Despite a great deal of scholarly debate
about the constitutionality of these statutes, these provisions, along
with their public nuisance law cousins, are enthusiastically em-
braced by state and local law enforcement agencies.
Section Three posits that these changes in landlord-tenant law
represent a shift from individualist to communalist standards, re-
flecting inherent tensions between fault and responsibility, freedom
and security This section explores the rhetoric of the courts and
legislatures effectuating this ideological shift.
Finally, Section Four evaluates the current standards' probable
effectiveness and overall social utility Specifically, tlus section
questions the underlying assumption that landlords can be induced
to control criminal activity on leased premises by the imposition of
affirmative incentives.
In conclusion, this article rejects the assumption that increased
liability standards provide incentives for increased control by land-
lords. The article finds this assumption to be legally and practi-
cally faulty for several reasons. First, from the landlord's perspec-
tive, the utility of these standards is doubtful. Practical enforcement
methods would encourage landlords to violate other standards de-
signed to protect tenants from discrimination, invasion of privacy
and negligent maintenance. Further, the increased costs of height-
ened regulation is likely to reduce the availability of quality, af-
fordable rental housing.
Second, from legal and societal perspectives, the assumption
that these increased standards provide effective incentives entails
costs in itself. While the new standards may increase the accept-
ability of hidden, private enforcement costs, little evidence suggests
that they will actually decrease crime. Moreover, while these reac-
tive standards create an image of effective crime control, they
distract the commumty from more effective uses of tort, nuisance
and criminal laws in the prevention of crime. 3 While these stan-
13. Some commentators argue that legal standards should be geared toward reinforcing
other aspects of community life. For example, some commentators assert that "crime rates
rise when social controls - the family, the church, the neighborhood, and all the mvisi-
ble bonds of a coherent community - break down "[W]here you find transition,
mobility, rapid social change and a more transient population you also find higher
crime rates.'- Morganthau et al., supra note 1, at 36 (quoting Douglas McDonald, a se-
mor social scientist at Abt Associates, a policy-research and consulting firm located in
1992]
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dards seem to enhance important community involvement, the
growth of community is an organic process which must be facili-
tated through nurturing, not intimidation or threats.
14
I. THE DUTY TO PROTECT TENANTS
In the past thirty years, landlord tort liability has undergone a
drastic metamorphosis. 5 Courts have expanded common law war-
ranty and statutory standards in an effort to improve the quality of
residential housing,'6 particularly low-income housing.'7 As a re-
Cambridge, Massachusetts).
14. There is, of course, considerable disagreement as to whether the law is following
or leading in this regard. On one hand, various courts and commentators reason that the
law rightly follows the legal standards established by modem society. See, e.g., Green v.
Superior Court, 517 P.2d 1168, 1184 (Cal. 1974) (asserting that judges "do not exercise a
novel prerogative, but merely follow the well-established duty of common law courts to
reflect contemporary social values and ethics"); David E. Van Zandt, An Alternative Theo-
ry of Practical Reason in Judicial Decisions, 65 TUL. L. REV. 775 (1991) (arguing that,
in the context of landlord-tenant laws, courts are changing legal rules and shifting risks to
conform to common-sense expectations based on commumty values).
On the other hand, some commentators reason that the law must affirmatively shape
the appropriate community standards. For example, one scholar asserts that the "loss of
social adhesive" and the "breakdown in sources of personal support once provided by
tightly structured communities and extended families" must be recognized by the law.
MARSHALL S. SHAPO, THE DUTY TO ACT: TORT LAW, POWER AND PUBLIC PoucY 70
(1977). Specifically, where "vital personal interests" are involved, the imposition of
"broadly defined duties" would help to counteract "[t]he dislocations of modem life." Id.
at 69-72.
15. See generally Olin L. Browder, The Taming of A Duty - The Tort Liability of
Landlords, 81 MICH. L. REV. 99 (1982) (discussing recent changes in landlord-tenant law
and advocating further extensions into tort law).
16. Since the courts' objective has been to improve the quality of available housing,
the development of tort liability has primarily focused on the residential setting. The allo-
cation of responsibility for maintaining rental property in a commercial setting often dif-
fers significantly from a residential setting. Based on the assumption that market forces
are more suited to allocating burdens in a commercial setting, courts have been reluctant
to interfere in commercial transactions. As a result, many courts apply a lower standard
of security for commercial buildings. See, e.g., Czech v. Aspen Indus. Ctr., 368 A.2d 938,
939 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1976), cert. denied, 372 A.2d 313 (NJ. 1977) (distinguishing com-
mercial from residential premises in terms of fairness and public interest).
Nonetheless, some courts steadfastly apply standards similar to those imposed m the
residential setting, without regard to the differences between residential and commercial
leases. See, e.g., Green Co. v. Divmcenzo, 432 So. 2d 86 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1983);
Rowe v. State Bank of Lombard, 531 N.E.2d 1358 (Ill. 1988); Richmond Medical Supply
Co. v. Clifton, 369 S.E.2d 407 (Va. 1988).
17. Of particular importance to this development was the growth of the implied war-
ranty of habitability doctrine. First developed in Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428
F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970), this doctrine has been adopted
by statute or common law in an overwhelming majority of states. See Pugh v. Holmes,
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suit, in almost every jurisdiction, courts impose on landlords a duty
of care relating to the condition of leased residential premises.
Moreover, the scope of this duty has been expanded from its initial
focus on the physical condition of the premises to its current con-
cern with overall residential safety
Landlord tort liability for the condition of leased premises
represents only a subset of a broader category of premises liability
doctrines.I" The current state of landlord liability is but one point
in a slowly evolving area of law. Early common law bestowed
immunity on landlords for the condition of their premises based on
the rationale that the landlord-tenant relationship was considered to
be one of strangers, 9 a relationship entailing no legal duty of
protection.2"
Imtially, exceptions to this general rule of immumty derived
from the landlord's superior knowledge of or ability to maintain
the premises' structural integrity One exception provides landlord
liability for injuries caused by defects in the common premises.21
405 A.2d 897, 901 n.2 (Pa. 1979), for a comprehensive listing of cases and statutes from
the 40 jurisdictions winch have adopted the doctrine. See also UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LAND-
LORD AND TENANT ACT §§ 1-6.104, 7B U.L.A. 427-508 (1985), which has been adopted
in a number of jurisdictions and winch establishes criteria for placing and maintaining the
premises in a habitable condition.
18. See generally JOSEPH A. PAGE, THE LAW OF PREMIsEs LIABiLrTY 193-253 (2d ed.
1988) (exploring the entire concept of prermses liability and the narrower category of
landlord liability).
19. In the words of the Michigan Supreme Court, -[a] tenant may rent tumble-down
property if he wishes and if it does in fact tumble down during his occupancy, the land-
lord, without more, is not liable." Awad v. McColgan, 98 N.W.2d 571, 573 (Mich. 1959).
Accord Friedman v. Le Noir, 241 P.2d 779 (Ariz. 1952) (noting "it to be generally the
law that in the absence of an agreement to the contrary the lessor is not obligated to
make repairs upon demised premises or to keep them in repair during the term of the
lease"); Divines v. Dickinson, 174 N.W. 8 (Iowa 1919) (recognizing that "[t]he law is
well settled that, in the absence of a covenant or agreement by the landlord to make
repairs or maintain the leased premises in a safe and suitable condition, for the occupancy
and use of the tenant, he is not bound to do so"); Irish v. Rosenbaum Co., 34 A.2d 486
(Pa. 1943) (stating that "[i]t is well settled in this Commonwealth that no implied cove-
nant rises out of the relationship of landlord and tenant winch requires the landlord to
repair"); see also Lawrence H. Eldredge, Landlord's Tort Liability for Disrepair, 84 U.
PA. L. REV. 467 (1936) (discussing the liability of a landlord for injuries caused by a
pre-existing condition on the leased site where the landlord has not agreed to make re-
pairs and where the condition was present at the time the tenant took possession); Ray-
mond H. Harkrider, Tort Liability of a Landlord, 26 MICH. L. REV. 260 (1928) (explain-
mg that landlord-tenant law m 1928 followed the general precepts of caveat emptor).
20. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 375 (5th ed. 1984) (noting the law's consistent refusal to impose a duty to res-
cue).
21. See id at 440.
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A second exception arises if the landlord knows of a latent defect
in the premises but does not disclose or remedy that defect.' A
third exception provides that if a landlord undertakes repairs on the
premises, even within areas exclusively controlled by the tenant,
the landlord may be liable for injuries resulting from negligence in
making the repairs.23
In some jurisdictions, only these categorical exceptions remove
landlord immunity 24 Other jurisdictions take a broader approach,
using general negligence doctrine to allocate risk. Under this ap-
proach, the landlord's liability is determined by balancing the fore-
seeability and reasonableness of the risk of injury against the
ability of the landlord to reduce that risk.25
Tenants have offered a variety of theories to justify landlord
liability in tort for third party criminal activities, including defenses
based on constructive eviction26 and implied warranty of habitabil-
22. See, e.g., Marsh v. Bliss Realty, Inc., 195 A.2d 331 (R.I. 1963) (reciting the well-
settled rule that "the landlord is liable in tort where the proximate cause of the tenant's
mjury arises out of a latent defect which was known to the landlord at the time of the
letting and was not made known by him to the tenant"); Perkins v. Marsh, 37 P.2d 689
(Wash. 1934) (holding that a landlord's failure to disclose that a basement had the ten-
dency to flood constituted fraud and that the landlord had a duty to disclose concealed
defects which are known to the landlord but cannot be discovered by a tenant's examina-
tion of the premises); ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 301-02
n.2 (1984) (noting that nondisclosure of "a known but 'latent' defect that creates an un-
reasonable risk of harm to the tenant might be deemed a species of 'fraud' that would
justify the tenant in 'rescinding or setting aside the lease when he discovers the defect").
23. See generally KEETON et al., supra note 20, at 446 (lessor liable for injuries re-
sulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care when making repairs).
24. See, e.g., Hurt v. Pershing Mobile Home Sales, 404 N.E.2d 842, 844 (Ill. App. Ct.
1980); Broughton v. Maes, 378 N.W.2d 134, 136 (Minn. CL App. 1985); Bellemare v.
Gateway Builders, 420 N.W.2d 733, 740-41 (N.D. 1988); Kobylinski v. Hipps, 519 A.2d
488, 491 (Pa. Super. CL 1986); Humbert v. Sellers, 677 P.2d 760, 761-62 (Or. CL App.
1984), rev'd on other grounds, 708 P.2d 344 (Or. 1985).
25. See Sargent v. Ross, 308 A.2d 528, 534 (N.H. 1973) (As a general rule, "land-
lords as other persons must exercise reasonable care not to subject others to an unreason-
able risk of harm A landlord must act as a reasonable person under all of the cir-
cumstanes including the likelihood of injury to others, the probable seriousness of such
injuries, and the burden of reducing or avoiding the risk." (citations omitted)).
26. See Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Kaminsky, 768 S.W.2d 818, 823 (Tex. Ct. App.
1989) (upholding constructive eviction defense in an action for unpaid rent where landlord
refused to assist physician-tenant in keeping anti-abortion protestors from blocking entrance
to leased clime); but see Fountas v. Ziegler, 305 So. 2d 864 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)
(holding that crimes of violence against a commercial lessee and other crimes in the
neighborhood are beyond the landlord's control and do not constitute a constructive evic-
tion); Creditthrift of America v. Sinclair, 430 So. 2d 822 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (leasing
adjacent premises for operation of a "porno shop" did not warrant lessee's vacation of the
premises prior to the lease's expiration); Sciascia v. Riverpark Apartments, 444 N.E.2d 40,
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27 29ity,2  and claims based on contract?8  and misrepresentation.
42 (Ohio CL App. 1981) (no constructive eviction of tenant victimized by criminal activi-
ty where landlord provides reasonable security measures).
Although generally opposed to the extension of landlord liability for criminal activi-
ties on the premises, I find considerable merit m the constructive eviction defense. In this
context, the tenant essentially argues that some condition over which the landlord retains
control has so interfered with the tenant's use and enjoyment of the property that he is
forced to leave. See CUNNINGHAM et al., supra note 22, at 296-97. "[B]ecause of some
wrongful act or omission by the landlord, the premises [has] become uninhabitable
('untenantable') for the intended purposes. The tenant is not physically evicted or excluded
- but he might as well be." Id. at 296.
This defense becomes critical where the untenable condition consists of a tenant's
victinuzation on the leased premises. Recent studies indicate that victims of violent crime
typically cope with their fear by changing environments. Criminal intrusions and attacks
can produce symptoms akin to post-traumatic stress syndrome which commonly entail
changes in residence. AMERicAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION DIAGNOSTIC STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 248-49 (3d ed. 1987) (discussing the need to avoid
environments and stimuli associated with the traumatic event). For example, most women
suffering from rape trauma syndrome move from the premises at which they were raped.
Ann W. Burgess and Lynda L. Holmstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIA-
TRY 981, 983 (1974) (reporting that a change of residence "in order to ensure safety and
to facilitate the victim's ability to function in a normal style, was very common").
A cost-benefit analysis bears out the reasonableness of permitting such a defense
under these circumstances. In comparison to the substantial costs of tort liability, termna-
tion of tenant-victim leases results only in a loss of rental income, a relatively small cost,
especially where the landlord could have prevented the loss by providing adequate locks
and lighting. See Trice v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 302 N.E.2d 207, 211 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973)
(Hayes, L, concurring) (commenting that the milder economic consequences of allowing
defenses of implied warranty of habitability and constructive eviction make them prefera-
ble vehicles for extending landlord liability for criminal acts of tlurd persons to tort ac-
tions on these grounds).
Moreover, the constructive eviction defense is consistent with equitable cost alloca-
tion. Even if the landlord were not at fault, the tenant may be able to terminate the lease
simply because of the landlord's superior ability to bear the costs. This theory is consis-
tent with the common law supporting a tenant's ability to terminate a lease for similar
reasons, such as when the premises is substantially destroyed or when the tenant, as a
member of the armed services, is forced to relocate. CUNNINGHAM et al., supra note 22,
at 407-08 (1984).
27. See generally Annotation, Landlord's Obligation to Protect Tenant Against Criminal
Activities of Third Persons, 43 A.L.R.3d 331, § 6(c) (Supp. 1991); but see Feld v.
Merriam, 485 A.2d 742, 750 (Pa. 1984) (Zappala, J. concumng) (rejecting a tenant's
assertion of an implied warranty of habitability because the provision of "security servic-
es" is not a "fundamental element[- in distinguishing an uninhabitable structure from a
residence" and because "the remedies available thereunder are mconsistent with the reme-
dies sought in a tort action such as this").
28. See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
29. Compare O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp. Intercoast, 142 Cal. Rptr. 487,
491-92 (Cal. CL App. 1977) (stating valid claim for fraud when landlord knew of past
rapes in apartment complex by an identified assailant but assured prospective tenant of the
apartments' safety without disclosing the prior rapes) with Cooke v. Allstate Management
Corp., 741 F. Supp. 1205, 1216 (D.S.C. 1990) (finding landlord's statement that the apart-
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However, most theories developing the landlord's duty to protect
tenants have arisen in the context of negligence actions.
These tort actions, alleging landlord liability for the criminal
actions of third parties, present several inconsistencies beyond the
obvious challenge to landlord immunity For example, such causes
of action seem inconsistent with the common law doctrine that
there is no duty to rescue or protect another.3"
Moreover, acceptable theories of liability vary from jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction. As a South Carolina District Court noted,
"[t]he wide range of approaches taken by courts in other jurisdic-
tions establishes only that support can be found for practically any
position."3 Indeed, courts within a single jurisdiction may differ
as to the appropriate basis for liability; even appellate courts have
misinterpreted or ignored their own state supreme court's analysis
of the issue.32 Thus, depending on the court and the circumstanc-
es, liability has been both accepted and rejected based upon a
landlord's failure to provide adequate lighting,33  security
services34 and locks.3 5
ment complex is "safe" a statement of opinion inadequate to support a claim for fraud-
ulent misrepresentation).
30. See generally KEETON et al., supra note 20, at 307. Likewise, there is no privilege
to defend another unless there is a legal duty to protect that person. See Gossett v. State,
51 S.E. 394 (Ga. 1905) (parent and child are justified to protect one another but may not
act for the sake of revenge); Frew v. Teagarden, 205 P. 1023, 1025 (Kan. 1922) (self-
defense principle applies where one forcefully resists an assault upon a servant); Sloan v.
Pierce, 85 P 812, 813 (Kan. 1906) (one may use reasonable force to protect family
member); State v. Douglas, 101 S.E. 648, 648 (S.C. 1919) (father and son have nght to
protect one another).
31. Cooke, 741 F Supp. at 1209 n.1 (considenng a tenant's action against her landlord
following an assault by an intruder).
32. For example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a landlord could be liable
only if he/she undertook a "program of security" which was beyond the usual and normal
precautions of a reasonable homeowner, such as lunng guards to patrol the premises. Feld
v. Mernam, 485 A.2d 742, 746-47 (Pa. 1984). Three years later, a Pennsylvania supenor
court held that ordinary locks and lighting constituted such a program of security. Reider
v. Martin, 519 A.2d 507, 510-11 (Pa. Super. 1987).
33. Compare Rowe v. State Bank of Lombard, 531 N.E.2d 1358, 1365 (Ill. 1988) (fur-
nishing outside lighting not assumption of duty to protect) with Frances T. v. Village
Green Owners Assoc., 229 Cal. Rptr. 456 (Cal. 1986) (failure to provide adequate lighting
produces an actionable claim for negligence).
34. Compare Stelloh v. Cottage 83, 201 N.E.2d 672, 673 (Ill. App. CL 1964)
(landlord's provision of private police force cannot be construed as msurng absolute pro-
tection of tenants from cnme) and Goldberg v. Housing Auth. of Newark, 186 A.2d 291
(NJ. 1962) (no duty to provide security guard protection) with Sharp v. W.H. Moore,
Inc., 796 P.2d 506, 508-09 (Idaho 1990) (provision of security guards signals that a duty
of protection has been sufficiently undertaken to present a factual issue of adequacy and
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In sum, a landlord's duty to protect tenants may arise in a
variety of ways. First, some courts have simply extended the ex-
ceptions to landlord mununity to encompass liability for criminal
activities on the premises. The landlord's control of the common
premises or the landlord's voluntary assumption of a duty to pro-
vide security serves as the basis for the landlord's duty Second,
other courts have applied general negligence standards to establish
a duty deemed either inherent to the landlord-tenant relationship or
resulting from factors weighted to amount to special circumstances.
Under tus method, problems of causation and foreseeability com-
monly anse. Tlurd, courts recently have premised liability on local
or state legislation requiring landlords to provide certain security
measures.
A. TRADITIONAL EXCEPTIONS - LIABILITY FOR
DEFECTS IN THE COMMON PREMISES
The seminal case establishing a landlord's tort liability for a
third'party's criminal actions is Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave-
nue Apartment Corp.36 A District of Columbia circuit court per-
mitted a tenant to sue her landlord in tort for injuries sustained
during a criminal assault and robbery in a common hallway 37
Applying the rationale used to invoke landlord liability for injuries
caused by physical defects, 38 the Kline court held that "[t]he duty
to deny summary judgment) and Cross v. Wells Fargo Alarm Serv., 412 N.E.2d 472, 472
(Ill. 1980) (landlord's provision of security guards from 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m. increased
danger to residents after 1:00 a.m. and therefore stated an actionable basis for a claim).
See also Feld, 485 A.2d at 747 (dictum) (landlord has a duty only to insure that security
police act with due care, not to guarantee that their services are adequate to protect ten-
ants).
35. Compare Braitman v. Overlook Terrace Corp., 346 A.2d 76, 84 (N.J. 1975) (tenant
could recover upon proof that landlord "unreasonably enhanced the risk of loss due to
theft by failing to supply adequate locks to safeguard the tenant's premises after suitable
notice of the defect") with Riley v. Marcus, 177 Cal. Rptr. 827, 830 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)
(no general duty to provide secure door locks) and Martin v. Usher, 371 N.E.2d 69, 70
(11. 1977) (no duty to maintain and repair door locks).
36. 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The Kline plaintiff was not the first to advance the
common premises theory as the basis of a landlord's liability for criminal activities, only
the first to succeed. See, e.g., Kobeski v. Judkowitz, 57 Lack. Jur. 37 (Phila. C.P. 1956)
(refusing to impose liability on a landlord for injuries suffered by a tenant during a bur-
glary due to the absence of a common law or statutory duty requiring the landlord to
guard against such injuries).
37. Kline, 439 F.2d at 477.
38. The Kline court noted that "the rationale as applied to predictable criminal acts by
third parties is the same [as that applied to injury due to physical defects]." Id. at 481.
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[of protection] is the landlord's because by his control of the areas
of common use and common danger he is the only party who has
the power to make the necessary repairs or to provide the neces-
sary protection."39 Although the landlord is not an insurer of the
tenants' safety, where he has knowledge of the insufficiency of ex-
isting security measures, he is legally bound "to take those steps
which are within his power to mimmize the predictable risk to Is
tenants." 4 Thus, to be successful, the tenant must prove that the
landlord had both control and knowledge of the defect and that the
defect foreseeably enhanced the risk of criminal activity
Tlus approach to landlord liability has gained widespread
acceptance, even in jurisdictions that allow only the narrowest
exceptions to general landlord immumty For example, Illinois has
repeatedly rejected the proposition that landlords have a duty to
protect tenants from criminal activity 41 Nonetheless, Illinois has
permitted claims based on the landlord's alleged control of com-
mon areas, albeit with a narrow interpretation and strict application
of foreseeability and causation elements.42
Liability for physical defects was established in Levine v. Katz, 407 F.2d 303, 304 (D.C.
Cir. 1968), where the court held that
where a landlord leases separate portions of property to different tenants and
reserves under his own control the halls, stairs, or other parts of the property
for use in common by all tenants, he has a duty to all those on the premises
of legal right to use ordinary care and diligence to maintain the retained parts
in a reasonably safe condition.
39. Kline, 439 F.2d at 481.
40. Id. Here, the court premised liability on the fact that the landlord knew of other
tenants who had previously been criminally assaulted, that the building's security measures
had diminished since the tenant's arrival, and that the areas in need of protection were
exclusively controlled by the landlord. Id.
41. See Shea v. Preservation Chicago, Inc., 565 N.E.2d 20, 23 (Ill. Ct. App. 1991)
(landlord has no general duty to protect tenants from third party criminal attacks); Rowe
v. State Bank of Lombard, 531 N.E.2d 1358, 1367 (Ill. 1988) (landlord-tenant relationship
is not a "special" one imposing a duty to protect against the criminal acts of others).
42. See Morgan v. Dalton Management Co., 454 N.E.2d 57, 61 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)
(recognizmg the landlord's duty but denying liability in this case due to lack of foresee-
ability, voluntary undertaking or special relationship between landlord and tenant); Smith
v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 344 N.E.2d 536, 539-40 (Il. App. Ct. 1976) (denying liability
where the tenant's loss had no physical or causal connection to the premises' condition);
see generally Carrgan v. New World Enter., 446 N.E.2d 265 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)
(providing a thorough survey and analysis of relevant Illinois precedent); Hiram H. Lesar,
Tort Liability of Illinois Landlords for Crimes of Third Persons, 1983 So. ILL. U.LJ. 415
(1983) (discussing the Illinois courts' strict treatment of tort actions against landlords for
criminal activities on the premises).
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In proving a defect m the common premises, plaintiffs have
been most successful when the alleged defect relates to the
perpetrator's access to the building. Conditions such as broken or
missing locks, missing pass keys" and easily accessible lad-
ders45 or fire escapes seem more likely to produce liability
than conditions such as poor lighting47 or defective burglar
alarms.4 Unless these latter conditions occurred in tandem with
accessibility defects or caused the criminal to target the tenant, no
cause of action exists.49
For example, one Illinois appellate court reversed summary
judgment for the landlord in a case where the physical condition of
the prenises facilitated a tenant's murder.5" The adverse condi-
tions supporting potential liability consisted of inoperable exterior
lights, overgrown and concealing weeds, an accessible ladder and
an unlockable apartment window 5 Because the landlord had ex-
clusive control over these conditions which were linked directly to
the intruder's ability to enter the premises, the Illinois court permit-
43. Johnston v. Hams, 198 N.W.2d 409, 411 (Mich. 1972) (allowing tenant to main-
tam an action based on the landlord's failure to provide locks in a vestibule); see also
N.W. v. Amalgamated Trust & Say. Bank, 554 N.E.2d 629 (I1. App. Ct. 1990) (alleging
landlord liability based upon failure to repair apartment building's back door lock); Beck
v. Rossi, 466 N.E.2d 1124 (Il1. App. Ct. 1984) (asserting a cause of action based on
landlord's failure to install and maintain locks on doors used for entry to the premuses).
44. Rowe, 531 N.E.2d at 1368 (holding landlord liable for failing to monitor the pos-
session of a pass key).
45. Cooke v. Allstate Management Corp., 741 F. Supp. 1205 (D.S.C. 1990) (holding
that the physical layout of the premises, in this case a ladder positioned near an apart-
ment, could support a claim of negligence under the "common areas" exception);
Duncavage v. Allen, 497 N.E.2d 433, 437 (ll. App. 1986) (holding landlord liable for
leaving a ladder accessible to unauthorized persons).
46. Aaron v. Havens, 758 S.W.2d 446 (Mo. 1988) (holding that The fire escape is part
of the common premises and subject to the landlord's duty of care).
47. Rowe, 531 N.E.2d at 1365 (refusing to find an assumption of the duty to protect
the tenants against criminal acts simply because it provided inadequate illumination of the
common areas).
48. Carrigan v. New World Enter., 446 N.E.2d 265 (Ill. App. Ct, 1983) (refusing to
base liability on a non-working burglar alarm due to a lack of proximate cause and fore-
seeability).
49. See, e.g., Duncavage v. Allen, 497 N.E.2d 433, 436 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (finding
liability since the perpetrator testified that he chose the tenant's building because of its
dilapidated condition); Stribling v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 340 N.E.2d 47 (Ill. App. Ct.
1975) (liability assessed where landlord negligently failed to seal off hole adjacent to
tenant's apartment through which a series of previous burglars had entered).
50. Duncavage, 497 N.E.2d at 436.
51. Id. at 440.
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ted the claim against the landlord. 2
By contrast, another Illinois appellate court refused to premise
landlord liability solely on a defective burglar alarm. 3  In
Carrigan v. New World Enterprises, the court held that the alarm
was not m the landlord's exclusive control because some action by
the tenant was required to set a properly operative alarm.' More-
over, even if the tenant had set the alarm, there was no indication
that an alarm would have deterred the intruder.55
In addition to requiring the tenant to prove that the defective
condition pertains to access, courts also linut common premises
liability by their reluctance to characterize an absence of higher
than normal security standards as a "defective condition." As a
Califorma court explained, "a landlord's efforts to make his pre-
mises more secure against criminal activity should not be greeted
by a pronouncement that if such efforts are later found to be mad-
equate he will incur a liability which would have been nonexistent
had he done nothing."56 No actionable defective condition exists
where a landlord simply fails to provide greater than customary
security measures. 7
Assuming that an actionable defect can be proven, courts will
still not impose liability unless the criminal activity has taken place
in a common area; that is, in an area over which the landlord
retains a superior ability to control. If the landlord does not have
practical control over an area, then the landlord is not liable.
In Aaron v. Havens, the Missouri Supreme Court considered
the appropriate definition of the "common area" in the context of
several physical aspects of a landlord's premises.58 The tenant as-
serted that the landlord was liable "for personal injuries alleged to
have resulted from a sexual assault by an intruder who had gamed
52. Id.
53. Carrigan v. New World Enter., 446 N.E.2d 265 (111. App. Ct. 1983).
54. Id. at 270 (refusing to speculate whether the tenant would have set the alarm that
night).
55. Id. (noting that no more than mere speculation indicated whether the assailant
would have been "frightened and fled"); see also Tarter v. Schildkraut, 542 N.Y.S.2d 626
(App. Div. 1989) (holding that one layer of locked doors was sufficient since additional
security would not have deterred the lover's quarrel which caused the harm).
56. Riley v. Marcus, 177 Cal. Rptr. 827 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (disallowing a tenant's
claim than an intruder gamed access to her apartment due to a door lock which was of
insufficient quality).
57. Id.
58. 758 S.W.2d 446 (Mo. 1988).
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entry to her apartment through a window adjoining a fire es-
cape."5 9 The tenant specifically alleged that the landlord was neg-
ligent in failing to install a lock on the tenant's apartment window,
in failing to provide a lock for the premises' back fence and in
failing to take precautions to secure the fire escape.6° Applying
traditional premises liability analysis, the Aaron court held that
"[t]he fire escape is part of the common premises under the
landlord's control" and, consequently, reversed the lower court's
dismissal.61 After reaching tlus conclusion, there was no need to
address the remaining two allegations. However, in dicta, the court
suggested that the window lock was not sufficiently within the
landlord's control to provoke liability and that the landlord had no
duty to provide a locked fence.
62
Even if the defect exists in a landlord controlled common
area, courts will not impose liability unless the defect foreseeably
enhances the risk of criminal activity 63 While in some jurisdic-
tions foreseeability provides the basis for the landlord's duty, m
common premises analysis, foreseeability is most often a surrogate
for proximate cause." In this latter context, foreseeability requires
that the landlord have notice of criminal activities on the premises
59. Id. at 446.
60. Id. at 447.
61. Id. at 448.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Largay, 346 So. 2d 393, 395 (Ala. 1977) (holding that
an unlocked cellar door foreseably facilitated a rape so as to produce liability); Paterson
v. Deeb, 472 So. 2d 1210, 1217-20 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1985) (holding that a landlord
will not be liable for a criminal attack unless a failure to provide adequate locks created
a foreseeable risk of crme); Duncavage v. Allen, 497 N.E.2d 433, 437-38 (I1. App. Ct.
1986) (holding that poor or non-existent lighting and a previous burglary made a criminal
assault and murder foreseeable as to make proximate cause a question of law); Trentacost
v. Brussel, 412 A.2d 436, 440-41 (NJ. 1980) (holding that a mugging was- a foreseeable
result of the absence of a lock on the front entrance); see also Kline v. 1500 Massachu-
setts Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (holding landlord liable when
aware of conditions that make possible further crumnal attacks on tenants).
64. As the New Jersey Supreme Court stated, "[t]o establish proximate cause, it is suf-
ficient to show that according to the common experience of mankind the resulting injury
was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the negligent act." McCappm v. Park Capital
Corp., 126 A.2d 51, 52 (NJ. 1956) (citations omitted) (holding landlord liable for placing
the apartment keys in an area easily accessible to the public). See also Duncavage, 497
N.E.2d at 437-38 (holding that a landlord's failure to keep common areas in a reasonably
safe condition may be the proximate cause of a criminal act, if such act was reasonably
foreseeable at the time of the landlord's negligence); Trentacost, 395 A.2d at 544 (holding
that foreseeability is an issue of probability and a question for the jury); Scott v. Watson,
359 A.2d 548, 555-56 (Md. 1976) (providing a general discussion of the proxunate cause
formula).
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that would cause him or her to anticipate specific future risks to
the tenants.65
Furthermore, the tenant must prove that the risk of the actual
crime that caused the harm was foreseeably enhanced by the de-
fect. For example, an Illinois appellate court rejected a tenant's
claim against a landlord who had tied open fire escape doors for
ventilation despite repeated requests that the doors be locked.'
Because there had been no prior crimes on the premises, the court
held that the tenant had provided insufficient facts to prove her
rape was a foreseeable risk from the open door.67
Foreseeability is most easily demonstrated when tenants can
show not only that prior similar crimes had occurred on the pre-
mises, but also that past perpetrators had gained access through the
same means as in the current claim.6" In fact, knowledge that the
defective condition enabled prior crimes can make foreseeable even
subsequent crimes of a different type. Thus, proof that prior in-
truders have gained access to the premises to commit property
crimes can establish the foreseeability of future entrance by mtrud-
ers who may commit violent crimes.6 9
In general, courts applying common premises analysis tend to
impose the strictest standards of foreseeability, relying on analogies
to traditional doctrines of tort liability and strict foreseeability to
limit the further expansion of landlord liability. Notwithstanding
65. See Duncavage, 497 N.E.2d at 438 (stating that "prior incidents similar to the one
complained of and which are connected with the physical condition of the premises may
impose a duty of reasonable care"); Morgan v. Dalton Management Co., 454 N.E.2d 57,
60 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (subsequent assault on tenant not foreseeable to landlord simply
because assailant had threatened victim in the past); Stribling v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 340
N.E.2d 47, 51 (I11. App. Ct. 1975) (prior incidents which are similar to the one com-
plained of and which are connected to the premises' physical condition may impose a
duty of reasonable care on the landlord).
66. Petrauskas v. Wexenthaller Realty Management, Inc., 542 N.E.2d 902 (Il1. App. Ct.
1989) (dismissing the action due to absence of proximate cause).
67. Id. The court also stated that proof of violent crimes in the neighborhood was
insufficient to establish foreseeability. Id.
68. See Duncavage, 497 N.E.2d at 435 (reversing summary judgment in landlord's
favor where the ladder next to the tenant-victim's apartment had been used previously to
burglarize the same apartment through the same unlockable window); Stribling, 340
N.E.2d at 49 (upholding liability where series of previous burglars had gamed entrance
through hole in common wall of an adjacent vacant apartment).
69. Duncavage, 497 N.E.2d at 438 (prior burglary establishes foreseeability of subse-
quent murder in same apartment); Aaron v. Havens, 758 S.W.2d 446, 446-47 (Mo. 1988)
(finding prior burglary sufficient evidence of foreseeability of subsequent rape in same
apartment).
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this strict construction, common premises analysis holds no guaran-
tee of limited liability If a court is inclined to impose liability to
further some policy of risk-spreading, it can almost certainly locate
some structural defect upon which to blame the criminal activity
Conversely, and more commonly the case, courts have the power
to artificially contract landlord liability by narrowly construing the
required elements of defective condition, common area, landlord
control and foreseeability Since the existence of a duty is a
question of law, ample grounds exist for early dismissal of these
cases.
70
Because of this leeway and the difficulties outlined above,
many jurisdictions have rejected the common premises approach as
a clumsy surrogate for weighing underlying policy consider-
ations." As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded, "criminal
acts of a third person belong to a different category and can bear
no analogy to the unfixed radiator, unlighted steps, falling ceiling,
or the other myriad possibilities of one's personal negligence."72
Courts that reject common premises liability may turn to a volun-
tary undertaking theory as the proper basis for imposing liability
B. TRADITIONAL EXCEPTIONS - VOLUNTARY
ASSUMPTION OF DUTY TO PROVIDE SECURITY
Under the voluntary assumption theory, the landlord's duty
derives from an express or implied promise to provide security 73
The Restatement (Second) of Torts states that:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to
render services to another which he should recognize as
necessary for the protection of the other's person or things,
is subject to liability to the other for physical harm result-
mg from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform
his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise such care
increases the risk of such harm, or (b) the harm is suffered
70. See, e.g., Petrauskas, 542 N.E.2d at 907 (holding that the existence of a landlord's
duty to protect is a question of law and that dismissal for failure to state a claim is ap-
propriate).
71. See, e.g., Cooke v. Allstate Management Corp., 741 F. Supp. 1205, 1211-12
(D.S.C. 1990); Feld v. Merriam, 485 A.2d 742, 746 (Pa. 1984); Gulf Reston, Inc. v.
Rogers, 207 S.E.2d 841 (Va. 1974).
72. Feld, 485 A.2d at 745.
73. This theory is similar to the negligent repair theory. See supra note 23.
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because of the other's reliance upon the undertaking.74
Under this theory, the issue is not whether the landlord has a
duty to provide security measures, but whether the landlord has
actually undertaken that duty Voluntary assumption may occur
through actions designed to provide security measures, through oral
statements or promises or through express lease terms. Some juis-
dictions also preserve a distinction between misfeasance and non-
feasance, requiring proof of reliance on the landlord for security
when the tenant is asserting liability based upon an omission to
perform," but not when the tenant is claiming negligent
performance.76
Courts sometimes find that an assumption of duty exists when
a landlord has voluntarily taken actions characterized as security
measures.' However, whether an action can be characterized as a
security measure vanes from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In Illinois,
for example, measures that are typically provided by landlords, but
not distinctively linked to security, do not imply an assumption of
duty Thus, landlords have been excused from liability for defective
entrance doors,78 parking lot gates,79 fire escape doors and hall-
way lights"0 because these structures are common incidents of
leased premises and not characteristically security measures. By
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TOTS § 323 (1977).
75. See, e.g., Nelson v. Umon Wire Rope Corp., 199 N.E.2d 769, 778-80 (Il1. 1964)
(drawing a distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance and holding reliance unnec-
essary to prove the former).
76. See, e.g., Figueroa v. Evangelical Covenant Church, 879 F.2d 1427, 1435 (7th Cir.
1989) (holding landlord liable for improper performance of a voluntary undertaking re-
gardless of actual reliance).
77. Thls theory has also occasioned vicarious liability. See, e.g., Mims v. N.Y. Life
Ins. Co., 273 N.E.2d 186, 187 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971) (finding landlord liable for burglary
facilitated by the landlord's agent's negligence in leaving a tenant's door open after re-
specting the apartment).
78. See, e.g., N.W v. Amalgamated Trust & Say. Bank, 554 N.E.2d 629, 635 (1.
App. Ct. 1990) (holding "that door locks are commonplace and furnished by virtually
every landlord [and] conclud[ing] that a promise to maintain door locks in working
condition does not rise to a voluntary undertaking to protect tenants from criminal activi-
ty").
79. See, e.g., B.C. v. J.C. Penney Co., 562 N.E.2d 533, 540 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)
(holding that gate to shopping mall parking lot under construction was not a security
measure undertaken for plaintiff's benefit).
80. Petrauskas v. Wexenthaller Realty Management, Inc., 542 N.E.2d 902, 908 (Ill.
App. CL 1989) (concluding that housing code sections requmng fire escape doors and
hallway lights are intended to promote the building's structural soundness, not to evidence
a landlord's assumption of risk).
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contrast, a voluntary assumption of duty has been successfully
premised upon the landlord's installation of interior security doors
and safety locks.8"
Similarly, in Pennsylvama, the assumption of duty theory was
originally limited by that state's supreme court to apply only to
those situations in which a landlord provides unique or extraordi-
nary security measures.8 2 However, within two years of its impo-
sition, this limitation was interpreted by a state appellate court to
encompass ordinary locks and lighting. 3
Other courts have analyzed assumption of duty by weighing the
economc consequences of imposing more stringent security mea-
sures."a Ttus factor has generally been decisive in cases involving
large expanses of land where increased security measures would be
especially costly 85
In addition to the actual provision of security measures, a
landlord may assume a duty to provide security by malang state-
ments or promises that induce the tenant's reliance on the
81. See, e.g., Shea v. Preservation Chicago, Inc., 565 N.E.2d 20, 20 (ill. App. CL.
1990) (permitting case based on landlord's failure to maintain interior door lock); Nails v.
Blank, 571 N.E.2d 1321 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that provision of locking interior
doors raised a question of fact as to whether the landlord had assumed a duty to provide
security). But see Carrigan v. New World Enter., 446 N.E.2d 265, 273 (Ill. App. CL.
1983) (finding no liability based upon installation of burglar alarm since this provision
does not constitute a promise to protect tenant), Cf. Morgan v. 253 East Delaware Con-
dommium Ass'n, No. 1-90-0472, 1992 III. App. LEXIS 769 (l1, App. Ct. May 18, 1992)
(provision of doorman to screen visitors did not imply a duty to provide a security force
to protect tenants from visitors who had been properly screened).
82. Feld v. Mernam, 485 A.2d 742, 746-47 (Pa. 1984) (holding that the provision of
one security guard subjects the landlord to a duty of care equal to the amount of protec-
tion one guard could reasonably be expected to provide).
83. Reider v. Martin, 519 A.2d 507, 510-11 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (construing the "se-
curity program" described in Fel to include front door locks).
84. See, e.g., Graham v. M & J Corp., 424 A.2d 103, 110 (D.C. Ct. App. 1980)
(acknowledging "the economic burden which liability wold impose on the defendant as an
important factor"); Aaron v. Havens, 758 S.W.2d 446, 448-49 (Mo. 1988) (stating that the
jury may consider economic factors in ascertaining landlord liability and use of ordinary
care); Lay v. Dworman, 732 P.2d 455, 457 (Okla. 1986) (listing "the economic conse-
quences of the imposition of [a] duty" as an appropriate factor for consideration).
85. See, e.g., Figueroa v. Evangelical Covenant Church, 879 F.2d 1427, 1436 n.10 (7th
Cir. 1989) (holding that the availability of resources may affect the extent of a duty of
protection placed upon a University for campus and parking lot safety); Rabel v. Illinois
Wesleyan Umv., 514 N.E.2d 552, 560-61 (Il11 App. Ct. 1987) (holding that "the magm-
tude of guarding against [harm from a fraternity party] and the consequences of placing
the burden on the defendant" prevented the extension of a duty to protect). Cf. Taylor v.
Hocker, 428 N.E.2d 662, 666 (ill. App. Ct. 1981) (holding that the imposition of a duty
to protect shopping mall patrons from assault in the parking lot was too great a burden
to place on mall owners).
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landlord's provision of particular security measures. For example,
m Reider v. Martin, a tenant was robbed and raped outside her
apartment in a common stairway 86 Although the landlord had not
implemented an official secunty policy, the Reider court held that
the landlord's repeated prormses to remedy faulty locks had fos-
tered reliance by the tenant and, therefore, had established an as-
sumed duty to provide security 1
7
A landlord's duty to secure the premises may also be based on
express lease provisions reasonably related to security8 8  In
Blaustein v. Gilbert-Dallas Co., a tenant was raped by an unknown
party who gained access to her apartment with a key 9 A Texas
Court of Appeals reversed summary judgment for the landlord on
the basis of a lease provision requiring the landlord to change
locks upon request. The appellate court held that this provision
created an assumption of the burden of providing security sufficient
to establish a duty actionable in tort.91
Clearly, foreseeability plays a central role under each variation
of voluntary assumption. Plaintiffs have urged courts to impose
liability if "the landlord's actions materially increase the risk of
criminal activity although there have been no prior, similar criminal
86. 519 A.2d 507 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
87. Id. (reversing the trial court's dismissal and remanding for further proceedings).
88. Tis approach may also serve as the basis for breach of contract claims. However,
contract actions are brought less frequently than tort actions due to the fact that there is
generally insufficient evidence of a contractual duty to provide security. Moreover, even
where a contractual duty exists, damages in contract actions are limited to economic loss-
es, such as to compensate property damage or personal injury, to the exclusion of parn
and suffering or punitive damage awards. Joseph A. Page, Selecting the Remedy, 3 AM.
JUR. TRIALs 637, 662-63 (1965).
Nonetheless, there are some advantages to a contract approach. For one, contract
theory may provide a method by which to avoid the tort doctrine's narrow restriction of
landlord liability for criminal activities. For example, in Richmond Medical Supply Co. v.
Clifton, 369 S.E.2d 407 (Va. 1988), a commercial tenant sued its lessor for failure to
replace a defective exterior door through which burglars had successfully gained entrance.
The trial court dismissed the claim based on tort cases rejecting a landlord's duty to pro-
vide security. Id. at 409. The Virginia Supreme Court, however, reversed and remanded,
stating that tort doctrines did not apply to a case based on an express contract. Id. While
foreseeability is a prima facie element of tort claims, in contract actions it serves merely
to limit consequential damages. Id. If criminal activity was a reasonably foreseeable conse-
quence of the breach of a contractual duty, the plaintiff may recover for property losses.
Id.
89. 749 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 634.
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attacks on the premises."' However, tis assertion has been un-
successful.93 Instead, courts either require a "prior incident" notice
similar to that required by the structural defect cases or accept a
broad inference of notice from the volatile nature of the surround-
ig neighborhood.'
The voluntary assumption theory has been criticized for creat-
ing disincentives to provide security measures.95 Ordinarily, eco-
nonuc incentives would encourage a landlord to repair structural
defects to preserve his investment in the premises. However, these
incentives are minimized or removed when the improvements also
increase the landlord's potential liability to tenants. Moreover, the
voluntary assumption theory serves to create an appearance of
greater protection for tenants least likely to live in high crime areas
since the types of housing in which "extraordinary" security pro-
grams tend to appear would be higher income properties.
Despite these problems, courts seem more willing to assess
liability on this basis. One reason for this may be the theory's
foundation upon the landlord's choice to provide some security
measures, making the imposition of liability appear to be premised
more on fault than on risk spreading. Moreover, to the extent it is
drawn from traditional categories of landlord tort liability, tis
doctrine reflects a relatively comfortable extension of common law
rules.
C. STATUTORY SECURITY DUTIES
Courts are even more comfortable extending landlord liability
92. Shea v. Preservation Chicago, Inc., 565 N.E.2d 20, 23 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
93. Id. at 24. Instead, the Shea court adopted a case-by-case inquiry to determine
whether the landlord has assumed a duty to protect tenants from reasonably foreseeable
results. Id.
94. Riley v. Marcus, 177 Cal. Rptr. 827, 830 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that the
mere provision of secure locks and lighting was not sufficient, in and of itself, to indicate
foreseeability of future crime); Small v. McKennan Hosp., 437 N.W.2d 194, 201 (S.D.
1989) (noting that violent criminal activity can be foreseeable simply upon common
experience").
95. Iromcally, in assessing the necessity of proving notice of pnor criminal activities as
an element of liability based upon the voluntary provision of security measures, an Illinois
court discredited the element, stating that such a requirement "has the effect of discour-
aging landowners from taking adequate measures to protect premises which they know are
dangerous." Shea, 565 N.E.2d at 25 (quoting Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 695
P.2d 653 (Cal. 1985)). The irony lies m the fact that the theory of undertaking to provide
security measures has been the only consistent basis upon which a duty has been pre-
mised in Illinois.
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based on an express contractual promise or statutory duty Some
states have enacted, or have authorized municipalities to enact,
legislation that imposes on landlords an explicit duty to provide
security Exemplifying many such enactments, the Uniform Resi-
dential Landlord Tenant Act expressly requires landlords to provide
clean and safe housing conditions." Violations of these statutes
may serve as the basis for a claim of negligence.97
Some courts have interpreted state landlord-tenant legislation to
apply only to "failures of the building - [such as] collapsing
stairs, faulty walls, [and] dangerous windows. ' 5 However, m Pat-
erson v. Deeb, a Florida district court applied its state's legislation
to establish a landlord's duty to provide security 99 In that case, a
tenant had been sexually assaulted in her apartment building which,
at the time of the attack, had a defective front door lock and a
missing back door lock. oe The landlord's liability was premised
upon a Florida statute that required leased property to be secured
with locks and common areas to be maintained in a "safe condi-
tion.""0' Although Florida courts had not routinely imposed a tort
duty on landlords to provide for tenant safety, the Paterson court
96. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD TENANT ACT § 2.104(a)(3), 7B U.L.A. 460 (1991).
97. See, e.g., Braitman v. Overlook Terrace Corp., 346 A.2d 76, 85 (N.J. 1975) (noting
that the landlord's liability for burglary could alternatively be based upon the New Jersey
Tenement House Act which specifically requires dead bolt door locks) (citing NJ.A.C.
§§ 5:10-6.6(d)(7)).
98. Deem v. Charles E. Smith Management, Inc., 799 F.2d 944, 946 (4th Cir. 1986).
See also Williams v. William J. Davis, Inc., 275 A.2d 231, 232 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (stating
that "[t]he terms 'safe' and *safety' when used in the regulations refer to safety from
structural defects, unsamtary conditions, fire hazards and the like"); Cooke v. Allstate
Management Corp., 741 F Supp. 1205 (D.S.C. 1990) (citing Deem and holding that the
fit and habitable requirement does not extend to protection from criminal activities);
Pippen v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 399 N.E.2d 596, 599 (Ill. 1979) (noting that "the phrase
'decent, safe and sanitary dwellings' refers exclusively to the physical condition of
the premises"); De Koven v. 780 West End Realty Co., 266 N.Y.S.2d 463, 467 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. 1965) (holding that, under the statute, conditions "dangerous to life, health or
safety [include] are lack of heat, of running water, of light, of electricity, of adequate
sewage disposal facilities, or an infestation by rodents"); Mengel v. Rosen, 735 P.2d 560,
562 (Okla. 1987) (explaining that "such words as 'safe, 'fit' and 'habitable' as used
within the context of such statutes refer exclusively to the physical condition of the
premises"); see generally Annotation, Landlord's Obligation to Protect Tenant Against
Criminal Activities of Third Persons, 43 A.L.R.3d 331, § 5(a) (1972) (discussing statutory
and regulatory bases for the landlord's duty to maintain safe premises).
99. Paterson v. Deeb, 472 So. 2d 1210, 1217 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 1985), review denied, 484
So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1986) (construing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.51 (West 1987 & Supp. 1991)).
100. Id.
101. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 83.51(2)(a) (2) & (3)).
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held that such a duty logically followed from the express language
of the statute."° Moreover, the court held that the statute elin-
nated the requirement of foreseeability, reasoning that it was "not
willing to sacrifice the first victim's right to safety upon the
altar of foreseeability by slavishly adhering to the now-discredited
notion that at least one criminal assault must have occurred."'0 3
Similarly, in Brock v. Watts Realty Co., the Alabama Supreme
Court applied a municipal ordinance to validate a claim for
wrongful death against a landlord.1 4 The attacker had gamed en-
trance to the tenant's apartment through a back door with a defec-
tive lock.t05 Although the defect had been reported, the landlord
had yet to undertake repairs."° Based on a provision of the Bir-
mingham Housing Code requiring locks on all exterior doors and
windows, the Alabama Supreme Court found that the landlord had
a duty to provide security 107
The landlord argued that his duty ended with the provision of
102. Id. at 1218-19.
103. Id. (citing Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 695 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1985)).
While other courts have sympatluzed with the inappropriateness of a narrow foresee-
ability rule, they have not followed Florida in eliminating the requirement altogether. See
Trentacost v. Brussel, 412 A.2d 436, 444 (N.J. 1980) (focussing on the foresight of a
reasonably prudent person and holding that violation of administrative regulation is "avail-
able as evidence for determining the duty owed"); Nixon v. Mr. Property Management
Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 551 (Crex. 1985) (reciting that -[it] is not required that the particu-
lar accident complained of should have been foreseen[,only] that the injury be of
such a general character as might reasonably have been anticipated" (citations and empha-
sis omitted)).
104. Brock v. Watts Realty Co., 582 So. 2d 438, 441-42 (Ala. 1991), reh'g denied,
1991 Ala. LEXIS 563. Cf. Klingbeil Management Group Co. v. Vito, 357 S.E.2d 200,
203 (Va. 1987) (holding a local ordinance requiring dead bolt locks preempted by a state
law requiring tenants to submit a written request and a fee before the installation of such
locks was required).
105. Brock, 582 So. 2d at 439.
106. Id.
107. Id. The court relied upon the following ordinances:
Sec. 7-1-93 Windows, exterior doors, etc.
Every window, exterior door and basement hatchway shall be
reasonably weather tight, watertight and rodent proof and shall be kept
in sound working condition and good repair. Locks shall be provided on
all exterior doors and all exterior openable windows.
Sec. 7-1-97 Construction, maintenane, etc., generally, of facilities, etc.
Every facility, piece of equipment or utility which is required
under this article shall be so constructed or installed that it will function
safely and effectively and shall be maintained in satisfactory working
condition.
Id. at 439 (emphasis added by the court).
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operational locks at the beginning of the lease term, and that there-
after, pursuant to the lease, the responsibility for the locks' repair
rested on the tenant.'O° The Brock court rejected this argument,
noting that the lease also required the landlord's prior permission
for all repairs."° Importantly, the court specifically reserved judg-
ment on the issue of whether a broader lease term could effectively
shift the responsibility for complying with the municipal ordinance
onto the tenant.110
Although few in number, these statutory duty cases may mdi-
cate a growing trend of legislative direction in the security of
leased premises. While statutory requirements provide explicit,
predictable security standards tailored to the particular community,
they fail to adequately protect the landlord. Because these statutes
require only minimal measures - adequate door locks, for exam-
ple - the landlord cannot be assured that compliance with the
statute will protect him from liability Unless a jurisdiction were to
enact comprehensive legislation, explicitly delineating landlord
security duties, landlords still face the difficulty of predicting the
extent of their liability under general negligence standards, the
theory of liability imposed in most jurisdictions.
D. GENERAL NEGLIGENCE STANDARDS
Rather than applying traditional exceptions or relying on statu-
tory or contractual duties, most courts analyze landlord liability for
third party criminal activities under doctrines of general negligence.
Under this approach, there are two situations in which a landlord
may have a duty to protect tenants against criminal acts: (1) when
there is a "special relationship" between the landlord and tenant,
and (2) when there are "special circumstances" by which the
landlord's act or omission exposes the tenant to an unreasonable
risk of crime. Both approaches pose an exception to the general
rule that there is no duty to warn or to protect others from danger.
Foreseeability is the key to liability under both approaches,
with a few subtle differences. In jurisdictions applying the "special
relationship" theory, a landlord presumptively has a duty to protect
tenants against unreasonable risks of crime."' Foreseeability evi-
108. Id. at 441.
109. Id. (remanding on the issue of causation).
110. Id.
111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302B cmt. e (1965).
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dence serves to prove proximate cause. Since proximate cause is a
question of fact, logically, more actions brought under this theory
will reach a jury
By contrast, jurisdictions requiring "special circumstances" do
not entertain a presumption of a duty to protect tenants. 112 Fore-
seeability is the basis both for imposing the landlord's duty and for
establishing proximate cause. Since duty is a question of law,
foreseeability is weighed solely by the judge, usually at a prelimi-
nary stage of the case. As a result, under the "special circumstanc-
es" approach, more cases are likely to be dismissed prior to a full
adjudication. Because courts are concerned with the effect of their
decisions on norm articulation, they are more likely to apply strict-
er standards of foreseeability in establishing a duty than are juries,
which consider foreseeability as a matter of proximate cause and
are primarily motivated by individualized justice.
Thus far, courts have defined "special relationships" to include
innkeeper-guest, common carrer-passenger, school-student and
sometimes employer-employee." 3 Until very recently, most juris-
dictions failed to include the landlord-tenant relationship as a "spe-
cial relationship" that would invoke a duty to protect." 4 Nonethe-
less, an increasing minority of jurisdictions are now moving toward
recogmtion of the residential landlord-tenant relationship as one
which is categorically analogous to the innkeeper-guest relation-
ship. 115
112. See, e.g., Faheen v. City Parking Corp., 734 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Mo. Ct. App.
1987).
113. The landlord may also be liable as a result of his or her relationship with the
wrongdoer. See, e.g., Kendall v. Gore Properties, Inc., 236 F.2d 673, 678 (D.C. App.
1956) (holding landlord liable for failing to conduct a pre-employment check of
employee's character prior to giving him access to a young woman's apartment);
Henderson v. Nolting First Mortgage Corp., 193 S.E. 347, 354 (Ga. 1937) (holding land-
lord liable for assault on tenant's guest by a janitor who had been negligently hired);
Zerder v. Frman Holding Co., 274 N.Y.S. 588, 589 (1934) (holding landlord liable for
negligence in selecting a dishonest employee to paint tenant's apartment); LaLone v.
Smith, 234 P.2d 893, 897 (Wash. 1951) (holding landlord liable for assault by janitor
whose violent character was known to the landlord prior to making the decision to hire).
114. See, e.g., Morgan v. Dalton, 454 N.E.2d 57 (111. App. Ct. 1983); Scott v. Watson,
359 A.2d 548, 552 (Md. 1976); Feld v. Memam, 485 A.2d 742, 747 (Pa. 1984); Gulf
Reston Inc. v. Rogers, 207 S.E.2d 841, 844 (Va. 1974).
115. See, e.g., Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 483
(D.C. Cir. 1970); O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp. Intercoast Management, 142 Cal.
Rptr. 487, 490 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); Kargul v. Sandpiper Dunes Ltd. Partnership, 1991
Conn. Super. LEXIS 203 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 1991); Smith v. General Apartment
Co., 213 S.E.2d 74, 77 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975); Stephens v. Steams, 258 678 P.2d 41, 50
(Idaho 1984); Samson v. Saginaw Professional Bldg,, Inc., 224 N.W.2d 843 (Mich. 1975);
1992]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
However, it is difficult to characterize with certainty the ap-
proach of many jurisdictions since many decisions base liability not
solely on general negligence theory, but on alternative grounds
such as voluntary assumption or policy considerations as well.
11 6
The underlying basis for the special relationship approach is
the landlord's superior position to perceive and prevent risks of
criminal conduct. Thus, in assessing whether the relationship gives
rise to a duty, courts must first decide whether the landlord was in
fact in such a superior position.11 7 In making this assessment, the
courts' analysis resembles the general negligence approach.
Under a negligence approach, the landlord's duty to protect
depends upon the outcome of a case-by-case balancing of the prob-
ability and severity of harm against the costs of avoidance. By law,
this balance rests, in large part, on the following factors:
[The] foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of
the connection between the defendant's conduct and the
injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's
conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of
the burden to the defendant and consequences to the com-
munity of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting
liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and preva-
lence of insurance for the risk rnvolved.118
Foreseeability, the crucial factor in this balance, requires that the
landlord have notice both of the risk of crime and of a condition
of the premises that would enhance that risk."1 9
Logically, some conditions are more likely to enhance risk
foreseeably than others.
Trentacost v. Brussel, 412 A.2d 436, 440 (N.J. 1980); Sherman v. Concourse Realty
Corp., 365 N.Y.S.2d 239, 245 (App. Div. 1975); Tedder v. Raskin, 728 S.W.2d 343, 347
(Tenn. App. Ct. 1987).
116. See, e.g., Sharp v. W.H. Moore, Inc., 796 P.2d 506, 509 (Idaho 1990) (discussing
a relationship but basing liability on assumption of duty).
117. See Faheen v. City Parking Corp., 734 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
118. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968) (reversing summary judgment
m tenant's favor in action by guest injured on a broken faucet (multiple supporting cita-
tions omitted)).
119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 448 (1965) (stating that a third party's cnnu-
nal act sever's liability "unless the actor at the time of his negligent conduct realized or
should have realized that such a situation might be created, and that a third person might
avail himself of the opportunity to commit such a tort or crime").
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Such simple measures as providing adequate lighting in
hallways and locks on outside entrances are peculiarly
witlun the landlord's capability and could substantially
reduce the risk of harm to his tenants. Under these circum-
stances, to hold the landlord unaccountable for injuries
proximately caused by the condition of the common areas
would be unconscionable.
120
However, even though prior criminal acts need not be proven, the
landlord must at least have had notice of an overall lugh risk of
crime in the premises' neighborhood.12 ' The required degree of
specificity of such notice lessens as the connection between the
general nature of the criminal activity and the landlord's specific
act or omission increases and as the burden of imposing the duty
of protection decreases.'
Thus, where the landlord knows of identifiable third persons
who may present specific dangers to tenants, but does not issue
warnings to the tenants, he may be liable for resulting injuries. For
example, in a California case, a landlord who had been supplied
composite drawings of an area rapist failed to disclose that infor-
mation to a prospective tenant, but instead reassured her that the
premises were safe and well-patrolled. 23 The tenant was later
raped in her apartment by the attacker identified in the composite
drawing. 24 The California court of appeals held that the tenant
120. Tedder v. Raskin, 728 S.W.2d 343, 348 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (affinuing directed
verdict m landlord's favor in an action by a tenant who was struck by a bullet which
came through the wall of a neighboring apartment); see also Johnston v. Hams, 198
N.W.2d 409 (Mich. 1972) (holding landlord liable for assault and robbery of elderly ten-
ant in dimly-lit, unlocked vestibule); Trentacost v. Brussel, 395 A.2d 540 (N.J. Super. CL
App. Div. 1978), aft'd, 412 A.2d 436 (N.J. 1980) (holding landlord liable for tenant
mugged in hallway of unlocked apartment building).
121. Riley v. Marcus, 177 Cal. Rptr. 827, 830 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (finding that tenant
raped in apartment did not state a claim based on inadequate lighting and locks where
landlord was unaware of the level of criminal activity in the neighborhood).
122. 7735 Hollywood Blvd. Venture v. Superior Court, 172 Cal. Rptr. 528 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1981) (holding a burned out hallway light bulb insufficient to establish duty to pro-
tect tenant against rapist despite landlord's knowledge of burglary and rape in the general
area); see generally Kwaitkowski v. Superior Trading Co., 176 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1981) (summarizing California cases raising the foreseeability issue); FOWLER V
HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., 2 THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.2, at 1026 (1956).
123. O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp. Intercoast Management, 142 Cal. Rptr. 487
(Cal. CL App. 1977).
124. Id.
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had stated a claim for tort liability, fraud and deceit."2
Moreover, liability may attach where the landlord did not know
the potential assailant's identity but knew that there had recently
been frequent occurrences of violent crimes on the premises. This
situation is known as the "violent crimes exception." 126 In some
jurisdictions, tius exception has been applied sparingly The fact
"that the premises is located in a high crime area where criminal
conduct would be more foreseeable than in some other area [has
been deemed] 'insufficient special facts' to create a duty ,127 In
these jurisdictions, the prior incidents of violent crime must be on
the premises itself and sufficiently numerous and recent to put the
landlord on notice, either actual or constructive, that there is a
probable danger to the tenants.1 2' Furthermore, the past incidents
must also be sufficiently similar to the incident for which liability
is asserted that a reasonable landlord would have taken precautions
to protect tenants against that type of harm.1 29
Nonetheless, the majority of courts have rejected the proposi-
tion that the landlord must have been aware of prior incidents that
closely match the crime committed against the plaintiff in type and
means of commission.'" °  As a California court commented,
"[w]hat is required to be foreseeable is the general character of the
125. Id. The court also held that punitive damages were an available remedy. Id.
126. See, e.g., Faheen v. City Parking Corp., 734 S.W.2d 270, 273-74 (Mo. CL App.
1987) (concluding that violent cnmes exception is a viable legal theory but affirming
dismissal due to a specific lack of foreseeability).
127. Faheen, 734 S.W.2d at 273 (citation omitted); Irby v. St. Louis County Cab Co.,
560 S.W.2d 392, 395 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) ("The allegation of a 'high crime area does
not ipso facto mandate [a] duty [of care].").
128. Faheen, 734 S.W.2d at 272.
129. Id. at 273-74.
130. Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 695 P.2d 653, 658-59 (Cal. 1985) (cnticizing
prior similar incidents rule and adopting balancing approach to foreseeability); Sharp v.
W.H. Moore, Inc., 796 P.2d 506, 510 (Idaho 1990) (stating that "[t]he 'prior similar
incidents' requirement is not only too demanding, it violates the cardinal negligence prin-
ciple that only the general risk of harm need be foreseen, not the specific mechanusm of
injury"); Sharpe v. Peter Pan Bus Lines, 519 N.E.2d 1341 (Mass. 1988) (holding that a
patron's being, stabbed was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of a bus company's
failure to provide security); Small v. McKennan Hosp., 437 N.W.2d 194 (S.D. 1989)
(analyzing facts under "totality of circumstances" test instead of allowing lack of prior
similar incidents to be dispositive).
The reasoning underlying the courts' disregard of the smmilarity requirement closely
parallels that applied to reject the "one free bite" rule. See Isaacs, 695 P.2d at 658 (rea-
soning that "surely a landowner should not get one free assault before he can be held
liable for criminal acts which occur on his property"); Sharp, 796 P.2d at 510 (stating
that "[t]here is no 'one free rape' rule in Idaho").
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event or harm, not its precise -nature or manner of occur-
rence."13' Thus, in a majority of jurisdictions, any crimes on the
premises, in sufficient number and degree, may provide notice of
future criminal activity sufficient to provoke liability
Some jurisdictions characterize knowledge in an even less
precise manner, going so far as to allow constructive notice of the
propensity for crime in the surrounding area to serve as a substi-
tute for the more particular foreseeability discussed above. Liability
has been assessed even though there have been no prior serious
crimes on the leased premises, but merely because of a high rate
of crime in the neighborhood. 32
Given this wide variance of approaches and range of relevant
factors, the chance of judicially resolving a case at a preliminary
stage is very slight and the difficulty of accurately predicting the
liability risks is very high.
E. THE LANDLORD'S DUTY TO PROTECT TENANTS:
IN GENERAL
Cumulatively, these tort cases, holding a landlord liable for a
third party's criminal actions against tenants, represent a shift of
the public policing responsibility to landlords.33  However, the
duty imposed is not a responsibility to control the conduct of the
third party; rather, it is a responsibility to provide or maintain the
leased premises so as to reduce the third party's ability to commit
crime thereon. In other words, it is a duty of crime prevention.
Studies of crime prevention techmques indicate that a structural
condition can "invite" crime at a particular location." One com-
131. Wylie v. Gresch, 236 Cal. Rptr. 552, 556 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (citing Isaacs, 695
P.2d at 659, quoting Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 665 P.2d 947 (Cal. 1983)).
132. See Johnston v. Hams, 198 N.W.2d 409 (Mich. 1972) (holding that actionable neg-
ligence may lie against landlord who provided inadequate lighting and unlocked doors for
a building in a high crime district); Trentacost v. Brussel, 412 A.2d 436 (N.J. 1980)
(finding a mugging the foreseeable consequence of a landlord's failure to provide front
lock on building where ample evidence existed of criminal activity in the neighborhood
and of landlord's knowledge of an attempted theft within the building); Skana v. State,
442 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1981) (finding that landlord knew or should have known from the
building's location in a high crime area that tenants were susceptible to injury from out-
siders).
133. See Johnston, 198 N.W.2d at 411-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the exten-
sien of tort liability as an aspect of the trend of "intrusion of private industry into the
business of public safety").
134. Madeline Johnson, Landlord's Responsibility for Crime: Determining Legal Causa-
tion, 17 REAL ESTATE L.J. 234, 238-41 (1989) (reviewing the literature on situational
707IMy]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
mentator has identified several crime prevention approaches rele-
vant to a landlord's duty to provide security 133 For instance, the
landlord can increase visibility of crime by providing lighting or
security patrols or he can decrease vulnerability to crime by pro-
viding locks or security doors." s
These techniques are related primarily to the physical condition
of the premises, an area for which responsibility has traditionally
been allocated to the landlord. Thus, the change brought about by
these cases is not in the nature of the duty, i.e., control and main-
tenance of the physical structure, but in the purpose of the duty,
i.e., reduction of the opportuity for crime rather than of the risk
of injury from the structural premises. However, establishing the
broader principle - that a landlord can be responsible for crinmal
activities on leased premises - has opened the door to an exten-
sion of the landlord's duty far beyond control and maintenance of
the physical premises to direct control of the conduct of others.
II. FROM A DUTY TO PROTECT TENANTS TO A DUTY
TO POLICE TENANTS
A landlord may be liable for the criminal activities of tenants
under several doctrines. First, as discussed above, landlords have
been liable if the condition of the premises contributed to the
crime or if the landlord failed to disclose information concerning
risks of crime. As a result, landlords may be held responsible for a
tenant's behavior if it endangers another tenant.
Second, a landlord may be liable for a tenant's conduct based
on public nuisance doctrines. This doctrine may oblige a landlord
to compensate the victims of a tenant's illegal activities if those
activities interfere with the neighbor's use and enjoyment of his
property In addition, public nuisance doctrines provide equitable
remedies such as orders to evict tenants, injunctions against certain
uses, and closure of property for up to one year. In the enforce-
ment of these equitable remedies, landlords may be liable for fines
or even imprisonment for civil or criminal contempt.
Third, recent legislation provides for forfeiture of property
crime prevention and concluding that -the decision [whether] to commit a crime is usually
not related to opportunity; [but that] the decision regarding where to commit the crime
may be related to opportunity').
135. Id. at 238.
136. Id. at 239
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connected with illegal activities. A landlord is at risk to lose Ins
property interest entirely due to a tenant's illegal activity on the
premises. The landlord's risk rests primarily on the civil rather than
criminal versions of these statutes, though both apply While pro-
tection for innocent owners are built into these statues, the defim-
tion of "innocence" as applied to a landlord is subject to interpreta-
tion and is certainly narrower than a criminal law standard of
innocence. This section will explore the standards and application
of each of these doctrines.
A. TORT DUTIES TO POLICE THE CONDUCT
OF TENANTS
Courts have uniformly rejected crime victims' tort claims based
on a landlord's duty to provide secure premises when neither the
criminal nor the victim have a relationship with the landlord."17
However, when the criminal activity originates with a tenant, plain-
tiffs have argued that liability should be premised on theories simi-
lar to those underlying the landlord's duty to protect tenants from
third party crime.'38
One theory consistently, though unsuccessfully, advanced by
plaintiffs in these cases analogizes the landlord's duty to that im-
posed under the structural defects analysis. For example, in Muniz
v. Flohern, Inc., a pedestrian on a public sidewalk outside a store
was shot by a bullet that originated from inside the building during
a robbery attempt.'39 The victim claimed that the landlord knew
the tenant was conducting a drug business and thereby had a duty
to stop the activity The appellate court reversed summary judg-
ment for the landlord and remanded for trial. The court, relying on
cases involving structural defects, 14 held that the landlord owed
137. See Waters v. New York City Hous. Auth., 505 N.E.2d 922 (N.Y. 1987) (holding
that the landlord had no duty to protect pedestrian who was accosted on the sidewalk
then robbed and sexually assaulted in defendant's building); see also Hutchins v. 1001
Fourth Ave. Assoc., 802 P.2d 1360 (Wash. 1991) (acknowledging the general rule that
there is no duty to protect another from an injury resulting from a third party's conduct
unless the defendant has a special relationship with the wrongdoer or with the foreseeable
victim). But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302B cmt. g (1977) (a landlord
owes a duty if he creates a special or peculiar temptation or opportunity for crime).
138. Some jurisdictions, recognizing the difficulties of limiting this duty to provide
security, give standing only to tenants and not to third party strangers who may be in-
.lured on the premises. See, e.g., Glick v. Olde Towne Lancaster, Inc., 535 A.2d 621, 625
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
139. 553 N.Y.S.2d 313, 316 (App. Div. 1990), rev'd, 570 N.E.2d 1074 (N.Y. 1991).
140. See Appel v. Muller, 186 N.E. 785, 787 (N.Y. 1933) (landlord had duty to protect
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a duty to the pedestrian-victim.1 41 Moreover, the court articulated
a landlord duty to control the conduct of persons on their premises
whenever the landlord is reasonably aware of the necessity to do
SO. 1
4 2
The New York Court of Appeals rejected the lower court's
reasoning. Because the landlord had no relationship to the gunman
and the robbery was not related to drug trafficking, the court held
that the landlord did not owe a duty to the pedestrian.
143
The Missouri Court of Appeals used a similar analysis to deny
liability in Conroy v. Solon Gershamn, Inc.'44 In Conroy, a
tenant's invitee was injured during a drug raid on the tenant's
apartment. The court refused to hold the landlord liable under a
common premises theory because the conduct occurred entirely
within the leased premises. 145 However, the court indicated that
even if the landlord knew of prior illegal and dangerous activities
within the apartment, the plaintiff needed to show that the tenant
who had shot the plaintiff had been involved in these prior "dan-
gerous activities."' 146 This additional analysis suggests that the
court might have imposed liability if the landlord had known the
tenant was dangerous.
Plaintiff-tenants have also attempted without success to prove
liability by analogizing their claims to cases involving a voluntary
assumption of duty 147 For example, a New York court held that
pedestrians from falling glass); see also Gillette v. Luone Co., 114 N.Y.S.2d 713 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1952) (landlord liable for damages caused when a tenant's sign fell on sidewalk
pedestrians, but landlord entitled to indemnification from the tenant).
141. Muniz, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 316. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 371
(1965) (describing landowner liability to persons outside the land for activities occurring
on the land).
142. Muniz, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
143. Muniz, 570 N.E.2d at 1074.
144. 767 S.W.2d 381 (Mo. App. 1989).
145. Id. at 383. In a similar case, a resident manager/tenant stood in his own apartment
and shot another tenant standing in the door of his apartment across the hall. Bryant v.
Brannen, 446 N.W.2d 847 (Mich. App. 1989). That court reversed the tenant's jury ver-
dict due in part to the fact that the conduct occurred on the leased premises. ld. at 852.
The court reasoned that "a common area under the landlord's control was involved only
to the extent that a bullet flew through the common hallway." Id.
146. Conroy, 767 S.W.2d at 383.
147. In a 1983 Illinois case, the tenants argued that lease provisions prohibiting conduct
that was illegal or disturbing to other tenants evidenced the landlord's voluntary assump-
tion of a duty to protect the tenant from the dangerous conduct of other tenants. Morgan
v. Dalton Management Co., 454 N.E.2d 57, 59 (I11. App. Ct. 1983). Not surprisingly, the
appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the tenant's claim, stating that a landlord is "not
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lease provisions allowing eviction of objectionable tenants did not
provide a basis for imposing a duty to protect a tenant's child
from being bullied by another tenant's child.14 The court stated
that lease provisions did not appear to have been designed to pro-
tect tenants and that the plaintiffs did not prove they relied on the
provisions when executing the lease. 49
Successful claims have been based on the theory that if a land-
lord knew or should have known of a tenant's dangerousness, he
should be liable to co-tenants."s This superior knowledge has
been held to create an obligation for the landlord to warn or other-
wise take actions to protect tenants.15 1 Proof that a landlord knew
of a tenant's criminal proclivity strongly supports a finding of
superior knowledge. Indeed, one of the earliest cases in which a
landlord was found to have a duty to protect others from a tenant
was based on this theory t52 In Dean v. St. Paul Union Depot
Co., the defendant-landlord leased a train depot to a tenant who the
landlord knew had an employee with a "vicious temper."' 53 The
employee assaulted the plaintiff, who was waiting in the depot for
a train.' 4 Analogizing to cases in which landowners kept savage
normally required to act as an intermediary in the disputes that anse between his tenants."
Id. at 61.
148. Bennett v. Ames, 434 N.Y.S.2d 766 (App. Div. 1980) (involving 8-year-old struck
with a baseball bat by a co-tenant's 10-year-old son on a common outdoor area of the
housing development).
149. Id. at 767-68.
150. As a matter of general premises liability, landowners may be liable for failure to
control the conduct of persons on their premises when the premises' use makes criminal
or violent conduct sufficiently probable. Compare Palmucci v. Falcone, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6363 (D.N.J. May 7, 1990) (holding owner of fitness club not liable for attack'by
one patron upon another) with Chomatopoulos v. Roma DeNotte Social Club, 515 A.2d
296, 300 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1985) (finding potential for violence where illegal gambling oc-
curs sufficiently probable to impose duty on landowner to provide security system).
151. Florida, in particular, has well-developed case law on this matter. See, e.g., Salerno
v. Hart Fin. Corp., 521 So. 2d 234, 235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (finding that tenant of
mobile home injured by acts of co-tenant can maintain an action against the landlord, if
the landlord had prior knowledge of similar criminal conduct on the premises and such
conduct was reasonably foreseeable); Vasques v. Rocha, 509 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1987) (concluding that landlord may be liable for injunes to a tenant from a dog
owned by another tenant if the landlord knows of the animal's presence and its vicious
propensity and can contest its presence); Lambert v. Doe, 453 So. 2d 844 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1984) (holding landlord who recognized and assumed a duty to protect tenants from
foreseeable criminal conduct liable for injuries to minor tenant who was sexually molested
by another minor tenant since the landlord knew of the molester's proclivity).
152. Dean v. St. Paul Union Depot Co., 43 N.W. 54 (Minn. 1889).
153. Id. at 55.
154. Id.
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animals on their leased property,'55 the Dean court held that the
landlord owed a duty to the victim based on his knowledge of the
dangerousness of the tenant's employee.' 6
Similarly, the landlord's knowledge of a tenant's mental illness
has provided some limited basis of liability In Samson v. Saginaw
Professional Building, Inc., a landlord leased part of a building to
a mental health facility, knowing that some patients had violent
tendencies.' 57 The landlord did not secure the remainder of the
building despite requests by the other tenants to segregate violent
patients. '5 The Michigan Supreme Court held that the landlord
had "a duty to investigate and take available preventative mea-
sures."15 9 The majority's standard suggests a potential duty to
check the background of tenants and either exclude tenants with
criminal histories or "circulate a memo that a former or present
mental patient or person with a criminal history works or lives in
the building." '6i However, while the court did not expressly tie
the landlord's duty to investigate the tenant's background to the
fact that the premises were leased to a mental health facility,
whose patients included inmates from a nearby state prison, that
factor was probably critical to the outcome. 6'
In contrast to the broad duty outlined in Samson, a New York
Court reversed a jury verdict for a tenant who was attacked and
stabbed by a mentally ill co-tenant in a common apartment build-
155. The analogy is telling. Viewing criminals as "wild animals" justifies their restraint
m maximum security pnsons as well as society's abandonment of notions of rehabilitation.
Similarly, three decades earlier, courts were still analogizing African slaves to domesticat-
ed ammals to justify less than humane treatment. See generally KENNETH M. STAMP, THE
PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH 192-236 (1956).
156. Dean, 43 N.W at 55. Landlords may be liable to third parties injured by their
tenants' dangerous ammals as well. The Alaskan Village, Inc. v. Smalles, 720 P.2d 945
(Ala. 1986); Uccello v. Laudeslayer, 118 Cal. Rptr. 741 (1975); Strunk v. Zoltanski, 468
N.E.2d 13 (N.Y. 1984); Palermo v. Nails, 483 A.2d 871 (Pa. 1984). But see Wright v.
Schum, 781 P.2d 1142 (Nev. 1989) (refusing to follow Uccello). For a thorough discus-
sion, see Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Landlord's Liability to Third Person for Injury
Resulting from Attack on Leased Premises by Dangerous or Victous Animal Kept by Ten-
ant, 87 A.L.R. 4th 1004 (1991).
157. 224 N.W.2d 843 (Mich. 1975).
158. Id. at 846.
159. Id. at 851.
160. Id. at 855 (Levin, J., dissenting).
161. The Samson court's opinion is difficult to characterize because the original opinion
of the court, written by Justice Kavanagh, contains an addendum added after the opinion
was distributed to respond to to Justice Levin's dissent. See id. at 850-51 (clarifying a
landlord's duty to affirmatively act to protect tenants from mental health patients/tenants).
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ing hallway.'62 The court held that the landlord had no duty to
protect the tenant because the landlord could not have anticipated
the violent attack.'63 Although the landlord knew of the attacking
tenant's chrome mental illness, in seven years there had been only
one complaint when the tenant peacefully entered and then left
another's apartment.' 64
The injured tenant argued that if the landlord had investigated
his tenant's background, he would have discovered the tenant's
propensity for violence. 65 The New York court refused to hold
that the landlord had a duty to investigate the tenant's background,
reasomng that such a duty would be a gross intrusion into the
tenant's privacy and that there are "widely recognized inherent
difficulties in predicting dangerousness."" c The court contrasted
the duty to provide secure locks and adequate lighting imposed by
general tort standards with the duty requested by the plaintiff. The
court concluded that "[a] landlord is not competent to assess the
dangerous propensities of his mentally ill tenants, nor does he have
the resources, or control over his tenants necessary to avert the sort
of tragedy presented by this case.'167
The plaintiff also argued that the landlord had a duty to evict
the tenant based on the likelihood that his mental illness would
cause him to engage in violent acts.168 Under the governing pub-
lic housing authority regulations, however, evictions for
"nondesirability" of a tenant were only permitted if the tenant's
repeated objectionable behavior indicated a propensity for future
harm. 169 Moreover, although the regulations permitted evictions
for alcoholism if the tenant's actions disturbed the peace or inter-
fered with the housing authority operation, they did not contain a
similar provision for mental illness. 17 Thus, the court concluded
162. Gill v. New York City Hous. Auth., 519 N.Y.S.2d 364 (App. Div. 1987). See also
Davis v. Gomez, 255 Cal. Rptr. 743 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding that landlord had no duty
to investigate, monitor or control behavior of tenant despite co-tenants' reports that the
tenant was "6asting spells" on people and had a gun in her apartment).
163. Gill, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 363.
164. Id at 367.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 368 (citing JOHN MONAHAN, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE
CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 47-49 (1981)).
167. Id. at 370.
168. Id. at 371.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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that the landlord had neither the duty nor the right to evict the ten-
ant. 17'
Plaintiff-tenants have also argued that a landlord has a duty to
control a tenant's conduct if he has notice that a tenant is selling
illegal drugs on the premises. Three reported cases have addressed
this issue. However, while other legal standards have more aggres-
sively sought to extend liability for drug-related activity," z the
courts have not been willing to extend tort liability on this basis.
In the Muniz case, 73 for example, the plaintiff claimed that land-
lord liability was appropriate because the landlord knew of tenant
drug activity " The lower court held that the shooting was di-
rectly related to the landlord's permissive attitude toward the illegal
drug activity because drug sales are "known to attract violent
crime."' 75 The appellate court, however, rejected this argument
and held that the landlord did not owe a duty to the plaintiff.76
In two other cases, shots fired from neighboring apartments of
alleged drug traffickers entered the plaintiff-tenants' apartments.
t77
In both of these cases, the courts found that complaints to the
landlord regarding suspected drug dealing were insufficient to cre-
ate a duty to evict the suspected tenants. 78 Both plaintiffs pre-
sented evidence of activities consistent with illegal drug dealing,
including a large volume of short-term visitors and visits by per-
sons with reputations for involvement in drug sales. 179  Since
there were no arrests prior to the incidents at issue, the courts were
reluctant to find that the landlord had a duty to evict. 80 The re-
sult of such a holding, according to one court, would be that
"[a]ny tenant would have a potent weapon to be used against any
171. Id. at 372. While the Gill court resisted creating a landlord duty to police his ten-
ants, the very fact that the case proceeded to a jury verdict indicates that the courts are
willing to entertain arguments on this issue.
172. See infra notes 298-309 and 369-480.
173. Muniz v. Flohern, Inc., 553 N.Y.S.2d 313 (App. Div. 1990), rev'd, 570 N.E.2d
1074 (N.Y. 1991). See supra text accompanying notes 139-43.
174. Muniz, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 314.
175. Id. at 315.
176. Muniz, 570 N.E.2d at 1074.
177. Williams v. Gorman, 520 A.2d 761 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986), cert. dented,
526 A.2d 182 (1987); Tedder v. Raskan, 728 S.W.2d 343 (Tenn. App. Ct. 1987).
178. In Tedder, the Tennessee appellate court affirmned a directed verdict for the land-
lord. 728 S.W.2d at 352. In Williams, the New Jersey appellate court affirmed a partial
summary judgment in favor of the landlord regarding the duty to evict. 520 A.2d at 765.
179. Tedder, 728 S.W.2d at 345-46; Williams, 520 A.2d at 763.
180. Tedder, 728 S.W.2d at 350-51; Williams, 520 A.2d at 763-65.
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other tenant with whom she has a dispute or whom she just dis-
likes."181 Both courts suggested that the landlords would- not be
liable for the shooting injuries, even if they had .notice of illegal
drug activity The courts were concerned with proximate causation
problems. The Tedder court specifically rejected the proposition
that a shooting is a "probable, ordinary, natural, or usual result of
drug dealing."8 2 The courts reached these conclusions despite the
widely-shared public perception that drugs cause violent crime. 3
While the few cases placing liability on the landlord for the
acts of tenants have generally been based on extreme facts,' it
is likely that a duty to police tenants will develop further.' Par-
ticularly in those jurisdictions in which the landlord has a duty to
provide security,'" it would be logical to extend the benefit of
that duty to protect third parties or tenants from other tenants.
Moreover, the extension of landlord liability to include tenants'
criminal activities could serve to reduce the incidence of crime.
Indeed, one successful techmque for reducing crime is managing
environmental conditions. 87 This environmental management may
require changes in tenant behavior. 8 It may also require in-
creased tenant momtoring to eliminate tenants whose activities in-
crease the probability of crimes, such as tenants engaging in drug
activities. However, extension of tort liability is not likely to pro-
vide a sufficient incentive for the increased level of behavioral
181. Tedder, 728 S.W.2d at 350.
182. 728 S.W.2d at 350; see also Williams, 520 A.2d at 765 (finding that shooting and
possible drug dealing in co-tenant's apartment were not related)
183. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., Samson v. Saginaw Professional Bldg., Inc., 224 N.W.2d 843 (Mich.
1975).
185. See Clara Tuma, Ex-Prosecutor is Banking That Crine Will Pay, Texas Law., Feb.
4, 1991, at 1 (describing attorneys specializing m representing crime victims who sue
landlords for inadequate security). One Houston attorney claims to have settled 20 to 25
tenant actions against landlords for between $500,000 and $1.5 million apiece. Id. at 19.
Another attorney reported settling between 100 and 200 victim's cases for between
$15,000 and $450,000 apiece. Id.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 138-61.
187. See Johnson, supra note 134, at 239 (discussing environmental management mea-
sures designed to eliminate crime).
188. For example, the landlord may encourage tenants not to keep cash on the premises.
Id. See generally Aaron v. Havens, 758 S.W.2d 446, 447-48 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) (Vic-
timized tenant known to keep substantial amounts of cash in apartment); Kazanoff v.
United States, 753 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd, 945 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1991) (in-
truders targeted tenant who operated furrier shop based on information that the tenant kept
substantial valuables in the apartment).
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momtormg that may be effective in reducing crime.
Furthermore, even if landlords evicted all crninal or dangerous
tenants, it is likely that criminals would just be relocated and crime
would still occur. To date, most reported cases have appropriately
refused to extend tort liability to increase landlords duties. While
maintaining the physical condition of the premises is a customary
aspect of the modem residential lease, momtoring and controlling
the behavior of tenants is less customary 189 Nonetheless, these
creative tenant arguments have rarely been dismissed as frivolous,
and their mere assertion may raise the settlement value of cases in
enough instances to succeed as a practical matter.
B. LANDLORD LIABILITY FOR PUBLIC NUISANCES
CAUSED BY TENANTS
In contrast to tort standards, public nuisance doctrine may
create broad landlord liability for tenants' illegal activities. Nui-
sance doctrines, both public and private, encompass a broad range
of activities and have been characterized as "the great grab bag,
the dust bin, of the law "9 Nuisance law developed initially in
the context of private claims between individuals. The earliest
private nuisance cases acted as simple environmental land use
regulation. 9' These cases involved use of land that caused loud
noise, noxious fumes and the obstruction or destruction of rights of
way 192
Common law public nuisance grew by analogy to these private
claims and addressed interference with public land use rights, such
as use of public highways.' 93 Whereas private nuisance actions
were brought by individuals as civil claims, public nuisance actions
were brought by a representative of the sovereign as either civil or
189. Increasingly, leases include rules regulating the use of the premises. However,
rather than serving as a basis for a landlord's duty to police the premises, these rules
provide more of a basis for the landlord's right to evict a tenant or a landlord's ability to
recover damages resulting from a tenant's destructive or disturbing activity.
190. Awad v. McColgan, 98 N.W.2d 571, 573 (Mich. 1959), overruled by Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Thorn, 258 N.W.2d 30 (Mich. 1977).
191. The nuisance action developed out of the common law action on the case and the
assize of nuisance. GEORGE T. BISPHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQuITY 695-96 (Joseph D.
McCoy, ed., 10th ed. 1929). See generally J.R. Spencer, Public Nuisance - A Critical
Examination, 48 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 55, 57-58 (1989) (describing evolution of public nui-
sance claims).
192. Id at 57-58.
193. Id. at 58-59.
716 [Vol. 42:679
LANDLORDS AS COPS
criminal actions." Under both the private and the public actions,
because the infringed rights involved real property for which dam-
ages were historically considered inadequate, the doctrine provided
ready access to equitable remedies such as injunctions and
abatement.195
The flexibility of the public nuisance doctrine and its equitable
remedies soon led to its application in cases less specifically relat-
ed to land use." For example, the famous organized labor in-
junction case, In re Debs, was brought as a public nuisance ac-
tion."9 Eventually, public nuisance acquired a broad definition,
encompassing any "unreasonable interference with a right common
to the general public." 98 These interferences traditionally have
included threats to the public's health, safety or morals."9 This
common law doctrine has been codified in every state.2°°
Throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century, civil and
criminal public nuisance statutes were a primary method of control-
ling vice, particularly alcohol sales and use and prostitution. Today,
nuisance actions have become a popular means of inhibiting the
use of property for illegal purposes, primarily illegal drug activi-
ty."' Under public nuisance statutes,2" landlords may be liable
194. Id.
195. BISPHAM, supra note 191, at 696.
196. The outside limits of the public nuisance action were addressed by an 1893 United
States Supreme Court opinion. Northern Pac. R.R. v. Whalen, 149 U.S. 157 (1893). A
railroad company attempted to close saloons where railroad employees got drunk and,
consequently, became unable to work. The Court refused to grant an injunction closing
the saloons because the railroad had no common law or statutory authority upon which to
base the nuisance action. Id. at 162.
197. 158 U.S. 564 (1895) (granting injunction to stop railway unions' strike and restore
transportation of the mails, persons and property).
198. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979); see also KEETON et al., supra
note 20, at 643-44 (defining public nuisance).
199. ID.
200. Id. at 646.
201. In 1987, Portland, Oregon was the first major city to use its public nuisance abate-
ment IMws to close drug houses. Now, Cities Hit Drug Suspects Where They Live, N.Y.
TIM's, Jan. 25, 1991, at B16. Since 1987, Portland has invoked its ordinance over 700
times and other cities have followed suit. Id. See also Katherine Bishop, Neighbors in
West Use SmaU Claims to Combat Drugs, N.Y. TiMES, Oct. 17, 1989, at A16 (usig nui-
sance actions in small claims courts against owners of buildings that house drug related
activity).
202. A landlord may also be liable for a tenant's conduct in a private nuisance action.
The early common law rule regarding landlord liability for a tenant's nuisance stated that
a landlord was not responsible for activities or conditions that arose after he had trans-
ferred possession to the tenant unless a contrary agreement existed. Tus immumty was
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for fines or subject to injunctions against their property because of
the illegal activity of their tenants."3
Under these statutes, the government is responsible for bringing
public nuisance actions," 4  although private parties may have
standing if they can show some umque or special injury 20 5 Com-
mon law public nuisance provided remedies of damages and sum-
based on the view that the lease was a transfer of property rather than a contractual or
status relationship. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 356 cmt. a (1977); see also
Nagel v. Landels, 530 P.2d 1239 (Or. 1975) (holding landlord not liable to visitor injured
on stairway missing handrail because the handrail was attached at the beginning of the
lease and the tenants had not notified the landlord of its detachment).
However, a number of exceptions to landlord immunity developed based on the
landlord's knowledge and control. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 357-58
(1977). The landlord's liability may be premised on his actual or constructive notice of
the property's uses and of the likelihood that those activities will cause a nuisance. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 837 (1977). Liability does not require any unlawful
action by the landlord, but may result merely from leasing the premises to someone who
is likely to conduct a nuisance. New York v. Monarch Chem., 456 N.Y.S.2d 867 (App.
Div. 1982) (denying landlord's motion to dismiss because liability would exist if he knew
tenant was storing toxic chemicals which were likely to leak). Likewise, a landlord may
be liable for a tenant's conduct arising after the lease begins, if the landlord has notice of
the conduct and is able to control that conduct. See Putnam v. Stout, 345 N.E.2d 319
(N.Y. 1976) (noting that right to control can be shown by a duty to repair, a right of
reentry and the landlord's overall involvement in the tenancy); People v. Scott, 258
N.E.2d 206 (N.Y. 1970) (finding that landlord may be liable if he has right of entry and
notice of a nuisance). For example, if an individual is disturbed by the increased traffic,
noise and harassment caused by what he suspects is a drug business being operated by a
neighboring tenant on leased premises, he can bring a private nuisance action for the con-
duct. See Oscar v. University Students Co-operative Assoc., 939 F.2d 808 (9th Cir. 1991)
(involving apartment tenants who sued neighboring student housing co-operative, alleging
that the students' massive drug violations interfered with the quiet enjoyment of their
property). Yet despite the possibility of liability for a tenant's illegal conduct, private rn-
sance actions are relatively scarce in this situation. One reason for this may be that since
illegal activity by a tenant tends to affect an entire neighborhood and since recovery of
damages and the limited injunctions against the activities (rather than the eviction of the
tenants) are the preferred private nuisance remedies, no single neighbor is likely to pursue
this type of action. See Southwestern Constr. Co. v. Liberto, 385 So. 2d 633 (Ala. 1980)
(holding that an injunction is the proper remedy to abate a private nuisance).
203. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-43-10 (Law Co-op 1977) (injunctions); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 29-3-101 (1980) (fines); UTAH CODE ANN. § 47-1-1 (1989) (lessor subject
to penalties for tenant nuisances).
204. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Massios, 360 N.E.2d 631 (Mass. 1977) (holding that under a
public nuisance statute declaring standards for safe maintenance of common passageways
in leased buildings, visitor to building who fell in darkened passageway did not have pri-
vate right of action).
205. See generally William B. Johnson, Annotation, What Constitutes Special Injury that
Entitles Private Party to Maintain Action Based on Public Nuisance - Modern Cases, 71
A.L.R.4th 13 (1990). A number of statutes give standing to any citizen within the juns-
diction where the public nuisance is being maintained. See infra notes 273-80 and accom-
panying text.
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mary abatement.2 The statutory counterparts provide additional
remedies of building closure, property forfeitures, criminal fines
and mprisonment.0 7
There are various types of public nuisance statutes. First, all
jurisdictions define nuisance generally' and allow for injunctive
and monetary relief. These statutes are merely codified versions of
the common law of public nuisance. The definition of public nui-
sance is often broad, including any activity threatemng the health,
safety or morals of the commumty" regardless of whether these
activities are illegal.210
Second, virtually all states have a specialized public nuisance
statute that focuses on vice activities. Jurisdictions vary in the
activities defined, the criminal or civil nature of these statutes and
the range of sanctions available. In general, these statutes can be
divided into those providing for criminal nuisance liability and
those directed at civil nuisance abatement.
Tlus section focuses on the specialized public nuisance statutes,
because these are the.provisions under which a landlord most often
will be subject to liability for the criminal activities of his tenant.
This section describes first the criminal then the civil forms of
these public nuisance statutes.
1. Criminal Nuisance Statutes
The common law crime of public nuisance (often called com-
mon nuisance) imposed criminal liability for a range of mischiefs
for which the criminal law did not otherwise provide satisfactory
206. See City of Clucago v. Festival Theatre Corp., 438 N.E.2d 159, 165 (Ill. 1982)
(discussing common law remedies); State v. Johnson, 195 P.2d 1017, 1019 (N.M. 1948)
(nuisance statutes did not impair courts' common law power to impose damages or sum-
marily abate a public nuisance).
207. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 823.01 (West Supp. 1992) (criminal fines); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 100 1/2, 5 (Smith-Hurd 1987) (property forfeiture and building closure);
MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 600.3820 (West 1987) (imprisonment). See generally 58 AM.
JUR. 2D, Nuisances §§ 229-232 (1989) (discussing penalties).
208. See id. at § I (Most jurisdictions use a broad, general defimtion of nuisance be-
cause an exact definition could not encompass all appropriate fact patterns.).
209. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 657.1 (1988) ("Whatever is injurious to health, indecent,
or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as essentially
to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, is a nuisance.").
210. Cf. Touslun v. Chicago, 320 N.E.2d 202 (I11. App. Ct. 1974) (affirming a tempo-
rary injunction prohibiting the operation of a masturbatory massage parlor despite the fact
that the defendant's activities "bordered on illegality without quite crossing into it"); ac-
cord Chicago v. Geraci, 332 N.E.2d 487 (Il1. App. Ct. 1975).
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relief. Many public nuisance prosecutions involved either activities
that were not criminal or activities that were criminal but punish-
able by such a minimal penalty that nuisance prosecution provided
a greater penalty 211
Statutory criminal nuisance definitions mirror the broad public
nuisance common law. For example, in New York, one is guilty of
a second degree criminal nuisance if he "knowingly conducts or
maintains any premises, place or resort where persons gather for
purposes of engaging in unlawful conduct." 212 Similarly, the Utah
criminal statute defines a public nuisance as any unlawful act or
omission that "[a]nnoys, Injures, or endangers the comfort, repose,
health, or safety of three or more persons; or [o]ffends public
decency ,,213 Some courts have expressed concern that the appli-
cation of these broad definitions may create new crimes.214 For
example, a New York court determined that "to be deemed a pub-
lic nuisance, an act either must itself be illegal, or must be per-
formed in an illegal manner." 21 5 This restriction attempts to en-
sure that only activities independently determined to be criminal
may provide the basis for criminal nuisance actions.
Determining the standard of culpability under some nuisance
statutes is difficult. Under private nuisance, liability can attach for
conduct that is intentional, reckless or negligent.21 6 For abnormal-
ly dangerous conditions, there is strict liability 217 While the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts suggests that the same standards apply
to criminal public nuisance,2 8 most courts have applied only
strict liability standards to activities constituting public nuisanc-
es.219 For example, Utah's criminal public nuisance statute con-
211. Spencer, supra note 191, at 77.
212. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.45(2) (McKinney 1989).
213. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-803(a)-(b) (1991).
214. For example, former provisions of New Jersey's public nuisance statutes were held
unconstitutionally vague. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Congleton, 90 A.2d 550 (Essex
County Ct. 1952). But cf. State ex rel. Webster v. Daugherty, 530 S.W.2d 81 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1975) (ruling nuisance statute not unconstitutionally vague).
215. Commissioner of Dept. of Bldgs. of New York v. Sidne Enters., Inc., 394
N.Y.S.2d 777 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) (applying nuisance statute regarding places used for
lewd purposes to a topless and bottomless dancing establishment).
216. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1977).
217. Id.
218. Id. § 822 cmt. a.
219. Robert Abrams & Val Washington, The Misunderstood Law of Public Nuisance: A
Comparison with Private Nuisance Twenty Years After Boomer, 54 ALB. L. REV. 359, 368
(1990).
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tams no mens rea requirement and the courts have refused to infer
such a requirement." For instance, New York's concern that its
second degree criminal nuisance statute created "virtually a crime
of absolute liability""' resulted in amendment of the statute to
include "knowing or reckless" standards for liability 22 Even if
strict liability is applied to public nuisance actions, however, courts
must still assign liability to either the landlord or the tenant, or
both.
Under early common law, courts refused to hold landlords
liable for a criminal nuisance caused by a tenant, under the theory
that a lease was considered a conveyance transferring all rights to
control the use of the preimses to the tenant.2 3 However, a num-
ber of exceptions have developed that now expose landlords to
criminal liability. For example, a landlord will be liable if he leas-
es property knowing the tenant will be using the property for ille-
gal purposes and the landlord is "active in advising .. or in
aiding and assisting" in the nuisance.22  Moreover, as the
landlord's contractual powers to control tenant conduct have grown,
courts have extended the breadth of the statutes.225
Courts have differed on the extent to which a landlord must be
actively involved in the nuisance in order to be criminally liable.
Most courts interpreting these statutes have focused on the meaning
of "maintain" as establishing the outside boundaries of a landlord's
liability In 1970, for example, a New York court held that if a
nuisance is caused by a tenant's activities on leased premises, the
landlord may be liable merely by knowing of the conduct and
failing to take action to abate it.226 In People v. Campbell, anoth-
220. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-803 (1990); see People v. Burtlesen, 47 P. 87, 89
(Utah 1896) (holding that intent is immatenal m public nuisance cases). See also People
v. Rubenfeld, 172 N.E. 485 (N.Y. 1930) (Cardozo, J.) (finding defendant liable with no
discussion of intent or mens rea), cited m Abrams & Washington, supra note 219, at
373-74.
221. William C. Donmino, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.45 at 274
(McKinney 1989) (discussing how New York public nuisance law presently construes the
mens rea requirement).
222. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.45 (McKinney 1989).
223. See St. Louis v. J.E. Kaime & Bros. Real Estate Co., 79 S.W. 140 (Mo. 1904);
New York v. Corlies, 2 Sand. Ch. 301 (N.Y. 1891).
224. State v. Williams, 30 N.J.L. 102, 106 (1862).
225. As the cases m this section reveal, much of the interpretation of the landlord's
contractual or statutory ability to control tenants is used to impose responsibility on land-
lords for tenant conduct.
226. People v. Schriber, 310 N.Y.S.2d 551, 552 (App. Div. 1970) (convicting landlord
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er New York court stated that "a 'do-nothing' policy is tantamount
to acquiescence."227 In that case, there had been 107 arrests for
narcotics violations in a 6-month period on the premises of a
"flophouse." 228 The landlord cooperated with the police investiga-
tions and set up security systems to restrict public access to the
building.229  The court held that these efforts negated the
landlord's guilt under the statute.2" The dissent argued that more
than a "token effort" should be required and that the owner had
"failed to supply the high degree of specialized supervision that the
situation demanded.
231
Some state statutes specifically outline landlord liability for
tenant nuisances. For example, the Rhode Island statute provides:
Every person who shall let any building for any of the
purposes [prohibited by statute], or who shall know-
mgly permit any such building to be so used while
under his control, or who shall, after five (5) days notice
from any officer or magistrate of any such use of said
building omit to take all reasonable measures to eject
the tenant [shall be] guilty of aiding in the mainte-
nance of such nuisance. 23
2
However, landlord liability is usually less clearly defined.
Criminal nuisance can be a costly and difficult means to deter
illegal use of property Many modem criminal nuisance statutes
require proof of owner knowledge and participation in the nui-
sance.233 Additionally, constitutional guarantees require proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt and a right to a jury trial in criminal
of criminal nuisance because he knew of and acquiesed in marijuana smoking on leased
premises).
227. 256 N.Y.S.2d 467, 469 (Crim. Ct. 1965).
228. Id. at 468.
229. Id. at 469.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 470 (Matzkin, J., dissenting).
232. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-30-7 (1981).
233. See supra notes 216-25.
234. See Ramsey v. United Mine Workers of America, 401 U.S. 302, 320 (1971) (stat-
ing that "[a]s a rule of evidence, clear proof should be required, so that criminal responsi-
bility should not be imputed but proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to impose
liability"); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable
doubt during the adjudicatory stage of a juvenile proceeding for offenses which would be
criminal if committed by an adult); see also Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55
(1899) (noting that "the presumption of the innocence of an accused attends him through-
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actions.? s Due to concerns about the high costs of these proce-
dures, public officials have increasingly used civil public nuisance
law instead of criminal statutes to remedy alleged nuisances.
2. Public Nuisance Abatement Statutes
Nuisance abatement statutes can be traced back to the early
common law, which permitted civil and criminal actions for keep-
ing "disorderly houses." These were places "kept in such a way as
to disturb, annoy, and scandalize the public generally or the neigh-
borhood, or the passers-by on a highway " This definition re-
flected the central concept that nuisance involved interference with
other's property rights. However, as discussed previously, the use
of the nuisance action soon grew beyond this core concept.237
Thus, a building could be deemed a nuisance even if the activities
therein were neither visible from the outside nor breached the
peace.238 In some situations, the nature of the building's visitors,
rather than the visitors' visible activities, defined the character of
the place. Thus, one court defined a disorderly house as a place
that was "the habitual resort of thieves, drunkards, prostitutes, or
other idle and vicious and disorderly persons. 239
The statutory versions of this common law doctrine have long
been used to regulate whatever vice crimes were at the forefront of
public attention.2 These statutes include the tobacco241  and
out the trial and has relation to every fact that must be established in order to prove his
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt").
235. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. See also Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3088
(1990) (stating that "[a] right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to
prevent oppression by the Government"); id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (tracing the history
of the Constitutional right to a jury trial).
236. Mossman v. Ft. Collins, 90 P. 605, 606 (Colo. 1907).
237. See supra text accompanylung notes 190-203.
238. Beard v. State, 17 A. 1044, 1045 (Md. Ct. App. 1889) (approving jury instruction
to convict even if no conspicuous improprieties were evident).
239. Mossman, 90 P. at 606 (citing State v. Williams, 30 N.J.L. 102 (1862)); see also
RI. GEN. LAWS § 11-30-1 (1981) (nuisances include places "where intemperate, idle,
dissolute, noisy or disorderly persons are in the habit of resorting").
240. The history of vice control in this country and in Europe reflects a cycle of re-
pression and tolerance. See generally Jerome H. Skolnick, The Social Transformation of
ice, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1988) (discussing historical trends in attitudes
toward vice control). Similar vice statutes have existed throughout history. The Prostitution
Act of Pans 1635 allowed the closing of houses of prostitution, and the summary head-
shaving, flogging and banishment of their resident meretrices. Mackey, Red Light Law: An
Aspect of the Study of Prostitution, in 8 E.C. BARKSDALE STUDENT LECTURES 31 (1983-
84).
241. See Austin v. State, 48 S.W. 805 (Tenn. 1898) (upholding ordinance which re-
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alcohol ordinances242 of the nineteenth century, the Red Light
Abatement Acts of the early twentieth century,243 the Speak-easy
and liquor control statutes of the prohibition period2" and the
modem narcotics laws.245 These statutes, like their common law
counterparts, have been directed at protecting public morality 24
Under these public nuisance ordinances and statutes, if an
alleged nuisance occurs on a leased premises, the owner as well as
the tenant may be subject to suit. Thus, landlords are particularly
susceptible to liability for their tenant's cnnunal activities. Because
these statutes are the primary form of nuisance actions brought
against landlords, they will be examined in some detail here. First,
the available remedies will be outlined. Next, the types of activities
deemed nuisances, the types of evidence used to establish nuisances
and the standards for landlord liability will be analyzed. Finally, a
case study demonstrating the interaction of these principles will be
presented.
a. Remedies
Nuisance abatement statutes provide a potent arsenal of reme-
stricted sale of cigarettes). But see City of Zion v. Behrens, 104 N.E. 836 (Ill. 1914)
(striking down ordinance which prohibited smoking in public parks, streets and buildings);
Hershberg v. City of Babourville, 133 S.W. 985 (Ky. 1911) (voiding ordinance which
forbade smoking within corporate limits).
242. See Henry Schofield, Equity Jurisdiction to Abate and Enjoin Illegal Saloons as
Public Nuisances, 8 ILL. L. REV. 19 (1912) (discussing alcohol ordinances).
243. The Red Light Abatement Acts were enacted throughout the United States m the
early 20th century to regulate prostitution houses. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 544:1
(1974) (initially enacted in 1919); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2320 (McKinney 1985)
(initially enacted in 1909).
244. See Annotation, Constitutionality of Statute Providing for Forfeiture & Property
Upon Which Intoxicating Liquor is Manufactured or Sold, 10 A.L.R. 1591 (1921).
245. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 823.113 (West Supp. 1989) (defining drug houses as
public nuisances subject to abatement actions). These statutes regarding illegal drugs are
not recent developments. States conducted nuisance prosecutions based on statutes which
made it a misdemeanor to "'openB or maintainf a place where opium, or any of its
preparations, is smoked by other persons.' People v. Reed, 61 N.Y.S. 520, 520 (App.
Div. 1899) (quoting N.Y. PENAL CODE § 388).
246. The impetus for the statutes may not always be directed toward morality. For
example, prostitution laws first developed in England after prostitution was connected with
transmission of venereal diseases. Mackey, supra note 240, at 35. Some commentators
have suggested that morality laws may simply be bureaucratic strategies to extend the
power and resources of the institution. Donald T. Dickson, Bureaucracy and Morality: An
Organizational Perspective on a Moral Crusade, DRUGS AND PoLmcs 31-54 (Paul E.
Rock, ed. 1977) (arguing that a combination of both moral and bureaucratic factors will
exist in any given moral crusade).
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dies short of criminal fines and imprisonment. These remedies
include eviction of the tenant and injunctions against the defendants
and the property itself which prohibit further criminal activities.
Many of these statutes also allow for closure or "padlock" orders
which prohibit access by anyone, including the owner, for up to
one year.247
One important remedy provided by most statutes is a prelim-
nary injunction restraining further illegal use of the premises. 8
Typically, preliminary injunctions require the person requesting the
injunction to post a bond, a requirement dispensed with when the
injunction is sought on behalf of the public.249 Likewise, to ob-
tain a preliminary injunction, one must usually show a likelihood
of success on the merits, the immediate threat of irreparable harm
if the injunction is not issued and a balancing of equities that
favors the plaitiff. ° However, to obtain relief under the typical
abatement statute, the plaintiff need only provide some evidence
that a nuisance exists. Depending on the jurisdiction, the range and
type of evidence required for these preliminary orders vanes from
mere allegations at the pleading stage to clear and convincing evi-
dence presented at a hearing."'
In addition to preliminary relief, injunctions are a common
247. The constitutional validity of such orders remains in doubt under certain circum-
stances. Compare Sanders v. State, 203 S.E.2d 153 (Ga. 1974) (holding permanent pad-
lock order on bookstore unconstitutional) with State ex rel. Kidwell v. U.S. Mktg., Inc.,
631 P.2d 622 (Idaho 1981) (holding one-year padlock order on bookstore constitutional),
appeal dismissed, 455 U.S. 1009 (1982). But see infra note 254. For a more detailed dis-
cussion of padlock orders, see Jeffrey S. Trachtman, Pornography, Padlocks, and Prior
Restraints: The Constitutional Limits of the Nuisance Power, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1478
(1983).
248. Eg., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11570 (West 1991); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 712-1270 (1990); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2323 (McKinney 1991); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 15-43-30 (Law. Co-op. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-3-105 (1980); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 47-1-2 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 4-82, 48-8 (Michie, 1989); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 823.10 (West Supp. 1990).
249. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-43-30 (Law. Co-op. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-3-
105(b) (1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 47-1-2 (1989).
250. City of New York v. Castro, 542 N.Y.S.2d 101, 103 (Sup. Ct. 1989), aft'd, 559
N.Y.S.2d 508 (App. Div. 1990).
251. Compare TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-3-105 (1980) ("the court shall, upon the
presentation of a bill or petition therefor, alleging that the nuisance complained of exists,
award a temporary writ of injunction7) with N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:54A-2 (1990) (allowing
ex parte temporary restraining order "to preserve samples of materials located at the pre-
inses which are allegedly involved in the nuisance" but permitting a preliminary injunc-
tion only "if at the [later] hearing, the allegations of the petition are sustained by clear
and convincing evidence").
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form of final relief. Most "padlock" statutes permit authorities to
close a premises from any access or use for up to one year. 2s
At least one public nuisance statute goes beyond limited closings
and allows total forfeiture of property used for activity involving
illegal drug sales."5 3
The constitutionality of padlock orders has generally been up-
held.2" The only constitutional challenges to these preliminary
injunction orders that have consistently prevailed have been chal-
lenges by closed adult book stores or movie theatres. In that con-
text, because of First Amendment concerns with prior restraint of
speech, the United States Supreme Court and many state courts
have held injunction orders unconstitutional."'5
The Texas legislature provided a unique alternative to closing
premises after the Umted States Supreme Court declared its previ-
ous abatement statute unconstitutional. 56 The new statute pro-
vides that if a person continues to maintain a previously enjoined
nuisance, the political subdivision may- (1) cut off public utility
services, (2) prohibit private utility companies holding franchises to
use public streets from providing services to the premises, (3)
revoke the certificate of occupancy, and (4) prohibit the use of
public streets or rights of way to access the premises.5 7 Such
closure orders are not punitive, but rather provide a deterrent to
252. E.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 712-1275 (1990); Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 195.130, 195.253
(1989); TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 125.002 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991).
253. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 823.113-.114 (West Supp. 1990).
254. See generally Annotation, supra note 244, 10 A.L.R. at 1591 (citing cases which
upheld padlock statutes as constitutional); see also Gaskins v. People, 272 P. 662 (Colo.
1928) (upholding constitutionality of closure orders even when owner of property is not
made a defendant in the proceedings because provisions for bonding by owner sufficient
to satisfy due process); State v. Rossitto, 191 A.2d 642 (Del. Ch. Ct. 1963) (bonding
provisions m statute satisfied due process).
255. See, e.g., Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308 (1980) (striking down
Texas statute which authorized judges to enjoin future exhibitions of films not yet held
obscene); J-R Distributors, Inc. v. Eikenberry, 725 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1984) (facial Frst
Amendment challenge to state nuisance statutes permitted); Airways Theater Inc. v.
Canale, 366 F Supp. 343 (W.D. Tenn. 1973) (holding nuisance statute which permitted
seizure of film equipment and film merely upon a determination of obscenity by a police
officer unconstitutional); People ex reL Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc, 503 N.E.2d 492
(N.Y. 1986) (closing an adult bookstore under public nuisance statutes implicated state
constitutional expression rights requiring a narrowly tailored statute). But see State v.
Panno, 447 N.W.2d 74 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (holding mandatory closure of book store
not unconstitutional where consistent pattern of illegal public sexual conduct exists).
256. Vance, 445 U.S. 308.
257. TEX. Ctv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 125.045 (west Supp. 1991).
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continued illegal use of the property 25' Though equity courts will
not generally enjoin a crime, an exception is made for public nui-
sances where continual arrests and mimmal punishments are of
little effect in deterring the ongoing criminal enterpnse. 59
The scope of the available injunctive relief depends on the
connection between the activities claimed to constitute a nuisance
and the premises upon which they occur. For example, the Wash-
mgton Supreme Court held that merely because prostitutes regularly
took their clients to a particular hotel, that activity alone did not
indicate that the whole building was a house of prostitution for
purposes of the public nuisance statute.26° The court stated that in
order to padlock the building, its predominant use must be for the
purposes of prostitution.26 t Thus, if illegal activities are confined
to only one separable portion of the premises, such as one apart-
ment or floor, the closure order may only extend to that portion of
the premises.
262
Remedies vary from state to state, including some exceptionally
creative lawmaking. Missouri and Rhode Island have provisions
under which any tenant's use of leased premises for certain illegal
activities renders the lease automatically void, without any notice
or action by the landlord.263 Provisions for the seizure and sale
of personal property used in connection with the illegal activities
are not uncommon.264 Texas statutes provide for fee shifting in
258. See, e.g., Grosfield v. United States, 276 U.S. 494 (1928) (interpreting abatement
provisions of the National Prohibition statute as preventive rather than punitive).
259. See Toushin v. City of Chicago, 320 N.E.2d 202, 207 (I1l. App. Ct. 1974); Doug-
las v. Wiener, 370 N.W.2d 720 (Neb. 1985).
260. State ex rel Carroll v. Gatter, 260 P.2d 360 (Wash. 1953).
261. Id See also Otten v. Town of China Grove, 660 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Ct. App.
1983) (finding testimony of three witnesses regarding two incidents of gambling on pn-
vate property on Sundays insufficient to establish "habitual use" of property for gambling).
262. In State ex reL Brucker v. Robinson, 229 N.W. 403 (Mich. 1930), an apartment
building with 50 apartments could not be closed as a public nuisance because evidence
existed of prostitution in one apartment only. However, dicta indicated that if the apart-
ments hosting the illegal activities could not be specifically identified, then the entire
building rmght be closed. Id. at 405. See also People ex reL Dougherty v. Holschuh, 209
N.W. 158 (Mich. 1926) (ruling that because illegal liquor sales by tenant occurred on first
floor of two-story building with separate entrances, the padlock order could only close off
first floor); Rogers v. City of Abilene, 704 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (holding in-
junction overbroad both floors of building were closed even though there was only proof
of alcohol and drug violations on the first floor).
263. See Mo. REV. STAT. §441.020 (1989) (gambling); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-30-6
(1990) (prostitution, lewdness, gambling, illegal liquor).
264. E.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 712-1230 (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 100 1/2 5
(Smith-Hurd 1987); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-43-80 (Law. Co-op. 1976); TENN. CODE ANN.
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public nuisance actions.265 Waslungton state recently enacted leg-
islation providing for "off-limits orders" which can be implemented
as part of nuisance abatement proceedings.2" Under these orders,
a court may designate an area to be "protected against drug traf-
ficking" use area, or a "PADT area," and enjoin "a known drug
trafficker who has been associated with drug trafficking in an area
that the court finds to be a PADT area, from entering or remaining
m a designated PADT area for up to one year."267 Finally, at
least one municipal abatement ordinance allows the costs of law
enforcement activities conducted on the premises to be levied
against landlords who have been warned of illegal activities on
their properties.2"
While the actions for injunctions are civil in nature, the con-
tempt proceedings to enforce the injunctions may be either civil or
crinunal. Some states specifically provide for civil contempt sanc-
tions if injunctions in nuisance actions are violated.269 If crimmal
contempt proceedings are brought, proof of the owner's actual
knowledge and participation in conduct violating a nuisance abate-
ment order is required.27°
Unlike its private nuisance cousin, public nuisance is not a tort,
but rather is an administrative claim brought on behalf of the entire
community Under the law of private nuisance, neighbors can act
to abate nuisances without legal process. 271 In the case of public
nuisances involving disorderly houses, however, self-help abate-
§ 29-3-101 (1980).
265. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 125.022(g) (West Supp. 1991).
266. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 10.66.005-66.130 (West 1990).
267. Id at § 10.66.020.
268. LANSING, MICH., ORDINANCES § 630.04 (1991). Under the Lansing, Michigan nui-
sance abatement ordinance, a landlord who was warned by police about drug sales on his
leased property was assessed $1,475 by the city council to cover the costs of a second
drug raid on his rental house, and the house was ordered closed for two months. Land-
lord Penalized for Tenant's Crimes, WASH. TIMEs, Apr. 17, 1991, at B5.
269. TEx. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 125.022(e) (including as sanctions for
"civil contempt" fines of $1,000-$10,000 or jail for 10-30 days or both).
270. See Gaskans v. People, 272 P. 662, 663 (Colo. 1928) (allowing owner of premises
where tenant conducted a nuisance the opportunity to post bond against abatement order
instead of being held in criminal contempt for failure to appear since she lived out of
state and was unaware of the nuisance order). But see Home v. City of Cordele, 329
S.E.2d 134 (Ga. 1985) (finding contempt action available against owner refusing to obey
nuisance abatement order regardless of his knowledge of the nuisance).
271. See, e.g., Climax Specialty Co. v. Seneca Button Co., 103 N.Y.S. 822 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1907).
[V/ol. 42:679
LANDLORDS AS COPS
ments are not permissible.2" But, some statutes allow private citi-
zens to prosecute public nuisance actions themselves and to seek
eviction of tenants without joining the landlord.273
Some states provide an intermediate position by setting up
administrative systems in which citizens can bring nuisances to the
attention of the prosecutorial government officials. For example, a
Texas statute uses public meetings to identify public nuisances
against which abatement actions may lie.274 Under this provision,
upon the request of ten percent of the registered voters in an elec-
tion precinct, the district attorney may call a public meeting at
wlich neighbors state their complaints about an alleged public nui-
sance.275 The owner of the property is personally served with no-
tice of the meeting.276 The results of the meeting are reported to
the district attorney, who may then begin proceedings to abate the
nuisance.2' Similarly, a Florida statute authorizes creation of lo-
cal admimstrative boards for the purpose of receiving complaints
and conducting hearings regarding alleged public nuisances.27
These admimstrative bodies have the power to declare a place a
public nuisance and prohibit further "operating or maintaimng of
the place or premises" for one year.279 The board may also seek
temporary and permanent injunctions from the courts."'
b. Definitions of Nuisances and Evidentiary Standards
for Landlord Liability
Nuisance abatement statutes usually proscribe only certain
illegal or immoral activities. The range of activities included vanes
from state to state, and may involve pornography,2"' prostitu-
272. Slaughter v. People, 2 Doug. 334 (Mich. 1846) (holding that neighbors of house of
prostitution may not tear down the building in an attempt to abate the nuisance).
273. See, e.g., Kellner v. Cappellim, 516 N.Y.S.2d 827 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1986) (ap-
plying city eviction ordinance against occupants of vacant building in which drug sales
and drug related activities were said by neighbors to occur).
274. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 125.042 (West Supp. 1987).
275. Id
276. Id. § 125.043.
277. 1d. § 125.044.
278. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.138 (West Supp. 1991) (applicable to illegal drug-related
and street-gang activities). This statute was amended in 1991 to add prostitution to the list
of public nuisances covered by its provisions. 1991 Fla. Laws 143.
279. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.138.
280. Id. § 893.138(6).
281. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 124.021 (West Supp. 1991) (prohibit-
ing the commercial manufacture, distribution or exhibition of material defined as obscene
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tion," 2  illegal drugs,28 3 illegal alcohol or drunkenness," gam-
bling"' and similar vices.2" 6 These statutes penalize "inducing
by criminal statute). A prior version of the Texas statute was declared unconstitutional in
Vance v. Umversal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308 (1980). See also HAW. REV. STAT.
§§ 712-1270, 1271-1280 (1990) (addressing display or promotion of pornography); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 29-3-101 (1990) (declared unconstitutional in Anways Theater, Inc. v.
Canale, 366 F. Supp. 343 (W.D. Tenn. 1973)); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.42.010,
.020-.900 (Supp. 1983-1984) (invalidated in Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S.
491 (1985), insofar as the word "lust" is to be understood as reaching protected mate-
rials).
Use of these statutes to control obscenity presents special problems involving the
First Amendment and prior restraint which are beyond the scope of this article. See gen-
erally Peter J. O'Connor, The Nuisance Abatement Law as a Solution to New York City's
Problem of Illegal Sex Related Businesses in the Mid-Town Area, 46 FORDHAM L. REV.
57, 67 (1977); Doug Rendleman, Civilizing Pornography: The Case for an Exclusive
Obscenity Nuisance Statute, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 509 (1977); B. Kay Albaugh, Comment,
Regulation of Obscenity Through Nuisance Statutes and Injunctive Remedies - The Prior
Restraint Dilemma, 19 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 7 (1983); Carolin D. Bakewell, Comment,
Constitutional Law - The Constitutionality of North Carolina's Nuisance Abatement Stat-
ute: A Prior Restraint on Nonobscene Speech, 61 N.C. L. REV. 685 (1983); Steven T.
Catlett, Note, Enjoining Obscenity as a Public Nuisance and the Prior Restraint Doctrine,
84 COLUM. L. REV. 1616 (1984).
282. One statute defines "house of prostitution" as a place "used for the purpose of
lewdness, assignation, or prostitution." N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2320 (McKinney 1985).
E.g., HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 712-1270, 1271-1280 (1985); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 99.1, 99.2-
31 (West 1984 & Supp. 1991); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.3801, 600.3802-4001
(West 1987 & Supp. 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.680 (Vernon Supp. 1991); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 15-43-10, 20-130 (Law. Co-op. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-3-101, 102-115
(1980 & Supp. 1991); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 47-1-1, 2-8 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 48-
7, 8-15 (Miclue 1989).
283. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 823.10 (West Supp. 1991); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 712-
1240, 1241-1256 (1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.3801, 3802-4001 (West 1987
& Supp. 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 195.130 (Vernon Supp. 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 24:21-35, 36-37 (West Supp. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-3-101, 102-115 (1980 &
Supp. 1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.48A.010, .011-.900 (West Supp. 1991); WIS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 823.01, .02-.22 (West 1977 & Supp. 1991).
284. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 311.740 (Vernon 1963) (defining nuisance to include
"all property kept and used in maintaining such a place and any still, doubler, worm,
worm tub, mash tub, fermenting tub "); See also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§
600.3801, 600.3802-4001 (West 1987 & Supp. 1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-30-1, 2-11
(1981); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-3-101, 102-115 (1980 & Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 4-81,82-83 (Miclue 1988).
285. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 849.01, .02-46 (West 1976 & Supp. 1991); HAW. REV.
STAT. §§ 712-1220, 1221-1231 (1985 & Supp. 1991); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 99.1, .2-.31,
99A.10 (West 1984 & Supp. 1991); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.3801, 600.3802-
4001 (West 1987 & Supp. 1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-30-1, 2-11 (1981); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 29-3-101, 102-115 (1980 & Supp. 1991).
286. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-25-6 (1988) (unlawful betting on ammal
races); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-3-101, 102-115 (1980 & Supp. 1991) (quarreling, fighting
& breaches of peace); WASH. REV. CODE § 77.16.100 (Supp. 1991) (use of dogs while
hunting).
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vice, rather than the vice itself."" 7 Mumcipalities have adopted
similar public nuisance abatement ordinances."'
Various pieces of evidence may be used to prove a violation
under these ordinances and statutes. Since the common law defim-
tion of disorderly houses depended on the status of the persons
who gathered there, the character of visitors to property may be
used as presumptive evidence of activities that occur on those
premises."89 The general reputation of the place as one at which
illegal activities occur may also be introduced.21 Indeed, the cen-
trality of this evidence is demonstrated by early cases that refer to
these nuisances as houses of "ill repute." 29' A number of state
statutes raise a presumption of illegal activities based on general
reputation.2" Noise, fighting and other disturbances, sufficient m
287. People v. Vandewater, 164 N.E. 864, 867 (N.Y. 1928).
288. E.g., Nuisance Abatement Law, NEW YORK CITY ADMIN. CODE §§ C16-2.0,
2.01-.22 (Supp. 1985-86). A complete text of the onginal ordinance is provided as an
appendix to O'Connor, supra note 284, at 79.
289. See Steinberg v. People, 390 P.2d 811 (Colo. 1964) (holding tavern to be public
nuisance based substantially on evidence that frequent visitors included "'police characters,'
prostitutes, and other undesirables"); Beard v. State, 17 A. 1044 (Md. 1889) (finding
general reputation for lewdness of women who frequented defendant's house competent
evidence to establish disorderly house conviction); State ex reL Cahalan v. Bernstem, 226
N.W.2d 56, 58 (Mich. CL App. 1974) (finding police testimony that prostitutes frequented
bar sufficient to support closing the bar for one year); City of New York ex reL Redlich
v. Goldman, 356 N.Y.S.2d 754, 757-58 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1974) (concluding that reputation
of visitors constituted presumptive evidence of unlawful activities on premises).
290. See State ex rel. Cox v. Taft, 100 S.E.2d 161, 163-64 (W. Va. 1957) (evidence
regarding the general reputation of the premises permitted to establish the defendant's
knowledge of the public nuisance). But see State v. Calley, 10 S.E. 455, 456 (N.C. 1889)
(finding testimony proving the loose morals and conduct of a woman and her daughters
in their own house insufficient to prove the existence of a disorderly house); Morgan v.
City of Humble, 598 S.W.2d 364, 365-66 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that it was re-
versible error to allow police officer to testify regarding general reputation of club as a
location for solicitation by prostitutes because the officer had no actual knowledge of the
club's reputation).
291. See Beard v. State, 17 A. 1044, 1044 (Md. Ct. App. 1880) (defining bawdy house
as house where certain persons of "evil name and fame, and of dishonest conversation,
[came] to frequent"); State v. Calley, 10 S.E. 455, 456 (N.C. 1889) (calling bawdy
house a house of "ill-fame").
292. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3767,05 (Baldwin 1989) ("evidence of the gen-
eral reputation of the place is prima facie evidence of [a public] nuisance); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 11-30-5 (1990) ("notorious character of any such premises, or the notoriously bad
or intemperate character of persons visiting the same shall be evidence that such
premises are nuisances"); see also Kellner v. Cappellim, 516 N.Y.S.2d 827, 830 (N.Y.
City Civ. Ct. 1986) (finding that under New York City Abatement ordinance "proof of
the ill repute of the demitsed premises or those resorting thereto shall constitute presump-
tive evidence of unlawful use").
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themselves to constitute a public nuisance under the common law
and some statutes,293 may also be evidence that criminal activities
take place at a location.2"
Arrests can constitute evidence of a nuisance, but they must be
sufficiently frequent to establish a habitual illegal use of the prop-
erty 2' Some statutes specify that a certain number of arrests on
the premises constitutes prima facie evidence of a public nmu-
sance.29 However, the presumption of nuisance can be rebutted
under most of these statutes.297
Recently, an Ohio court of appeals evaluated standards for
evidence and the appropriate burden of proof.29 In that case, a
citizen anti-crime organization, Concerned Chnstian Men (CCM),
was conducting a public relations campaign and learned from sev-
eral residents in one Dayton neighborhood that marijuana was
being sold from a particular house.21 CCM contacted the police,
who began surveillance of the house. The police noticed "an mor-
dinate volume of traffic which stopped in front of the house and
purchased unidentified packages.""3°° This evidence was sufficient
to obtain an ex parte temporary restraimng and search order under
Ohio's public nuisance statutes."' As part of the inventory search
293. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-3-101, 102-115 (1989) (nuisance includes fight-
ing and quarreling); see also Commonwealth v. Tick, Inc., 233 A.2d 866, 868 (Pa. 1967)
(ruling that trial court abused discretion in failing to close tavern when drunk, disorderly
and loud patrons used foul language outside bar disturbing the neighbors).
294. State ex reL Freeman v. Pierce, 573 N.E.2d 747, 749 (Ohio App. Ct. 1991) (drug
activities on premises deemed per se nuisance).
295. See State ex reL Patterson v. Motorama Motel Corp., 307 N.W.2d 349, 352 (Mich.
App. 1981) ("a nuisance involves repeated or continuing conduct and should not be
based upon proof of a single isolated incident unless [there is a] reasonable inference
that the prohibited conduct was habitual"); see also Kentucky Alcoholic Beverage Control
Bd. v. Jacobs, 269 S.W.2d 189, 191-92 (Ky. App. 1954) (closing tavern for one violation
of liquor laws violated constitutional due process); Morgan v. City of Humble, 598
S.W.2d 364, 366 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980) (holding two arrests without convictions for prosti-
tution at a nightclub insufficient to establish nuisance).
296. See, e.g., N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2324-a (McKinney 1988) (making two or
more convictions within one year for any prostitution offense presumptive evidence of a
nusance).
297. People ex rel. City of New York v. MacBeth Realty Co., 420 N.Y.S.2d 252, 254-
55 (1979) (allowing hotel owner to rebut presumption that hotel was nuisance because
three prostitution arrests had occurred within one year).
298. Freeman, 573 N.E.2d 747.
299. Id. at 748.
300. Id. The mother of the defendant later testified that she was operating a food cater-
ing business outside of the home. Id.
301. Id
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conducted to preserve evidence of the nuisance, the police found
five pounds of marijuana.' At a subsequent hearing, the lower
court found the house a public nuisance and issued a one year
padlock order. 3
On appeal, the Oluo court held that the appropriate burden of
proof was not the criminal law's reasonable doubt standard, but
rather a civil law standard." 4 Because the statute allowed mjunc-
tive relief, the court held that clear and convincing evidence was
the appropriate standard of proof.3 5 As to the elements necessary
to prove a nuisance, the court noted that, like negligence per se,
the plaintiff need only prove a "de facto violation" of a criminal
law not a "de jure conviction."3°
The most difficult aspect of this case related to whether the
relator was required to prove that the property owner had any
relationship to the nuisance. The Ohio statute did not specifically
require that the owner be made a defendant to abatement proceed-
ings or be proven to have had knowledge of the illegal activi-
ties.3 7 The relator argued that once he proved a violation, the
burden shifted to owners to show their innocence in regard to the
nuisance."°i The court disagreed and held that in any abatement
action in which the owner is a defendant, the relator must show
"by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant had knowl-
edge of and either acquiesced to or participated in a felony viola-
tion on the property ,309
Unlike the Ohio statute, some state statutes expressly require
proof of a landlord's fault in closure actions. Under these laws,
much of the evidence used to establish a nuisance is also relevant
to proving that the landlord had notice of the nuisance. Reputation
evidence may help establish not only that a building's use consti-
tuted a nuisance but that the owner knew of the use.310 While
302. Id. For the applicability of constitutional search and seizure protection m the con-
text of nuisance abatement proceedings, see Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd.,
350 So. 2d 158 (La. 1977).
303. Freeman, 573 N.E.2d at 749.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 752.
306. Id at 750.
307. Id. (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3719.10).
308. Id.
309. Id at 752.
310. State v. Taft, 100 S.E.2d 161, 163-65 (W. Va. 1957) (finding evidence of reputa-
tion admissible but not sufficient to sustain padlock order against owner where no other
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reputation evidence alone may be insufficient to establish actual
knowledge, a reputation for illegal activities plus a substantial rent
payment may be sufficient to meet some states' standards of con-
structive knowledge.31' Some statutes provide presumptions of
landlord knowledge and acquiescence based on the frequency of
illegal activity 2 or the reputation of the premises.3 t3
Not all courts have required proof of landlord knowledge m a
nuisance action. Many courts presume that a property owner knows
how his property is being used.314 For example, the Texas Court
of Appeals 315 relied on a 1915 precedent and held that if proper-
ty is determined to be a nuisance, closure orders may be granted
regardless of proof of the owner's knowledge or participation m
the nuisance.316 Moreover, the court held that the owner had the
burden of proving the nuisance had been abated.317
In determining whether knowledge on the part of the landlord
is required, some courts distinguish between in personam proceed-
ings and in rem proceedings. Many courts view closure orders as
in personam actions which must be supported by evidence of the
landowner's knowledge and participation in the nuisance. 318 How-
ever, other courts view closure orders as in rem actions against the
evidence of his knowledge of illegal alcohol service existed).
311. State v. Irving, 700 S.W.2d 529, 533 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (ruling that owner's
$60,000 net annual income from tenant's business and the widespread reputation of the
business as masturbatory massage parlor provided sufficient evidence of owner's knowl-
edge to support one year closure order).
312. TEx. Cv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 125.004 (West. Supp. 1991).
313. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2324-3(c) (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1991).
314. See, e.g., City of New York v. Castro, 542 N.Y.S.2d 101, 102-03 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1989), aft'd, 559 N.Y.S.2d 508 (App. Div. 1990) (enjoining defendant from occupying his
building despite the fact that he had no knowledge or notification that illegal gambling
occurred on his newly purchased premises).
315. Rogers v. City of Abilene, 704 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
316. Id at 146 (citing Moore v. State, 181 S.W. 438 (Tex. 1915) and limiting holding
to civil nuisance cases while continuing to require knowledge in crimnal nuisance ac-
tions).
317. Id.
318. See, e.g., Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Hartline, 11 So. 2d 833, 837 (Ala.
1943) (holding owner knowledge required because "ownership of real property imposes no
responsibility for a nuisance created and maintained thereon by other parties"); Ahern v.
Steele, 22 N.E. 193 (N.Y. 1889) (finding landlord who acquired property by inheritance
not liable for a nuisance of which he had no knowledge). Cf. State ex rel. Webster v.
Daugherty, 530 S.W.2d 81 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975) (concluding that innocent owner can be
subjected to permanent, perpetual injunction against operation of property without violating
due process because no liability for damages or fine or penalty is imposed on the owner
and there is no retroactive effect).
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property itself; hence, the owner need not have participated in or
have had knowledge of illegal activities on the premises.1 9 Tins
latter view results in a strict liability standard.
The constitutionality of a strict liability approach has been
addressed in a number of cases, with no clear result. Appellate
decisions by the Michigan courts illustrate the confusion with their
varying interpretations of the constitutionality of the Michigan
nuisance abatement statute. The Michigan statute does not require
that the owner have knowledge or notice of the nuisance for a
closure order.320 In 1977, the Michigan Court of Appeals held
that an owner's knowledge or notice of illegal use of premises is
not constitutionally required to uphold a closure order to issue.32'
The court relied on the United States Supreme Court's decision
permitting forfeiture of a vessel carrying contraband even though
the owner had no knowledge that his lessee was arrested for smok-
ing a single marijuana cigarette.322 The Michigan court's justifi-
cation for its interpretation summarizes the position taken by many
courts throughout the history of these statutes.
Closing the premises for up to one year prevents illegal
reuse of the property and substantially decreases any profit
derived from criminal activity Even though innocent, the
defendants may have been negligent in failing to discover
the flagrant misconduct alleged; the statute will encourage
them to be more careful in the future. The confiscation
threatened by the Michigan statute is at most a temporary
deprivation of use of the premises and forfeiture of the
furmshings 323
319. See People v. Barbiere, 166 P. 812, 815 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1917) (holding that
an action in rein does not require owner knowledge of the nuisance); see also People ex
rel. Hicks v. Sarong Gats, 117 Cal. Rptr. 24, 28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) (proceedings direct-
ed against the property did not violate defendant's First Amendment rights); People v.
Mecaddon, 192 P. 325 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1920) (finding owner's lack of knowledge re-
garding nuisance irrelevant in abatement action); People v. Bayside Land Co., 191 P. 994,
995 (Cal. Dist. CL App. 1920) (reasoning that statute's purpose is to reform property, so
innocence of owner is irrelevant).
320. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3815(2) (West 1987).
321. State ex rel. Patterson v. Weaver, 254 N.W.2d 68 (Mich. App. 1977). The Michi-
gan nuisance abatement statute does require that the owner be named as a defendant m
order for the court to issue a closure order. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3801 (West
1987 & Supp. 1991).
322. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
323. Weaver, 254 N.W.2d at 70.
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In 1981, the Michigan Court of Appeals again addressed the
issue of landlord knowledge in State ex rel Oakland County Pros-
ecutor v. Motorama Motel Corporation.324 In that case, the court
relied on a 1927 Michigan Supreme Court decision which held that
proof of the owner's "knowledge, acquiescence or consent" was
constitutionally required to close a building. 325 While noting that
the Michigan Supreme Court decision had been virtually ignored
for nearly fifty years, the court found that it had never been over-
ruled and approved the supreme court's analysis.326
The very next year the Michigan appellate court again ad-
dressed the issue of owner knowledge.327 Despite acknowledging
the confusion in its prior decisions on the issue, the court did not
clarify the status of the law Rather, the court concluded that, as a
practical matter, owner knowledge always would be present m an
abatement case.328 The court reasoned that even if an owner did
not know about illegal activities on his property prior to a proceed-
mg in abatement, the issuance of the complaint provided notice and
the owner could then avoid closure by taking steps to voluntarily
abate the nuisance.329 The court concluded that, "[a]s between so-
ciety and the owner of the premises, it is not unfair that the risk
of loss be placed on the owner who leased the premises to the
person who used the premises for the unlawful purpose.
330
One justification for placing the risk on the landlord is that
these statutes provide sufficient protection against unfair closures of
property Under these abatement statutes, a court can rescind a
padlock order against property if the owner pays the costs of the
nuisance proceeding and posts a bond against further nuisances on
the premises.331 The court must be satisfied with the owner's
324. 307 N.W.2d 349 (Mich. App. 1981).
325. Id. at 351 (citing People v. Schoonmaker, 216 N.W. 456 (1927)).
326. Motoramia Motel, 307 N.W.2d at 351 (citing State v. Weitzman, 176 N.W.2d 462
(Mich. App. 1970)) ("We are admittedly perplexed by the apparent inconsistencies of
Schoonmaker and the later decided cases, but we find that until some authoritative ruling
is made in this area, we shall use the holding espoused in Schoonmaker.").
327. State v. Mesk, 333 N.W.2d 184 (Mich. App. 1982).
328. Id. at 191.
329. Id. See also Commonwealth ex rel. Funk v. Miehl, 258 S.W.2d 493 (Ky. 1953)
(noting that a court may deny an injunction if the owner abates nuisance and there is no
likelihood of its recurrence); Rogers v. City of Abilene, 704 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. Ct. App.
1986) (permitting permanent injunction for continued violation without abatement by own-
er).
330. Mesk, 333 N.W.2d at 191 n.4.
331. E.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2332 (McKinney 1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-
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good faith pledge to abate the nuisance and prevent further nui-
sances from arising.332 Some statutes specify a required amount
for the bond, while others vest discretion in the judge.333 Howev-
er, relief from a closure order does not vacate any other orders is-
sued in the proceeding. For example, personal injunctions issued in
the same proceeding against the defendants are still valid.3"
While effective in some circumstances, public nuisance abate-
ment proceedings are complicated. The following case study dem-
onstrates the frustrations of all parties involved in a nuisance abate-
ment proceeding.
c. A Case Study in Nuisance Abatement
The saga of an attempt to close a 70-room, single-occupancy
hotel (The Ridgefield Hotel) in an Upper West Side neighborhood
of New York City illustrates the difficulties in a nuisance abate-
ment proceeding.335 A great deal of prostitution activity allegedly
occurred at the hotel, and the police undertook an investigation at
the request of the neighbors.33 6 Undercover officers were solicited
on the street "some distance" from the hotel, walked with the
prostitutes to the hotel, and arrested the prostitutes in the lob-
by
33 7
After three convictions for prostitution in the hotel in 1978, the
New York attorney general brought an abatement action to close
the hotel.38 The request for a preliminary injunction was sup-
43-110 (Law Co-op. 1990); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 823.15 (West 1989). These types of pro-
visions have been upheld against attacks that they are unconstitutional deprivations of
property. The National Prohibition Act, which included proceedings to abate liquor nut-
sances, was upheld in Schlieder v. United States, 11 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1926). This case
was later cited by the United States Supreme Court when it upheld the Prohibition Act
provision at issue in a case ordering an injunction against occupancy and use. Grosfield v.
United States, 276 U.S. 494, 498 (1928).
332. Eg., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2332 (McKinney 1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-
43-110 (Law. Co-op. 1990).
333. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3840 (West 1988) ($1,000 to $50,000);
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2332 (McKinney 1988) (value of the property); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 15-43-110 (Law. Co-op. 1990) (value of the property as ascertained by the court);
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 125.002 (West 1987) ($10,000); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 823.15 (West 1989) (discretion of court).
334. Eg., N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2332 (McKinney 1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § IS-
43-110 (Law. Co-op. 1990); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 823.15 (West 1989).
335. People ex reL City of New York v. MacBeth Realty Co., 420 N.Y.S.2d 252 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1979) ('MacBeth II").
336. Id. at 253.
337. Id.
338. People ex reL City of New York v. MacBeth Realty Co., 406 N.Y.S.2d 298 (App.
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ported by evidence of these arrests and by affidavits from four
witnesses who testified that the hotel had a reputation for frequent
prostitution.3 9 One witness testified that the rooms beyond the
lobby desk were rented seven or eight times each evening.' The
New York trial court issued a prelimnary injunction, closing the
entire hotel on February 14, 1978. 3"
Both the state and federal courts rejected the defendant-owner's
requests for a stay, but a number of hotel residents also brought a
class action requesting a stay of the closure order. 2 The federal
court for the Southern District of New York granted a preliminary
injunction restraining enforcement of the state court order against
innocent tenants on April 7, 1978. 34' On June 15, 1978, the Ap-
pellate Division of the New York Supreme Court modified its
original order, conforming its terms to those of the federal court's
order.3 The Appellate Division now held that the closure order
would apply only to the two rooms behind the lobby desk and to
any rooms that became vacant.?" This modification was neces-
sary to prevent innocent tenants from being forced to relocate and
because the evidence of prostitution was limited to the rooms be-
hind the lobby desk.
The court was not in full agreement. In a separate concurrence,
one judge noted that he thought the federal court had violated
abstention principles by enjoining the state court's order.3 Two
dissenting judges would have upheld the original order because it
was supported by "clear and convincing evidence of a continued
pattern of prostitution at the premises. '347 One dissenting opinion
objected to the more limited injunction because it would be diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to enforce. 3" The other dissenter com-
mented on the irony of the court's decision:
Div. 1978) ("MacBeth I"). The Supreme Court of New York County issued a preliminary
injunction in an unreported decision.
339. Id. at 300.
340. Id.
341. Id at 298.
342. Id. at 300. These plaintiffs were represented by the hotel owner's attorney. Id.
343. See id. at 299 (citing the unreported federal decision).
344. Id at 298-99.
345. Id at 298.
346. Id at 299 (Kupferman, J., concumng).
347. Id. (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
348. Id at 300.
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While one arm of the City government, attempting to en-
force the anti-prostitution laws, seeks to have the .building
closed as a public nuisance another arm of the City is
paying the rent for the welfare tenants in the building who
are represented by the attorney for the owners and 'hotel'
operator in an attempt to keep the building open. Such are
the annals of the poor."
The final action for a permanent.injunction -and damages was
tried nearly one year later, at which time the court held for the
defendant landowner.3 The court characterized hotels like the
defendant's as "hells on earth" and "dumping places for the un-
wanted, the unfortunates and 'losers' in our society ,,35 The court
sympathized with the "justifiable resentment on the part of the
Upper West Side community that they are beanng a disproportion-
ate part of the burden created by these 'hotels' ,352 Nevertheless,
the court stated that three arrests in one year were insufficient evi-
dence that the hotel was being operated as a house of prostitu-
tion. 53 The court found the statutory presumption adequately re-
butted because, even with a concerted police effort, only three
arrests were made for prostitution and none were made on the
premses."M Thus, the court demed the requested relief, suggest-
ing that the proper avenue for regulating the hotel's operations was
through the admimstrative agency that provided welfare referrals to
the hotel.3.
5
This two-year effort to close the Ridgefield Hotel demonstrates
the different standards of evidence required to obtain preliminary
injunctions and final closure orders, the dangerous impact of clo-
sure orders on innocent third parties, the cooperation of. the com-
munity and the police in pursuing a nuisance action, and the vaned
motivations for these actions. This case also illustrates how the
lack of predictability regarding these nuisance standards results in
inefficiency While the owner eventually won, the process spanned
349. Id at 301 (Fern, J., concurring in dissent).
350. MacBeth II, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 253-55.
351. Id at 253.
352. Id at 254.
353. Id at 255.
354. Id at 255. These facts were contrasted with testimony by a police officer that, at
a well-known Manhattan luxury hotel, there had been twenty arrests within a few weeks
and that several such luxury hotels were houses of prostitution.
355. Id at 256.
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two years, five court proceedings and the temporary closure of the
apartment building.
C. MODERN FORFEITURE LAWS AS A BASIS FOR
LANDLORDS' DUTY TO CONTROL/PREVENT TENANT
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
The high profile and often dramatic results of forfeiture statutes
provide an image of effective law enforcement efforts. Forfeiture
provisions exist in a variety of statutes including customs reporting
provisions3' and organized crime laws.357 The most commonly
invoked forfeiture statutes at both the federal and state level are
those relating to illegal drugs. At the federal level, section 881 of
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
197035 addresses the forfeiture of property used in connection
with illegal drugs. At the state level, the structure of forfeiture
statutes follows the Uniform Controlled Substances Act of
197o. 35
9
Under these statutes, the illegal activities of a tenant create the
risk of civil forfeiture of the landlord's property A criminal con-
viction of the tenant or landlord is not necessary to invoke a civil
forfeiture action.' ° Even the tenant's acquittal in a prior criminal
proceeding does not preclude a civil forfeiture action." I An ac-
356. Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5317(c) (1989).
357. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Comprehensive Forfeiture
Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988). See generally J. Morrs Clark, Civil and Criminal
Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REV.
379 (1976) (analyzing the Supreme Court's treatment of cases involving civil and mone-
tary penalties, forfeitures of property and other "quasi-crunmal" actions under a variety of
statutes); James R. Maxemer, Note, Bane of American Forfeiture Law - Banished at
Last?, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 768 (1977) (providing a thorough description of the history
of forfeiture proceedings in both England and the United States).
358. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988).
359. UNIF. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT, 9 U.L.A. 1 (1990). When the Uniform Con-
trolled Substances Act was originally proposed in 1970, all fifty states, Puerto Rico and
the Virgin Islands adopted it. UNIF. CONTROLL.D SUBSTANCES ACT, 9 U.L.A. at 47-48
(Supp. 1991). However, each state approved its own version of the Act. The modifications
made were numerous and substantial. In 1990, a new version of the act was adopted by
the Commissioners of Uniform Laws. UNIF. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT, 9 U.L.A. I
(1990 & Supp. 1991). The new act has not yet been adopted by any state.
360. See United States v. $152,160.00 U.S. Currency, 680 F. Supp. 354, 356 (D. Colo.
1988).
361. See United States v. Dunn, 802 F.2d 646, 647 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480
U.S. 931 (1987) (holding previous acquittal in cruinal trial does not raise issues of res
judicata or collateral estoppel in a civil forfeiture proceeding); United States v. One 1977
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quittal only means the state was not able to prove the crime be-
yond a reasonable doubt. 2 In a civil forfeiture action, once the
government establishes probable cause to link the property to
drugs, the defendant must refute the charges by a preponderance of
the evidence.363
Even when a criminal forfeiture proceeding accompanies a
federal crminal conviction, the civil proceeding is necessary to
assert third-party interests in the property.36  Therefore, a
landlord's tlurd-party interest is litigated in a subsequent and sepa-
rate trial, either following a criminal forfeiture action or as the sole
forfeiture action under the federal civil provisions.365
Interests subject to forfeiture under the civil forfeiture provi-
sions include contraband, vehicles, money and personal property,
with separate standards applying to each.3"6 The constitutional is-
sues raised by these provisions have been the subject of extensive
analysis and commentary 367 This article will not repeat that task,
Lincoln Mark V, 453 F. Supp. 1388, 1391 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding defendant's acquittal
in narcotics trial not dispositive in forfeiture proceeding because standards and burdens of
proof are different).
362. 1977 Lincoln, 453 F. Supp. at 1391.
363. Fg., United States v. 900 Rio Vista Blvd., 803 F.2d 625, 629 (11th Cir. 1986);
One Blue 1977 AMC Jeep CJ-5 v. United States, 783 F.2d 759, 761 (8th Cir. 1986).
364. See United States v. Stazola, 893 F.2d 34, 36 (3rd Cir. 1990) (noting that subse-
quent to a criminal forfeiture, a third party may file a claim asserting a legal interest in
the forfeited property, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(2)); United States v. Campus, 859
F.2d 1233 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Reckmeyer, 836 F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 1987).
365. Generally, '[b]ecause innocent third parties are not involved in this trial [criminal
forfeiture action], they may not assert their claims to the defendant's forfeited interest
until the trial has been completed." Michael Goldsmith & Mark J. Linderman, Asset For-
feiture and Third Party Rights: The Need for Further Law Reform, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1254,
1263. However, concurrent state civil and federal criminal forfeiture actions are permissi-
ble. United States v. Drane, 637 F. Supp. 482 (S.D. Ala. 1986).
366. See Goldsmith & Linderman, supra note 365 (discussing evolving standards for in-
nocent third parties under federal statutory provisions relating to forfeiture of vehicles).
367. See generally Brad A. Chapman & Kenneth W. Pearson, The Drug War and Real
Fstate Forfeiture Under 21 U.S.C. S. 881: The "Innocent" Lienholder's Rights, 21 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 2127 (1990) (examining constitutional issues arising under the federal law);
J. Morris Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework for Consti-
tutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REV. 379 (1976) (discussing federal forfeiture provisions in
the context of constitutional distinctions between criminal and civil puishment); Jean R.
Hutar, A "Kinder, Gentler" Interpretation of the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984,
24 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 171 (1990) (examining constitutional problems raised by forfeitures
at the pre-conviction stage); Mark A. Jankowski, Tempering the Relation-back Doctrine: A
More Reasonable Approach to Civil Forfeiture in Drug Cases, 76 VA. L. REV. 165
(1990) (discussing the proper standard of knowledge a subsequent purchaser must demon-
strate to claim innocent ownership and insulate himself from forfeiture); Lalit K. Loomba,
The Innocent Owner Defense to Real Property Forfeiture Under the Comprehensive Crime
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but will focus on application of these standards to landlord forfei-
ture for tenant criminal activities.' First, the primary federal
statute under which landlords' property is subject to forfeiture is
explored. Particularly, tlus section will examine application of fed-
eral standards, procedures and innocent owner defenses to land-
lords. Second, a variety of state statutes providing for forfeiture of
real property are outlined.
1. Forfeiture of a Landlord's Real Property Interests Under
Federal Statutes
Real property was not subject to forfeiture under the original
version of the federal drug statute.369 In 1982, the statute was
amended to include the proceeds of illegal activities as forfeitable
Control Act of 1984, 58 FoRDHAM L. REV. 471 (1989) (advocating a balancing approach
that accounts for the interests of property owners and society); James B. Speta, Narrowing
the Scope of Civil Drug Forfeiture: Section 881, Substantial Connection and the Eighth
Amendment, 89 MICH. L. REV. 165 (1990) (arguing that the federal forfeiture law should
be limited in light of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence); Katherine M. Yusavage, The
Landlord and Forfeiture Under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act of 1970, 9 GLENDALE L. REv. 33, 35 (1990) (exanuing landlords' forfeitures, bur-
dens of proof and remedies); Note, Fifth Amendment - Seizures and Forfeiture of Prop-
erty - Federal Court Upholds Pre-notice Seizure and Forfeiture of Real Property Used
for Narcotics Trafficking, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1139 (1991) (examining property forfeiture
and Fourth and Fifth Amendment jurisprudence); Christopher M. Neronha, Comment, In re
Metmor Financial Inc.. The Better Approach to Post-seizure Interest Under the Compre-
hensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, 65 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 853 (1990)
(exanunmg the constitutionality of awarding a post-seizure interest to an innocent owner
under the Drug Control Act); Peter Petrou, Note, Due Process Implications of Shifting the
Burden of Proof in Forfeiture Proceedings Arising Out of Illegal Drug Transactions, 1984
DUKE Li. 822 (1984) (arguing that due process is violated by shifting the burden of
proof onto the individual opposing the forfeiture statute).
368. The list of forfeitable property defined in § 881(a) was amended by the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 418. In part, the amendment express-
ly identifies 'any leasehold interest" as forfeitable. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988).
369. The original version of the act limited forfeitures to vehicles and contraband, pro-
scribing:
(1) All controlled substances which have been manufactured, distributed, dis-
pensed, or acquired in violation of this title.
(2) All raw materials, products, and equipment of any land which are
used in violation of this title.
(3) All property which is used or intended for use, as a container for property
described in paragraph (1) or (2).
(4) All conveyances, including, aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or
are intended for use, to transport property described in paragraph (1) or
(2).
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84
Stat. 1276 (1970).
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property 370 Under tlus provision, real property was forfeitable on-
ly as a "thing of value" if received "in exchange for a controlled
substance." 37' In 1984, Congress amended the statute again to
clarify the circumstances under which real property could be for-
feited.3 2 Under this amendment, real property was added to the
list of items subject to forfeiture if it was used to facilitate a viola-
tion.373
Thus, under the current statute, a landlord's real property inter-
ests may be forfeitable under two separate provisions. Section
881(a)(6) causes a landlord to forfeit real property if it is consid-
ered part of the proceeds of a criminal drug enterprise.374 Section
881(a)(7) subjects a landlord's property to forfeiture if it has "facil-
itated" a drug violation.375
a. Standards for Forfeiture
Under either statutory provision, the government need only
370. The 1982 amendment provided for forfeiture of:
(a]ll moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value fur-
rushed by any person in exchange for a controlled substance in violation
of this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all moneys,
negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate
any violation of this subchapter
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6).
371. Id.
372. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 306(a), 98 Stat.
2040, 2050 (1984); see also S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 195 (1984), reprinted
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3374 (noting that the amendments were "designed to enhance
the use of forfeiture as a law enforcement tool in combatting racketeering and
drug trafficking"). The legislative history reveals that Congress was concerned that
property "indispensable" to committing drug offenses was not subject to forfeiture under
the previous provisions. Id. 199, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3378.
373. The new provision reads:
(a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no
property right shall exist in them:
(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest in
the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or improvements,
which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to
facilitate the commission of, a violation of this title punishable by more than
one year's imprisonment, except that no property shall be forfeited under this
paragraph, to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or
omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without
the knowledge or consent of that owner.
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7).
374. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6).
375. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7).
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show probable cause existed to seize the property376 Thereafter,
the burden shifts to the landlord to prove either that the property
was not used to facilitate a drug violation or that the tenant's
illegal use was without the landlord's knowledge or consent.3"
Probable cause exists when the government has a reasonable
belief that statutory violations have occurred.378 Tus belief may
be supported by less than prima facie evidence, but it must be
based on more than mere suspicion.379 To prove probable cause,
the government must show the property was used for drug activ-
ities, though it need not link the property to any one particular
transaction."' As in nuisance abatement proceedings, probable
cause may be established by hearsay"' and circumstantial evi-
dence.
382
Of the two provisions, it is more difficult to establish probable
cause that the property was used to "facilitate" a violation. The
federal circuit courts disagree substantially regarding the appropriate
standard for facilitation under section 881(a)(7). Some interpret the
term consistent with its common meaning of making an activity
easier or freeing it from hindrances.383 More recently, one court
applied the language of the statute itself, deeming facilitation to
mean "used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part" to
further a violation.3u Other courts, however, have required a
"substantial connection" between the forfeited property and the
drug offense. 385 Unlike the nuisance standards, the substantial
376. United States v. 900 Rio Vista Blvd., 803 F.2d 625, 629 (ilth Cir. 1986).
377. See United States v. 5 Bell Rock Road, 896 F.2d 605, 610-12 (ist Cir. 1990) (up-
holding summary judgment for government because it met its burden and the defendants
did not meet theirs); United States v. 526 Liscum Dnve, 866 F.2d 213, 216 (6th Cir.
1988) (stating that once the government proves probable cause, "the burden then shifts to
the claimant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the property is not subject
to forfeiture").
378. 526 Liscum Drive, 866 F.2d at 216.
379. Id.; United States v. 11348 Wyoming, 705 F. Supp. 352, 355 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
380. United States v. Banco Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d 1154, 1160 (2d Cir. 1986).
381. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 165 (1978); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108,
i14 (1964).
382. United States v. 4492 S. Livonia Road, 889 F.2d 1258, 1269 (2d Cir. 1989), reh g
demed, 897 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1990).
383. See United States v. One 1977 Lincoln Mark V Coupe, 643 F.2d 154, 157 (3d
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 818 (1981).
384. United States v. 916 Douglas Ave., 903 F.2d 490, 492-93 (7th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, Bom v. United States, III S. Ct. 1090 (1991) (finding two telephone calls to
arrange a drug transaction sufficient to forfeit home).
385. See, e.g., United States v. Schifferli, 895 F.2d 987, 990 (4th Cir. 1990) (ruling that
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connection test does not require ongoing activities or violations but
may be met by a single violation on the property 31
6
Moreover, because section 881(a)(7) provides for forfeiture of
"[a]ll real property, including any right, title, and interest (including
any leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of
land,"38 7  courts have upheld broad forfeitures. For example,
courts have approved forfeiture of entire tracts of land based on
illegal activity on only a portion of the land.38" In addition, entire
buildings may be seized even though illegal drug activity occurred
in only parts of the building.3"9
b. Federal Procedures for Seizure of Property
Forfeitures under federal provisions may proceed pursuant to
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,3 ° which permit a judge
to Issue a seizure warrant only after an ex parte probable cause
hearing.391 Section 881 also authorizes the seizure of forfeitable
property without prior notice or hearing if the Attorney General
shows probable cause that property is forfeitable. 3' The federal
dental office used over 40 times to issue illegal prescriptions for eight patients constituted
substantial connection); United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1542 (4th Cir. 1989)
(finding four sales of cocaine from home in one month constituted substantial connection);
United States v. 3639-2nd St., N.E., 869 F.2d 1093, 1097 (8th Cir. 1989) (concluding
house was substantially connected to illegal drug activity where cocaine, drug scales, a
sifting device, drug paraphernalia, drug notes, weapons and $250 in government "buy
money" were found in the residence). Some states require a substantial connection by
statute. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.502(a)(8) (West 1991) (requiring a
"substantial nexus between commercial production or sale of the controlled sub-
stance and the real property").
386. United States v. 3097 S.W. llth Avenue, 699 F Supp. 287, 290 (S.D. Fla. 1988)
(ordering house forfeited after drugs were transferred between cars parked in the drive-
way), aftd, 921 "F.2d 1551 (1lth Cir. 1991). But see United States v. Certain Lots in
Virginia Beach, Virginia, Known as Lots 18 and 19 in Block 3, 657.1F Supp. 1062, 1065
(E.D. Va. 1987) (holding single violation insufficient for forfeiture absent other evidence
of criminal use of the property).
387. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7).
388. See, e.g., United States v. 40 Moon Hill Road, 884 F.2d 41, 44-45 (ist Cir. 1989)
(17.9 acres forfeited); United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1534 (4th Cir. 1989) (26
acres including family home forfeited).
389. United States v. 141st Street, 911 F.2d 870, 873 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Ill
S. Ct. 1017 (1991); United States v. 16 Clinton Street, 730 F. Supp. 1265, 1266
(S.D.N.Y. 1990).
390. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41.
391. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(d) (stating that all provisions of law related to forfeitures
generally are applicable to seizures and forfeitures under this statute).
392. 21 U.S.C. 881(b)(4).
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circuit courts have disagreed over the constitutionality of these ex
parte seizures.
In United States v. 4492 S. Livonia Road,393 the Second Cir-
cuit held that the seizure of an isolated farmhouse on 120 acres
without a prior adversarial hearing violated the claimant's right to
due process. 39 The court applied the due process test articulated
by the Supreme Court in a series of cases decided in the 1970s
relating to pre-tnal remedies.395 Under that standard, constitution-
al seizure of property without notice and hearing requires consid-
eration of three factors: the need to secure an important govern-
mental interest, the special need for prompt action and the strict
control over the state's monopoly of legitimate force.3' The
Livonia court balanced the significant need for effective crime
enforcement against not only the owner's interest in fair process
but also the constitutional concern for protecting the privacy of
one's home. 97 Moreover, the court rejected a finding that exigent
circumstances create a need for prompt action because "a home
cannot be readily moved or dissipated. ' 398  Thus, the court
concluded that due process required notice and a hearing before the
seizure.
399
Other courts have held that drug forfeitures involve inherently
extraordinary circumstances that justify ex parte seizures. These
courts rely on Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.' In
that case, a leased yacht was seized when marijuana was found on
board."° The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
seizure and forfeiture despite the lack of notice to the yacht's les-
393. 889 F.2d 1258 (2d Cir. 1989) (affirming the validity of the forfeiture despite the
constitutional violation), reh'g denied, 897 F.2d 659 (1990).
394. Id at 1265-66.
395. Id. (applying Fuentes v. Shevm, 407 U.S. 67, 81-82 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970); Smadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 341-42
(1969)).
396. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 91.
397. 4492 S. Livonia Road, 889 F.2d at 1265.
398. Id
399. Id. However, since a full hearing subsequent to the seizure had established proba-
ble cause, the court ultimately upheld the forfeiture. Id. See also United States v. Parcel
I, Beginning at a Stake, 731 F Supp. 1348, 1353-54 (S.D. Ill. 1990) (holding that an ex
parte magistrate proceeding was insufficient to protect claimants' rights given their private
interest m their seized homes).
400. 416 U.S. 663, reh'g denied, 417 U.S. 977 (1974).
401. Id at 665.
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sor. The court reasoned that seizure for purposes of forfeiture
"presents an 'extraordinary' situation (justifying] postponement of
notice and hearing.'"4 3
The analysis m Pearson Yacht has been used to justify seizures
of leased real property, despite the differences in exigency present-
ed by seizure of a movable vehicle versus seizure of real property
In United States v. 141st Street Corp.,' the Second Circuit re-
fused to apply the Livonia analysis to commercially leased property
because, unlike the private residence m that case, "the private
interest involved [was the] ownership and possession of an apart-
ment building solely for commercial purposes.'" 0 5 Moreover, the
court noted that because the seizure was pursuant to an ex parte
hearing before a magistrate, sufficient protection against erroneous
deprivation of property was provided.' Thus, the Second Circuit
apparently established a dual standard of due process for real prop-
erty seizures, requiring higher protection for private residences than
commercial properties. This rationale has been followed by other
courts. In United States v. 16 Clinton St., the court held that ex
parte judicial review was sufficient to justify the seizure of a large
commercial building, containing two stores and eight apart-
ments.'
c. The Innocent Owner Defense
Similar to the closure orders issued against a landlord's proper-
ty in nuisance abatement actions,4 ' forfeiture provisions have
been challenged on takings grounds; courts have held that the de-
sirability of deterring illegal use of property outweighs the eco-
nomic loss to lessors. The Supreme Court in Pearson Yacht noted:
To the extent that such forfeiture provisions are applied to
lessors, bailors, or secured creditors who are innocent of
any wrongdoing, confiscation may have the desirable effect
of inducing them to exercise greater care in transferring
402. Id at 680.
403. Id at 679-80.
404. 911 F.2d 870 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 1017 (1991).
405. Id at 874-75.
406. Id.; see also United States v. 300 Cove Road, 861 F.2d 232 (9th Cir. 1988) (hold-
mg that a magistrate's review before seizure offered sufficient protection), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 954 (1989).
407. 730 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
408. See supra text accompanying notes 247-68.
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possession of their property
In qualifying these remarks, however, the Court acknowledged
that innocent third parties may have a constitutional defense against
civil forfeiture, but only in an extreme situation.
[I]t would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim of
an owner whose property subjected to forfeiture had been
taken from him without Ins privity or consent Simr-
larly, the same might be said of an owner who proved not
only that he was umnvolved in and unaware of the wrong-
ful activity, but also that he had done all that reasonably
could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his
property 410
Thus, due process and takings challenges to civil forfeiture pro-
ceedings are foreclosed by the Pearson Yacht decision, and the
innocent owner defense is the only means for landlords to defeat
forfeiture.4 '
The landlord's risk of forfeiture under section 881(a)(6) (the
"proceeds" provision) is less than the risk under section 881(a)(7)
(the "facilitating" provision). The proceeds provision is lirmted.
Under Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, if a service
is provided for remuneration and the provider did not have a rea-
sonable basis to know the assets were potentially subject to forfei-
ture, the assets are immune from forfeiture.4"2 Whereas a landlord
may have a reasonable basis to know that illegal activities are
occurring on Ins premises, he is less likely to have a reasonable
basis to know the rent he is receiving is the product of drug trans-
actions.
Section 881(a)(7) poses a greater threat to landlords and raises
the most difficult questions regarding innocence. 13 Under this
facilitating provision, an innocent or ignorant owner may prevail
409. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 687-88, reh 'g denied,
417 U.S. 977 (1974).
410. let at 689.
411. See generally Goldsmith & Linderman, supra note 365, at 1264-67 (discussing the
legal consequences of Pearson Yacht).
412. 491 U.S. 617 (interpreting 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(B) (1988) which "gives a third
party who entered into a bona fide transaction with a defendant a right to make claims
against forfeited property, if that third party was 'at the time of [the transaction] reason-
ably without cause to believe that the (defendant's assets were] subject to forfeiture'").
413. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7).
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"by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to
have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent
of the owner."414 Thus, if there is evidence a landlord actually
witnessed illegal transactions, he has no innocent owner de-
fense.415 Willful blindness similarly will remove an innocent
owner defense.416
The defense may also include the element of consent. Some
courts have held that the innocent owner defense requires both lack
of knowledge and lack of consent.41 7 Other courts have permitted
an innocent owner defense even if a landlord knew of illegal activ-
ities on the premises, as long as he did not consent to these ac-
tivities,
Unted States v. 141st Street Corp. illustrates application of the
innocent owner defense." In that case, an apartment building
containing forty-one apartments was the site of extensive narcotics
activity 420 Undercover police found narcotics in seventeen of the
building's forty-one apartments.42" ' The police had raided the
building on two separate occasions. Initially, police executed search
warrants for eight apartments, arrested twenty-six people and seized
narcotics, money and weapons. Two weeks later, they executed
warrants in nine additional apartments, arrested another twelve
people and recovered more contraband.4" At that time, the build-
ing was seized pursuant to an ex parte application to a United
States magistrate under the provisions of section 881(a)(7).4'
414. Id
415. United States v. 19,026 Oakmont South Drive, 715 F Supp. 233, 237 (N.D. Ind.
1989) (allowing no innocent owner defense where two witnesses testified the defendant
was m the room when cocaine was being sold and used).
416. United States v. 5745 N.W. 110 Street, 721 F. Supp. 287, 290 (S.D.,FIa. 1989);
Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7) (1985) ("knowledge [of a fact] is established if a
person is aware of a lugh probability of its existence, unless he actually believes that it
does not exist").
417. United States v. Lot Ill-B, Waipouli, Kapaa Island, 902 F.2d 1443, 1445 (9th Cir.
1990); United States v. 418 57th Street, 737 F. Supp. 749, 751 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
418. United States v. 6109 Grubb Road, 886 F.2d 618, 626 (3d Cir. 1989) (allowing
innocent owner defense if owner proves either lack of knowledge or consent), rehg de-
med, 890 F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1989); see also United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 937
F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. 141st Street Corp., 911 F.2d 870 (2d Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, I1I S. Ct. 1017 (1991); United States v. 418-57th Street, 737 F. Supp. 749
(E.D.N.Y. 1990); United States v. R.D. 4, Box 382E, 727 F. Supp. 149 (D. Del. 1989).
419. 911 F.2d 870 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 1017 (1991).
420. Id. at 873. Crack vials and crack pipes were found throughout the building. Id.
421. Id
422. Id
423. Id. In executing the warrant, 15 apartments were sealed and their occupants evict-
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The owner was a corporation whose president and principle
stockholder, Mark Hersh, was the building's managing agenL4
The president's uncle, Morrs Nahluas, was the superintendent of
the building and often also acted as a managing agent a4 5 The
owner was unable to establish an innocent owner defense at the
district court level.42' The jury decided that forfeiture was appro-
priate because the owner knew of or consented to the drug activi-
ty.427 One basis for the jury's finding that the owner knew about
the drug activity was that police had spoken with Nahmias three
times during one summer regarding the extensive drug problem at
the building. 28 The police also left several telephone messages
and mailed a letter to the president, asking him to come speak to
them about the building.429 Apparently, the jury disbelieved the
president's testimony that he had received none of these messag-
es.
430
On appeal, the corporate owner argued that Nahmias's knowl-
edge of the drug activities was not sufficient to establish its knowl-
edge because there was extensive evidence that Nahmas had taken
bribes from drug dealers. in the building in exchange for leasing
apartments to them.41 Thus, the corporation argued, Nahlnias
was acting adversely to the corporation's interests and his knowl-
edge could not be imputed to it.432 The court rejected this argu-
ment' because the corporation never proved that it did not benefit
from its agent's actions. 33 Moreover, the court held that there
was sufficient proof of the president's knowledge to implicate the
corporate owner a.4  The president testified that he had visited the
apartment about a hundred times.4 35 The court noted that because
the apartment was "a veritable anthill of drug activity," the jury
ed. Id.
424. Id The realty corporation was the record owner of the building. Id
425. Id
426. Id. at 874. The government had satisfied its burden to establish that the building
had been used to facilitate a drug violation, shifting the burden to the defendant.
427. Id
428. Id at 873.
429. Id
430. Id
431. Id at 876.
432. Id.
433. Id
434. Id at 877.
435. Id
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was entitled to find that the president had knowledge." 6
The court also rejected the argument that the owner's knowl-
edge alone was sufficient to defeat its defense by applying the
interpretation of section 881(a)(7) that allows lack of consent as a
separate defense." In defining lack of consent under section
881(a)(7), the court followed the Pearson Yacht case and required
that the innocent owner do all that reasonably could be expected to
preclude the illegal use.a  The court believed that the Pearson
Yacht standard provided "a balance between the two congressional
purposes of making drug trafficking prohibitively expensive for the
property owner and preserving the property of an innocent own-
er.,
439
The 141st Street Corporation court held that under this stan-
dard the corporation did not establish an innocent owner defense
because it did not take affirmative steps to curb the drug activity
until after the police first raided the property 44 After that raid,
the only action the corporation took was to instruct Nahmias not to
accept rent from tenants who had been arrested." "The jury con-
cluded either that Realty Corp. knew of the narcotics activity be-
fore [the first raid] and took no steps to stop it, or that Realty
Corp.'s response after learning of the raid was inadequate."" 2
Exactly what constitutes taking all reasonable steps to curb
drug activity is unclear. Even when landlords have engaged in
extensive efforts to regulate the use of their premises, the require-
ment that they take all reasonable steps can invite challenge from
436. Id
437. Id. at 878.
438. IM at 879.
439. Id. See also United States v. Premises Described as Route 2, Box 61-C, 727 F.
Supp. 1295, 1299 (W.D. Ark. 1990) (following Pearson Yacht standard requiring defen-
dant to prove either lack of knowledge or that all reasonable steps were taken to prevent
the illegal activity). But see United States v. Lots 12, 13, 14 and 15, Keeton Heights
Subdivision, 869 F.2d 942, 946-47 (6th Cir. 1989) (rejecting incorporation of Pearson
Yacht standard into definition of consent under § 881(a)(7)); United States v. 171-02 Lib-
erty Avenue, 710 F. Supp. 46, 49-50 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (rejecting the Pearson Yacht stan-
dard); United States v. Certain Real Property, 724 F. Supp. 908, 914 (S.D. Fla. 1989)
(holding that the defendant can prevail with an innocent owner defense under § 881(a)(7)
without proving all reasonable steps were taken).
440. 141st Street Corp., 911 F.2d at 879.
441. IL
442. Id. at 879-80. The court stated that the evidence supported either conclusion. Id at
80.
1992]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
the government. In United States v. 710 Main Street,4 3 the gov-
erinment began a forfeiture action against a bar and arcade in
which drug activity had taken place.4 The owner admitted
knowledge of the illegal activities, but he offered evidence that he
had taken several steps to stop them.45 The owner had attempted
to obstruct illegal activity by his employees" 6  and his
patrons." 7 The owner limited his use of the property to those ar-
eas he could effectively control"' and also attempted to enlist the
police department in his personal efforts to eliminate drugs from
the property "' The landlord voluntarily pursued these actions de-
spite the fact he "did not have a complete high school educa-
tion, a law enforcement background, or even the advice of law
enforcement agencies to guide him."450
Originally, the district court dismissed this case, but reopened it
a few days later after the 141st Street Corp. decision. The govern-
ment argued that under the standard applied in 141st Street Corp.,
the owner did not do "all that could have reasonably been expect-
ed."4 "1 The government asserted that the owner could have hired
a bouncer or doorman to screen and control patrons and that he
should not have discontinued his use of an electromagnetic "buzz-
er" lock on the front door of the building, even though he found it
a hindrance to his business.452 The government also claimed that
the owner should have personally supervised the street in front of
the property, rather than watching from an upstairs window
453
443. 753 F.Supp. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
444. 1,
445. Id at 123.
446. Id He fired two bartenders after they were arrested on drug charges. Id.
447. Id. He installed signs, as a scare tactic, to warn patrons that they were subject to
being photographed and searched, ejected persons who were not patrons, and instituted a
locked restroom policy in which only one person could use the restroom at a time, for
only one minute, after requesting a key from the bartender to gain access. Id
448. Id at 123-24. For example, he closed off the rear portion of the restaurant area,
restricted the bar's daily operating hours and closed the third floor residential apartments.
Id
449. Id at 124. The owner personally engaged in surveillance of the property from a
nearby second-story window and provided anonymous phone tips to the police. Id In
addition, he wrote to the Commissioner of the Peekskill Police Department asking for
cooperation in ridding the property of drugs, but he received no response. Id.
450. Id
451. Id
452. Id
453. Id
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Regarding his leased arcade, the government argued that he should
have closed it or rented it to another business which "would have
been less conducive to that kind of heavy pedestrian traffic."4
While the district court ultimately rejected the government's argu-
ments, the very fact that such extreme measures by a landowner to
control his premises were subject to two separate court challenges
demonstrates the extensive reach of the "all reasonable steps" inter-
pretation.4
55
Perhaps the broadest interpretation of section 881(a)(7)'s
knowledge or consent standard was articulated by the court in
United States v. 2011 Calumet.4"6 The court held that the stan-
dard required a landlord prove that he "did not know and had no
reason to know of the illegal use; [that he was not] involved in the
illegal use; and tthat he] did all that could reasonably be expected
to preclude or discover the illegal use."4 57 Thus, under this stan-
dard, "actual knowledge or willful blindness" becomes a general-
ized "constructive knowledge" standard and "consent" becomes
"negligence in failing to preclude or discover." In 2011 Calumet,
the landlord leased commercial property through management
agents.4 5 The court held that the owner could not assert an inno-
cent owner defense because his agents had notice of illegal activity
and neither the owner nor the agents took all reasonable steps to
prevent the activity 459 The court found the owner had construc-
tive knowledge of the illegal activities for several reasons, includ-
ing: the property had been leased for a rent which was high for
the neighborhood, the owner's agents were aware of unauthorized
alterations including steel doors, barricaded windows, and "an
unusual mirror system above the door," and the property manager
and other employees had been aware of several drug raids on the
prenses.4" The owner was found to have constructive knowl-
edge because he was bound by his agents' knowledge and acts or
onussions.4 ' The landlord's failure to prevent the illegal activi-
ties provided an alternative basis for the forfeiture. The 2011
454. Id
455. Id at 125.
456. 699 F. Supp. 108 (S.D. Tex. 1988).
457. Id at 110 (emphasis added).
458. Id at 109.
459. Id at 110.
460. Id
461. Id
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Calumet court emphasized that, even though the lease disallowed
the property's use for illegal purposes, the landlord neither investi-
gated nor evicted the tenants. 2
2. State Forfeiture Provisions
State statutes vary as to whether and under what circumstances
real property may be forfeited. Some state forfeiture laws adopt the
express language of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act.463
Under that Act, real property interests, including leaseholds, are not
expressly subject to forfeiture; however, "containers" of controlled
substances may be forfeited. 4 At least one court has made real
property subject to forfeiture under this provision, because a build-
ng was specifically designed to contain and conceal a large mari-
juana growing operation." 5 Other state courts have rejected this
interpretation, but have permitted forfeiture of real property under
those statutory provisions that define "things of value used to facil-
itate violations" as forfeitable property'
As discussed in the context of public nuisance laws, some
jurisdictions incorporate forfeiture of real property interests into a
graded scheme of nuisance remedies.467 Other states have modi-
fied the Uniform Controlled Substances Act to bring real property
under the statute. These statutes provide for forfeiture based on:
1) Proceeds: "Things of value furnished or intended to be
furnished in exchange for controlled substance, all proceeds
traceable to such an exchange."" 8
462. Id
463. UNIF. CONTROU.E SUBSTANCES ACT § 505, 9 (Part I) U.LA. 1, 833 (1988 &
Supp. 1990). Those states adopting this Act without real property provisions include Alas-
ka), ALASKA STAT. § 17.30.110 (Supp. 1991), and New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-
31-34 (Miclue Supp. 1991).
464. UNIF. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT § 505(a)(3), 9 (Part I1) U.L.A. at 834.
465. Smith v. Mouat, 726 P.2d 474, 478 (Wash. App. 1986); see also In re Forfeiture
of 45,649 Maben Road, 434 N.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Mich. App. 1988) (property forfeited as
a thing of value used to facilitate illegal drug activity and as a container).
466. See People v. 2850 Ewing Road, 409 N.W.2d 800 (Mich. App. 1987) (rejecting
forfeiture by "container" standard but permitting forfeiture by "used to facilitate" standard).
467. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-13-504(2) (1986 & Supp. 1990) (forfeiture provision does
not include real property). But see § 16-13-303(I)(c) (real property is a class I public
nuisance if used for any drug-related activity) and § 16-13-301(2) (such property subject
to forfeiture); MD. CRIM. LAW. CODE ANN. § 297(b)(i)-(10) (1988 and Supp. 1992) (nui-
sance remedies provide for real property losses); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 161.53-.55 (West
1989) (forfeiture provision includes real property and also incorporates a nuisance provi-
sion).
468. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4313 (Supp. 1991); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 161.55(0
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2) Facilitation: "All real property including any right, title and
interest in any lot or tract of land, and any appurtenances or im-
provements, which are used, or have been used, or are intended to
be used, in any manner or part, to commit or to facilitate the com-
mission of a violation of the act."469
3) Both proceeds and facilitation.70
It is beyond the scope of tus article to detail each of the state
variants regarding procedure and standards.47 However, since
most of the states that permit real property forfeiture do so by
analogy to the federal statute, the federal standards shed light on
these state applications as well.4'
Most states that permit real property forfeitures have also
adopted the federal "knowledge or consent" provisions for innocent
owner protection.7" The same questions of interpretation will
(West 1989).
469. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-505(7) (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1991); IDAHO CODE § 37-
2744A(a) (Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, 1505(a)(5) (Smith-Hurd 1985 &
Supp. 1991).
470. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 4784(a) (1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 823.13
(West 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-13-49(d)(6) (Micue 1991); HAW. REV. STAT. § 712A-
5(2)(a) (1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65 -4135(a)(7) (1990); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 218A.410 (Baldwin 1990); 1989 MASS. ADV. LEGIS. SERV. § 653 (Law. Co-op.); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.7521 (West Supp. 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.5311(2)
(West Supp. 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 513.607(l) (Vernon Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE.
ANN. § 44-12-102(1)(h)(i) (1991); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453.301(8) (Miclue 1989);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 2 §503(A) (1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 3-791 (1989); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §6801 (1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28-5.04 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
69.50.505(a)(8) (1991); W. VA. CODE § 60A-7-703 (1989); WYO. STAT. § 35-7-
1049(a)(viii) (1989).
471. For commentary on specific state statutes, see Steven L. Kessler, New York's New
Forfeiture Legislation (Part 1), N.Y.L.J., Nov. 5, 1990, at 1 (reporting that legislation
provides law enforcement agencies and prosecutors more power); Robert P. Brouillard,
Note, Civil Forfeiture Law in Oregon: Efforts Toward Effective and Equitable Change, 25
WILL. L. REV. 455, 470 (1989) (asserting that law should protect innocent third parties);
Kent Fischman, Comment, An Overview of Oregon's New Forfeiture Act, 69 ORE. L.
REV. 169, 175 (1990) (concluding that new act poses constitutional problems).
472. For example, even though Michigan has its own version of the Uniform Act, its
,courts use interpretations of similar provisions of the federal forfeiture statute as persua-
stve authority. In re Forfeiture of $53.00, 444 N.W.2d 182, 186 (Mich. 1989).
473. Eg., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-64-505 (1987 & Supp. 1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16,
§ 4784(a)(8) (1990); HAW. REV. STAT. § 712A-5(2)(b)-(e) (1990); IDAHO CODE § 37-
2744A(d) (1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4135(a)(6) (1990); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 218A.410 (Baldwin 1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5821A (West 1989); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 333.7521 (West Supp. 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2 § 503(A) (1990);
OR. REV. STAT. § 3-791 (1989); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §6801 (1989); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 21-28-5.04 (1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-13(1)(g)(i) (Miclue 1991); W. VA.
CODE § 60A-7-703(a)(6)-(7) (1989); Wyo. STAT. § 35-7-1049(a)(viii) (1989).
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anse with respect to these state provision as have arisen under the
federal statutes.474 Some states impose an actual or constructive
knowledge standard without any defense for lack of consent.475
South Dakota and Missouri apply an "actual knowledge" stan-
dard,476 while Florida and Montana require that the act occur
with the owner's actual knowledge or express consent.4" These
actual knowledge standards allow landlords to ignore intentionally
the use of their property At the opposite extreme, some states
impose general negligence standards to require accountability for
illegal uses of the property"47  Finally, some states provide no in-
nocent owner defenses whatsoever.479
For states using nuisance abatement statutes to effect forfei-
tures, the same standards of owner knowledge and the defenses of
voluntary abatement apply to forfeiture in the same way they apply
to closure orders.480
D. FUNDAMENTAL COMPARISONS AMONG TORT,
PUBLIC NUISANCE AND FORFEITURE DOCTRINES
Forfeiture and public nuisance doctrines have much in com-
mon. Most forfeiture statutes operate like nuisance abatement ac-
tions, asserting in rem jurisdiction against property used for illegal
purposes. Like nuisance statutes, these actions can be both criminal
and civil. Civil forfeiture procedures are preferred for the reasons
of administrative convenience and efficiency In both nuisance and
forfeiture actions, circumstantial evidence of illegal conduct can
provide sufficient proof to invoke the remedy
Under both forfeiture and nuisance, once the offending property
474. See supra text accompanying notes 413-62.
475. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 823.13 (West 1992) (actual knowledge); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 21-28-5.04 (1989) (actual or constructive knowledge).
476. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-20B-70.1 (1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 297(a)(4)(ii)
(Vernon Supp. 1991).
477. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.12(2)(b) (West 1992) (exempting real property from forfei-
ture if crime occurred without knowledge or consent of owner); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 44-
12-102(1)(h)(i) (1991).
478. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4304(3)(c) (West 1989); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 11470(g) (West Supp. 1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-13-49(e) (Miclue
Supp. 1991) (disallowing forfeiture if owner did not consent, did not know, could not rea-
sonably have known and did not gain from illegal activity); IDAHO CODE § 37-2744(d)(3)
(1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 809.14(1) (West Supp. 1991).
479. See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 161.55 (West 1989) (providing innocent owner defense
only for vehicular seizures while allowing seizure of real property).
480. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-13-303 (1986 & Supp. 1990).
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is proven subject to the remedy, the burden then shifts to the own-
er to redeem Ins property Thus, both forms of remedy provide
significant incentives for landlords to police their properties. Both
pose the serious threat of depriving a landlord of property, or of
rental income from property, before a full hearing is conducted,
impeding the landlord's financial ability to protect his legal inter-
ests in the offending property
One difference between these provisions is that forfeiture pro-
ceedings are always commenced by a government entity, whereas
relator actions are allowed in most nuisance actions. Also, although
states more often authorize municipalities to enact nuisance abate-
ment statutes than forfeiture statutes, the creativity of municipal
legislatures in fashioning "abatement" statutes can provide remedies
nearly as potent as forfeiture.4"' Because public nuisance statutes
rely on a long tradition of common law actions, the courts may be
more willing to interpret freely or supplement their provisions with
scienter or notice requirements than they are when interpreting the
newer federal and state forfeiture statutes. As a practical matter,
however, both provisions are enforced through similar mea-
sures.
4 82
Perhaps the most significant difference between nuisance and
forfeiture statutes is the scope of the remedy Whereas nuisance
statutes authorize closure for up to one year, they do not transfer
title or management responsibility to the government. However, the
forfeiture statutes result in complete loss of the offending property,
a much more significant deprivation. Moreover, transferring man-
agement responsibility of property, particularly housing, to the
government is an expensive remedy,4 3 and there is no evidence
that government is better able to control crime on these properties
than are private landlords.
The nuisance and forfeiture statutes create a landlord's duty to
481. In Lansming, Michigan for example, if the City Council declares a property a public
nuisance, it may also determine "that the owner shall be liable for the full cost of any
personnel (including police and code-compliance officers) involved in each raid subsequent
to the first raid, and the full cost of any City personnel and matenals involved m the
boarding-up or padloclng and assess those costs against the property.- LANSING, MICH.,
ORDINANCES § 630.04 (1991).
482. See nfra text accompanying notes 526-40.
483. The U.S. Marshals Service, which maintains properties forfeited under the federal
acts, prohibits, as a matter of policy, the seizure of real property unless it has an equity
of $50,000 or more. Monte R. Young & Michael Slaclknan, Cracks ti the Laws: Officials
say they lack tools to shut drug dens for good, NEWSDAY, May 6, 1990, at 5.
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police tenants. Tort doctrines also create a policing duty, though
not as extensive as forfeiture and nuisance duties. Tort standards
require landlords to prevent foreseeable criminal activity 4s4 Most
nuisance and forfeiture standards set much less demanding foresee-
ability requirements and shift the burden .to the landlord to meet
them. Tort doctrines can be invoked only by a specific individual
who has been harmed. Neither nuisance nor forfeiture provisions
require any harm, or even criminal convictions, for their invoca-
tion. Moreover, the tort damages remedy, though significant, does
not affect the landlord's ability to defend these cases as does the
closure/seizure remedy of nuisance and forfeiture.
Despite these differences among the tort, nuisance and forfei-
ture provisions, all share the same basic assumptions regarding the
ability and responsibility of landlords to police their property The
next section of this article will explore those assumptions.
III. THE IDEOLOGY AND RHETORIC OF DOCTRINES
REQUIRING LANDLORDS TO REDUCE CRIMINAL
ACTIVITIES ON LEASED PREMISES
As evidenced by the doctrines described in this article - tort
standards imposing a duty upon the landlord to police and protect
tenants and nuisance abatement and forfeiture statutes permitting
tenants' unlawful activities to place the landlord's property at risk
- legal responsibility for the security of leased property has shift-
ed to the landlord. From a theoretical perspective, this change rep-
resents an ideological shift from relatively individualist standards to
more communalist standards. 485 This section will explore this
ideological shift, first describing the characteristics of a change in
focus along the spectrum from individual to communal standards
and then identifying some rhetorical devices used to effectuate this
shift consistent with the common law process.
A. Shifting Standards from Individualist to Communalist
The individualist perspective favors individual autonomy and
self-regulation,48 6 disapproving of laws addressed to the protection
484. See supra text accompanying notes 111-19.
485. Jack M. Balkin, The Crystalline Structure of Legal Thought, 39 RUTGERs L. REV.
1, 13-21 (1986); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REv. 1685, 1713 (1976); Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in
Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 975, 980.
486. See Jack M. Balkin, The Rhetoric of Responsibility, 76 VA. L. REV. 197, 206
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or regulation of group interests, such as family, women or ten-
ants."' The communalist perspective values responsibility to oth-
ers based on role or status and uses law as a vehicle to encourage
such responsibility."' Accordingly, liability from the communalist
perspective is based on norms of responsibility without fault, en-
dorsing affirmative remedies at a systemic level rather than an mdi-
vidual level.4"9 Communalist values favor the achievement of so-
cial goals via societal allocation of duties rather than by reliance
upon individual effort and competition."
Many significant legal developments may be seen as variants
along the spectrum from individualism to communalism.49 ' In
many cases, the direction of movement along tis spectrum de-
pends upon the perspective from which the law is viewed." 2
(1990) (explaining that rules which are individualist m nature de-emphasize an actor's
responsibility for the effects of his/her actions on others).
One scholar, Leslie Green, has identified three theses associated with a theory of
etlcal individualism.
The first is egoism, the view that everyone should act only to promote their
own interests, such as increasing their own wealth, status or power. The second
is instrumentalism which holds that all social relations and institutions are of
value only to the extent that they promote the ends of individual persons. Fi-
nally, there is the weak thesis that [Green calls] humanism, according to wlch
morality must have some connection (not necessarily instrumental) with the
interests of persons.
Leslie Green, Associative Obligations and the State, in LAW AND THE COMMUNITY: THE
END OF INDWIDUALISM? 93, 109 (Alan C. Hutchison et al. eds. 1989). Of these,
tristrumentalism seems particularly relevant m the characterization- of traditional landlord-
tenant law as individualist in orientation.
487. See Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Individualism, and Minority Rights, in LAW AND
THE COMMUNIT: THE END OF INDIVIDUALISM?, supra note 486, at 181, 183-88 (discuss-
mg the opposition of the individualist position to minority rights).
488. See Green, supra note 486, at 108-14 (discussing communalists' teliance on roles
and status); see generally ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 33-34 (2d ed. 1984)
(discussing societies where one's identity is largely dependent on his relationslup to others
in society).
489. Ballan, supra note 486, at 206.
490. IX
491. This variance is exemplified by developments in tort law, spanning from intent to
negligence to strict liability, and contract law, advancing from freedom of contract to
consumer rights. See generally Mark S. Brodin, The Role of Fault and Motive in Defining
Discrimination: The Seniority Question under 7tle VII, 62 N. CAR. L. REv. 943, 990-91
(1984) (discussing movement in American legal system away from a purely fault-based
liability system toward a willingness to find liability without fault).
492. Individualism and communalism are not two separate and opposing viewpoints, but
rather points along a spectrum of theories about the relationship between law and people.
See Balkin, supra note 485, at 19 (noting that identification of a rule as either idivid-
ualist or communalist in nature depends on the alternative to which the rule is compared).
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Viewed from a societal perspective, recent developments in land-
lord policing responsibilities signify movement toward a more
individualist standard since, overall, the general public's policing
responsibility is being reallocated to the private sector." This
trend acts to decentralize policing responsibilities, effectively mak-
ing the protection of others an individual responsibility, one of the
"thousand points of light" contemplated by President Bush.4
Thirty years ago the "community" responsible for criminal law
enforcement was composed of the citizenry as a whole, operating
through the state's police power. Currently, the defimtion of the
responsible "community" is more narrowly construed, dividing the
citizenry into smaller groups, such as landlords, business owners,
parents, health professionals and so forth, each responsible for
criminal activities likely to arise within their sphere of activity
Thus, there has been a shift from a larger commumty to a smaller
community, making the focus more individualist in nature.495
On the other hand, when the perspective changes from this
macro view to the narrower concerns of landlords and tenants, the
shift is clearly one from relatively individualist to more communal-
ist standards. First, standards producing landlord liability are based
less on fault and more on responsibility Consider, for example, the
tort standards placing liability on landlords for criminal activities
on the prenuses. 4' These tort standards have moved from a posi-
tion in which the landlord had no responsibility for a tenant's
safety unless he expressly agreed to undertake that responsibility to
a position in which a landlord's responsibility may arise based
simply on the general foreseeability of crime.497 Courts applying
493. See Balkm, supra note 486, at 208 n.35 (noting that "policies that deny govern-
mental protection in the hope of encouraging persons to take care of themselves are usu-
ally relatively individualist").
494. See Successful Drug Prevention Programs Highlighted as Part of Points of Light
Celebration of Service, PR Newswire Association, Inc., Apr. 19, 1991, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
495. Commenting on this shift in the context of tort liability, a New York court noted:
The trend toward enlarging the duty of landlords and other private parties to
provide security against criminal acts, even in the absence of agreements to do
so, has the potential of reaching absurd proportions. One can foresee landown-
ers, proprietors of restaurants, stores, theaters, banks, schools and, indeed, public
buildings being civilly responsible for all crimes on their premises.
Clarke v. J.R.D. Management Corp., 461 N.Y.S.2d 168, 170 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1983)
(granting judgment for landlord where tenant's car was broken into while parked in a
rented garage, stating that tenants should be held "stringently to their proof").
496. See supra text accompanying notes 15-136.
497. See, e.g., Muniz v. Flohern, Inc., 553 N.Y.S.2d 313, 316 (App. Div. 1990) (The
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these standards regularly invoke the disclaimer that a landlord is
not an insurer of his tenant's safety 498 However, as a practical
matter, given the lack of predictability in the negligence standards
and the difficulty of predicting and controlling criminal behavior,
the landlord is indeed held as an insurer. As defined, the require-
ments of foreseeability and causation, especially as applied in gen-
eral negligence approaches, depart measurably from previous rul-
ings holding that a criminal's actions were an intervening cause
that severed the landlord's liability499
Nuisance and forfeiture standards are also based in notions of
responsibility rather than fault. However, these standards approach
this shift in a less direct analytic manner than the tort standards.
Nuisance and forfeiture statutes begin with the presumption that
landlords are responsible for and aware of their property's use;
thus, the landlord bears the burden of proving his innocence in
connection with illegal activities occurring there.5" Indeed, many
such statutes have been interpreted so that either actual or construc-
tive knowledge can result in a foreclosure or forfeiture of the
landlord's property,5 ' in essence paralleling the foreseeability
doctrines of tort law
Thus, tort, nuisance, and forfeiture standards all proceed from
an assumption that landlords, more so than other members of soci-
ety, have the responsibility for criminal activities occurring on their
property
A second indicator that landlord responsibility for crime has
shifted toward a more communalist perspective is evident in the
underlying notion of freedom. For the individualist, freedom is
defined by individual autonomy502 For the communalist, freedom
common law also imposes a duty upon landlords to control the conduct of persons on
their premises when they are reasonably aware of the necessity to do so."), rev'd on
other grounds, 568 N.Y.S.2d 725 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1991).
498. See, e.g., Becker v. IRM Corp., 698 P.2d 116, 129 (Cal. 1985) (holding that "like
any other business propnetor or owner of property, the landlord is not an insurer of a
tenant's safety") (citations omitted); Trentacost v. Brussel, 412 A.2d 436, 445 (NJ. 1980)
(conceding that "[a landlord] is not an insurer of his tenants' safety"); Mostert v. CBL &
Associates, 741 P.2d 1090, 1099 (Wyo. 1987) ("A landlord cannot be expected to be an
absolute insurer of the safety of each and every person who enters upon property which
is exclusively in the possession and control of his tenant.").
499. See supra text accompanying notes 111-32.
500. See supra text accompanying notes 408-62.
501. See supra text accompanying notes 247-62, 390-407.
502. Balkin, supra note 485, at 16 (explaining that "[f]reedom in Individualist
terms is liberty from the constraints, expectations, and duties imposed by and owed
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is defined by the security of group identification and protection. If
landlords enjoy general immunity from liability for criminal activi-
ties on their premises, they have a large degree of individual au-
tonomy Likewise, tenants have the autonomy to choose to ex-
change risks of crime for other values in selecting living arrange-
ments. Even for limited-income tenants for whom this choice may
be hypothetical at best, the shift away from landlord immunity
means less tenant freedom.
Summarizing the landlord-tenant relationship as it existed in
1927, during the reign of general landlord immunity, one commen-
tator stated as follows:
The landlord can lease his property, live his life apart from
the tenant, and forget all about him except when rent is
due. The tenant, on the other hand, goes about his business
free from direction by the landlord, and if he commits a
personal wrong it is his own.503
It is axiomatic that a change in landlord autonomy must neces-
sarily produce an equivalent change in tenant autonomy Hence, as
a landlord's duty to protect and police tenants increases, so too the
landlord's right to screen, control and evict tenants increases, there-
by decreasing tenant autonomy by reducing the number of available
housing options. For example, in Stuyvesant Associates v. Doe, a
New Jersey court held that a landlord could summarily evict a
tenant who had neglected to obtain scheduled scluzophrema treat-
ment and, as a result, had a psychotic episode, causing property
damage to his apartment as well as the common hallways."~ The
central question in the case was whether, given the tenant's psy-
chosis, his conduct resulted in damage that was "willfully or by
reason of gross negligence caused or allowed," as required by New
Jersey statutory law 505 The court's analysis relied heavily upon
the trend of expanding the landlord's duty with respect to tenant
security " Even though most courts have rejected claims for
landlord tort liability for damage caused by mentally ill tenants, the
Stuyvesant Associates court justified its allowance of the summary
to others-).
503. Raymond H. Harknder, Tort Liability of a Landlord, 26 MICH. L. REV. 531, 533
(1927).
504. 534 A.2d 448 (N.J. Super 1987).
505. Id. at 449 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 18-61.1(c) (West 1987)).
506. Id. at 451.
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eviction proceeding by reasoning that "[t]he landlord should not be
placed in the precarious position of having to defend himself
against damage or injuries caused by the irrational defendant."" °
As courts expand the landlord's right to police and control
tenant conduct, not only are tenants dened the constitutional
protection afforded in the public policing context, they have less
freedom in terms of privacy and autonomy -" This protec-
tion/oppression paradox often becomes more prevalent as the law
moves towards a more communalist standard; that is, there is a
greater danger that standards designed to increase protection of a
group will be used to increase regulation and even repression of
that group.'
The communalist response speaks not in terms of freedom to
but freedom from - freedom from the risk of crime.10 By plac-
ing increased responsibilities on landlords to secure leased proper-
ties, tenants and neighbors have greater individual autonomy with-
out the threat of crime. While this concern for freedom as security
is not inconsequential, to justify increased landlord responsibility
fully, landlords must truly be able to reduce the threat and risk of
crime. Standards that impose a policing duty on landlords represent
a significant shift from individualist to communalist norms with a
correlating redistribution of power and responsibility from the pub-
lic sector to the private sector.
Often, movements of the law along this spectrum meet with
charges of novelty, unworkability or unjustifiability Thus, lawmak-
ers may prefer to obscure the nature of this change. When the
change occurs primarily through judicial interpretation, the
judiciary's opinions may appear inconsistent with the interpretive,
incrementalist view of the judicial function." In interpreting stat-
utory duties, legitimacy depends in part on the legislation's consis-
tency with the fundamental value of fairness. Thus, courts applying
these provisions use a number of devices to characterize this
507. Id.
508. See infra text accompanying notes 589-607.
509. This phenomenon has been a central theme of the debate over affirmative action
and protective legislation for mnnorities and women. See generally Greschner, Feminist
Concerns with the New Communitarians: We Don't Need Another Hero, in LAw AND TnE
COMMUNITY: THE END OF INDIVIDUALISM?, supra note 486, at 119, 143-48.
510. See Balkin, supra note 485, at 17 ("Under the Communalist vision, one is truly
free only when one can enjoy the protection and security which membership m the
community offers.").
511. Gumo CALABRESi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUrES 3-8 (1982).
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change from individual to communal philosophy as nummal or as
consistent with existing legal norms. This section will examine
some of the rhetorical devices used by courts to implement such
recharactenzations or shifts.
B. Analytical Techniques Supporting Shifts Toward More
Communalist Standards
The courts have played the largest role in this shift to commu-
nalist standards of responsibility, whether by modifying common
law tort standards or by interpreting fault provisions in ambiguous
nuisance and forfeiture statutes. Three common analytic techniques
have been used to effectuate this shift: historical analysis, legal fic-
tions and category redefinition.
1. Historical Analysis
Historical analysis can be a powerful tool in justifying legal
doctrine." 2 Doctrinal change is rationalized by characterizing cur-
rent doctrine as a product of historical conditions that have long
since vamshed. Conversely, history can be similarly mampulated to
justify the retention of certain doctrines by making them appear to
be the result of time-honored traditions. The changes in landlord
responsibility for criminal activities rely heavily on both of these
forms of historical justification.
In the recent development of landlord tort liability, attention
has been drawn to the shifting basis of the landlord-tenant relation-
ship, from status to contract, to property, to contract and back to
status.513 A typical explanation for the growth of tort liability ties
the standards of liability to "the prevalent view of the lease at
different points in time."" 4
512. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, History as Ideology in the Basic Property Course,
36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 381 (1986) (discussing the function of historical perspective m un-
derstanding property law).
513. Commentary speculating on the nature of the lease transaction and its historical
analogue confirms Justice Holmes' aphorism that the law of property "is a matter of
history that has not forgotten Lord Coke." Gardiner v. William S. Butler & Co., 245 U.S.
603, 605 (1918). See generally Dale E. Bennett, The Modern Lease - An Estate in Land
or a Contract, 16 TEX. L. REv. 47 (1937) (considering application of contract principles
to modem lease transactions); John Forrester Hicks, The Contractual Nature of Real Prop-
erty Leases, 24 BAYLOR L. REV. 443, 446-53 (1972) (noting conceptual changes in real
property leases and the role of contract principles); Hiram H. Lesar, The andlord-Tenant
Relation in Perspective: From Status to Contract and Back in 900 Years?, 9 KAN. L
REV. 369 (1961) (tracing the historical development of the landlord-tenant relationship).
514. Miriam J. Haines, Landlords or Tenants: Who Bears the Cost of Crime?, 2
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In illustration, a landlord's tort immunity for injuries to or by
tenants may be viewed as consistent with early lease relationships.
Leases were initially executed to convey agricultural land to a
tenant fully capable of operating the entire premises; consequently,
the landlord was under no duty to maintain the property5 s
Nonetheless, the same historic analysis used to create landlord
immunity was instrumental in its dismantling. When courts in the
1970s finally began to declare the landlord immunity doctrine
obsolete, they merely changed the focus of their historical anal-
ogies. In establishing a landlord's general tort liability for criminal
activity against Ins tenants, the inaugural court observed that the
modem urban apartment lease was unlike older agricultural leases
and drew from what it considered to be a more appropriate histori-
cal analogy, the innkeeper-guest relationship." 6 Thus, history may
be used both to condemn current doctrine and to recharacterize
new doctrines as mere extensions of analogous, well-established
law.
, Above and beyond its chameleon-like quality, historical analysis
suffers an even greater defect: there is no accurate historical ana-
logue embodying the modem conditions justifying society's imposi-
tion of a policing duty on landlords. It is difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to locate a period of time that offers a setting endowed with
random anonymous property crimes, various liability rules and
insurance options, orgamzed professional police forces, urban
crowding, a mobile society and hundred-plus unit apartment build-
ings with corporate ownership and non-resident management. In
tlus sense, the modem lease is no more like the common law
innkeeper-guest or the feudal lord-vassal relationships than it is the
CARDOZO L. REV. 299, 305 (1981).
515. One commentator captured the essence of this era's landlord-tenant relationship,
stating:
It all made sense back m those days with the landlord off on the hunt or
drnnng port in the quiet of the evening, and the tenant asking only to be left
alone to tend his fences and to shear his sheep The model landlord was
the one who did the least. The tenant, in turn, was expected to run the farm,
to be the omnicompetent man fully prepared to see to his own shelter, heat
and light.
Thomas M. Quinn & Earl Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evaluation of
the Past with Guidelines for the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 225, 231 (1969).
516. Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 481-83 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (holding landlord liable for injuries to tenant criminally assaulted in the com-
mon hallway of an apartment house).
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common law agricultural lease.5 17
Nonetheless, a lustorical analysis of changes in tort liability
may, indeed, serve as valuable background. Arguably, the shift
toward more communalist rules of landlord liability for criminal
activities by and against tenants is simply a shift to an early status-
based concept of the landlord-tenant relationshp.58 But apart
from tius aid in labelling the nature of the shift, and given the
criticism implicit in drawing analogies to anachronistic rules, a
historical analysis draws little commendation.
As in the tort duty context, courts, in applying nuisance and
forfeiture statutes, have drawn upon history to justify the use of
remedies directed toward property rather than persons. For exam-
ple, in Pearson Yacht, the Supreme Court carefully traced the
history of the in rem forfeiture remedy to demonstrate constitution-
al acceptability 519
Despite this impressive application of history, one could dem-
onstrate that these remedies are no more than a by-product of
extinct public attitudes and conditions. The history of the use of
forfeiture and nuisance abatement remedies has been cyclical rather
than constant. These remedies have been used primarily against
vice crimes such as alcohol and drug use, prostitution and gain-
517. In this sense, the Kline court's reasoning and conclusion are flawed.
518. Historically, an agreement about security was inherent in the landlord-tenant rela-
tionship. In most feudal land transfers, the tenant pledged fealty and homage to the lord
(the feudal "landlord") and a liege relationship was created. This status relationship re-
quired loyalty and obedience by the tenant; that is, the tenant was required to be the
lord's man "in life and limb and earthly honour against all men except the king." JOHN
HAMILTON BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION To ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 195 (2d ed. 1979).
"The lord in return protected the tenant in his holding, ruled over him, and held court for
him." Id. While there was little in a legal sense that required the landlord to protect the
tenant from the criminal acts of third parties, there were extraordinarily strong customary
bases for such protection. The law of the manor was administered in the lord's court. Id.
If a tenant needed redress against others, the lord provided it. The lord of the manor was,
in every sense of the term, a governmental agent. Likewise, the lord could be held re-
sponsible for the crimes of tenants. Id at 203.
Moreover, this responsibility for tenant security extended to the entire community,
each member having the obligation to disclose and apprehend any person who had broken
the King's peace. I FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 568 (2d ed. 1905). This doctrine of communal responsibility was estab-
lished in the colonies of the United States as well with the practice of "holy watching"
in early Massachusetts. GEORGE LEE HASKINS, LAw AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSA-
CHUsErrs 91 (1960). -Holy watching" entailed inspection of one anothers' lives by mem-
bers of a congregation, any "delinquencies" which were detected were then reported to the
other members of the congregation. Id.
519. 416 U.S. 663, reh'g denied, 417 U.S. 977 (1974).
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bling"2 However, the public's definitions of and attitudes toward
such vices have fluctuated throughout history 521 Many of the his-
torical cases challenging and justifying the remedies of forfeiture
and closure arose during prohibition. Yet, the courts, in justifying
nuisance abatement and forfeiture laws, call up precedent from this
period to refute criticism that these remedies are unusual, novel
and, therefore, illegitimate.5
2
The history invoked as ancestry for these doctrines is equivo-
cal, at best. Depending on what era one chooses as the source of
history, the current law is either a radical shift in doctrine, an
example of well-established law or a return to a period of excess
and abuse. For example, during the early years of prohibition, one
commentator analogized nuisance abatement remedies to the early
use of injunctions in England.123 Rather than finding justification
in that analysis, however, the author remarked:
Let us hope [the increasing use of abatement orders] does
not mean we are going back to something like the turbu-
lent time of Richard ]I when there was a breaking down of
centralized government and the powerful barons so over-
awed the local courts that the only way to obtain convic-
tions for crime was to give chancery that power.5
2 4
Whether for criticism or justification, the exercise of tracing the
historical origins of the landlord's duty to control criminal activity
is but one indirect means to justify changes in common law rules.
2. Legal Fictions
Another common technique in supporting significant changes in
common law is the use of legal fictions.5" Legal fictions can
520. See supra text accompanying notes 236-46.
521. Jerome H. Skolmck, The Social Transformation of Vice, 51 LAW & CONTEmp.
PROBS. 9 (1988). The use of nuisance abatement remedies against houses of prostitution,
for example, prnmarily arose after a period in which prostitution was tolerated rather than
suppressed. Id. Indeed, "red light zones" were relatively common at one time in many
cities; thus, many public nuisance abatement statutes are popularly named "red light abate-
ment laws." Id.
522. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. One 1972 Chevrolet Van, 431 N.E.2d 209, 211 n.5
(Mass. 1982).
523. Cyrus D. Shabaz, The Historical Development of the Power of Equity Courts to
Enjoin Nuisances, 11 MARQ. L. REv. 32 (1926).
524. IM at 38.
525. A "legal fiction" is a statement known to be false. LON Lo FULLER, LEGAL FIC-
TIONS 1 (1967).
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serve many purposes. In addition to their use in the extension of
established legal terms and definitions to meet current condi-
tions,526 legal fictions may be used less benignly
to escape the duty of reasoned analysis, to perpetuate my-
thologies upon which the law thrives, to avoid criticism, to
mask the true intent and purpose of the communicator, to
avoid moral responsibility for decision, to dehumamze the
cases perhaps to lessen the burden of decision-making, and,
to pursue an agenda, usually political, that is inconsistent
with the mainstream of thought 527
Legal fictions play an important role in supporting the current
standards of landlord liability for criminal activities. Most signifi-
cantly legal fictions create the notion of "offending property" Tis
fiction is best illustrated by the traditional approach to landlord
liability by which the landlord's traditional duty to maintain the
common premises provides a basis on which to impose liability on
the landlord for criminal activities that are deemed to have been
"caused" by a physical defect in the common premises.52 The
defective property is "responsible" for the crime and, hence, is
dubbed "offending property"
This fiction is also commonly used in nuisance abatement and
forfeiture proceedings where the court characterizes the property
itself as an inducement to crime.529 Through this reification,
property is burdened with responsibility for crimes occurring there-
on. For example, in analyzing admiralty forfeiture proceedings, the
United States Supreme Court in an 1827 decision concluded "[t]he
thing is here primarily considered as the offender, ''530 a fiction
used to this day in nuisance abatement and forfeiture proceed-
ings.
53 1
A host of procedural and substantive consequences flow from
the fiction of "offending property" Since actions are against the
526. 1l at 22 (discussing the extension and modem application of out-dated linguistic
terms to enable the law's progression).
527. Ibrahim J. War, Truth, Strangers, and Fiction: The Illegitimate Uses of Legal
Fiction in Immigration Law, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 51, 58-59 (1989) (footnotes omitted).
528. See supra notes 36-72 and accompanying text (discussing landlord liability for
criminal activities based on the landlord's duty to maintain the common premises).
529. See supra note 319 and accompanying text.
530. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 1, 14 (1827).
531. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, reh'g dented,
417 U.S. 977 (1974). See supra notes 318-19 and accompanying text.
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property itself, as in rem proceedings, jurisdiction is more readily
obtained than if the action were in personam.5 2 More important-
ly, since this fiction identifies the property rather than the person
as the offender, it dispenses with the requirement of fault. Issues of
a landlord's knowledge, notice or consent may alternatively be con-
sidered (1) irrelevant,5 33 (2) collateral concerns to be raised in
separate proceedings,5 4 or (3) affirmative defenses for which the
landlord bears the burden of proof.
535
Beyond the expedience of the in rem proceedings, this fiction
may also serve to de-emphasize the roles of the landlord and the
criminal perpetrator so as to ease the moral acceptability of impos-
ing liability, essentially vicarious liability, on the landlord.5  If
the role of the landlord were emphasized, courts would have a
more difficult time justifying their denial of the landlord's use of
or title to the property on less than firm fault standards. Converse-
ly, emphasis on the criminal actor would de-emphasize the owner's
fault and raise the issue of vicarious criminal liability
Vicarious criminal liability has never achieved acceptance in
American law. The common law, of England recognized the crime
of misprision of felony under which one who knows of another's
felomous conduct may himself be criminally liable for failing to
report or to prevent that conduct.5 37 In the United States, howev-
er, that doctrine has both been rejected outright and reinterpreted to
require actions amounting to aiding or abetting. 3 8 Mere knowl-
edge of a crime and failure to take action to prevent it does not
532. In Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), the Supreme Court abolished formalis-
tic distinctions between in rem and in personam proceedings, instead requiring jurisdiction
to be founded upon the "nummum contacts" test enunciated in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Nonetheless, the Court admitted that the presence of
property itself may go a long way towards establishing compliance with the "nummum
contacts" requirements. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 207-08. The beneficial and practical aspects
of property ownership make the contact a weighty one. Id.
533. See supra text accompanying notes 314-17 (nuisance) and 475 (forfeiture).
534. See supra text accompanying notes 327-30 (nuisance) and 364-65 (forfeiture).
535. See supra text accompanying notes 408-18 (forfeiture).
536. See generally KEETON et al., supra note 20, at 500 (discussing the questionable
justification for the imposition of vicarious liability).
537. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW, 174-76 (2d ed.
1986); ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAw 572-77 (3d ed. 1982)
538. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 537, at 174-76 ("It is doubtful whether [misprision]
ever had a meaningful existence beyond the textbook writers."); PERKINS & BOYCE, supra
note 541, at 572-77 (suggesting that omission of the crime from the Model Penal Code is
proof that the crime of misprision will ever be revived in the United States).
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constitute a crime under the laws of the United States.5 39 Thus,
by imputing the cause of the crime to the "offending property,"
courts may escape difficult issues of criminal responsibility
3. Category Redefinition
A final technique used to generate acceptance of landlord lia-
bility for the criminal actions of others is the application of tradi-
tional doctrinal labels to distinct, non-traditional proceedings. For
example, in tort liability cases, traditional exceptions, originally
designed to establish the landlord's responsibility for the physical
premises, are increasingly extended to assess liability for the acts
of others.5"
This technique is also used in the context of nuisance and
forfeiture proceedings. Although dubbed civil actions, these pro-
ceedings embody many of the definitive characteristics of criminal
actions. For instance, one difference between civil and criminal
actions lies in the identity of the plaintiff. Criminal actions are
brought by a representative of the government whereas civil actions
are generally brought by private parties injured by another's ac-
tions. Despite this generalization and their characterization as civil
actions, the state prosecutes nuisance and forfeiture proceed-
ings.541 Even though prosecution of nuisance actions proceeds on
the relation of private individuals, these relators need not have suf-
fered any injury from the criminal activity on the premises, but
need only reside in the premises' district or neighborhood.- 42 In
forfeiture actions, the government's prosecution proceeds with even
less involvement by private persons. 43 Despite this state involve-
ment, such actions remain characterized as civil rather than crimi-
nal actions.
Further, in most situations, courts differentiate between civil
and criminal actions based on the type and severity of the remedy
539. In re David K., 145 Cal. Rptr. 349, 353 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (finding liability for
aiding and abetting established where defendant was found in the company of identified
robber in stolen car just three hours after the robbery).
540. See supra notes 21-49 and accompanying text.
541. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Crininal"?: Reflections on the
Disappearing TorVCrne Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U.L. Rev. 193 (March 1991).
542. See generally Spencer, supra note 191, at 66-73 (describing the histoncal evolution
of the relator proceeding); WLLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 591-
602 (4th ed. 1971) (discussing public and private nuisance actions).
543. Id.
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prescribed.' However, in nuisance and forfeiture proceedings,
courts look solely to the purpose of the remedies.' " For instance,
using the legal fiction of "offending property," courts characterize
the purpose of closure and forfeiture orders as preventative rather
than punitive.-5  On tius basis, courts label such proceedings as
civil without regard for either the potentially extraordinary losses or
the non-existence of a compensation pnnciple.-57
The unusual application of various doctrinal terms is especially
pronounced in nuisance abatement actions. The label "nuisance" is
usually associated with an unreasonable interference with another's
use and enjoyment of property or with the public's general
rights."  The central concept of nuisance, both public and pri-
vate, is the effects of actions on others.549 Yet in statutory nut-
sance abatement proceedings, bearing this same doctrinal label,
effect on others is unnecessary The plaintiff need not even demon-
strate that others are aware of the illegal use of property550 Rath-
er, it is the use of the property for illegal purposes that provides
the nature of the claim, a concept much more analogous to primi-
nal as opposed to civil actions.
In effect, the use of the nuisance label allows the statutory
version of traditional nuisance actions to share the traditional reme-
dy - injunctions - notwithstanding the fact that much of the core
definition for injunctions is missing. The basic maxims of equitable
remedies provide that equity acts in personam, that equity acts only
544. See Coffee, supra note 541.
545. See, e.g., Grosfield v. United States, 276 U.S. 494, 497 (1928) (interpreting
abatement provisions of the National Prohibition Act as preventative rather than-punitive).
546. Id
547. Except to the extent that forfeiture proceedings are characterized as a form of
reimbursement to government authorities for the cost of enforcement.
548. See 4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979) ("A public nuisance is an
unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public."); id. at § 821D ("A
private nuisance is a, non-trespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and
enjoyment of land.").
549. Id
550. See, e.g., State v. Strawberries, Inc., 473 N.W.2d 428, 435-36 (Neb., 1991) (con-
cluding that tavern's conduct constituted a public nuisance since it had the effect of un-
reasonably interfering with community morals); Adkins v. Thomas Solvent Co., 459
N.W.2d 22, 23 (Mich. App. 1990) (stating that a chemical company's contamination of
drnlang water unreasonably and substantially interfered with plaintiffs' use and enjoyment
of land so as to constitute a private nuisance); City of Virginia Beach v. Murphy, 389
S.E.2d 462, 466 (Va. 1990) (holding that an ordinance which prohibited the playing of
any television, radio or musical instrument in an annoying manner was a constitutional
protection of the public from nuisance).
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if legal remedies are inadequate, that equity will not enjoin a crime
and that equity abhors a forfeiture.55" ' While the current force of
maxims as precedent is considerably reduced, the basic principles
of equity reflected in these maxims endure in cases involving m-
junctions.552 Yet in nuisance abatement actions, courts use an in
rem proceeding with no proof that legal remedies are inadequate
deterrents to effectuate a forfeiture of property rights for a period
of up to one year.553 Thus, not only have courts "redefined" the
civil category of actions to encompass nuisance and forfeiture pro-
ceedings, they have "redefined" the application of the nuisance
label as well.
Hence, through the use of historical analysis, legal fictions and
redefined categories, the courts have succeeded in effecting a dra-
matic shift in the law of landlord liability, all the while making the
change appear consistent with centuries of legal doctrine. Some
courts, however, have rejected these approaches, arguing that the
question is simply one of social policy and fairness, concepts ex-
plored in the next section of this article.
IV A SOCIAL UTILITY ANALYSIS OF
LANDLORDS AS COPS
The primary justification for expanding the landlord's duty to
protect and police tenants is that landlords will then take actions to
reduce crime.5 4 Hence, the legitimacy of these standards depends
551. GEORGE TUCKER BISPHAM, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY §§ 16-27 (11th ed. 1931); see
generally Roscoe Pound, The Maxims of Equity, 34 HARV. L. REV. 809, 810 (1921) (trac-
ing the history and development of the maxims of equity).
552. See, e.g., EDWARD D. RE, REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 44-50 (2d ed. 1987)
(stating that "one finds reference to [the maxims of equity] in a number of recent deci-
sions").
553. The procedural requirements of injunctions are sclectively imposed as well. On one
hand, most nuisance abatement proceedings dispense with the disadvantageous, traditional
requirement that a bond be posted in exchange for a temporary injunction closing the
property. See, e.g., Gagel v. Cornelius, 380 So. 2d 1333, 1336 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)
(discussing Florida's dispensation of the bond requirement for the issuance of a temporary
injunction). By contrast, some states use the traditional requirements of equity to their
advantage to deny the right to a jury trial in nuisance abatement actions, relying upon the
absence of tis right in traditional equtty proceedings. See, e.g., City of Girard v. Girard
Egg Corp., 230 N.E.2d 294, 295 (II1. 1967); State v. Kearns, 264 S.W. 775, 779 (Mo.
1924); State v. Peters, 203 P.2d 299, 303 (Or. 1949). Thus, courts apply the label "in-
junction" to remedies and procedures that are often at odds with the traditional core deft-
nition of that term.
554. In 1986, the California Supreme Court stated that the growth of liability in the
residential landlord-tenant context derives from the recognition that "only the landlord is
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upon their effectiveness.
However, from the landlord's perspective, the current legal
standards are not sufficiently clear to predict liability 555 This am-
biguity coupled with the lack of financial incentives only encourag-
es landlords to seek other investment opportunities. Thus, m practi-
cal terms, these heightened standards will most likely serve only to
further reduce the availability of rental properties, especially low-
income housing properties.
In addition, from a societal perspective, shifting responsibility
for crime prevention to landlords is neither efficient nor effective.
Since the legal standards for landlord liability do nothing to ad-
dress the causes of crime, increased landlord efforts to meet these
legal standards primarily serve to relocate crime to other areas,
failing to significantly decrease criminal activity overall. Compared
to this minimal benefit, significant costs accompany the shift of
criminal law enforcement duties to landlords. Besides the grave
potential for violation of tenant rights, there is a danger of encour-
aging the "deputization" of the citizenry Moreover, criminal law
enforcement efforts becomes more hidden, thereby increasing the
corresponding opportunity for corruption and discriminatory en-
forcement and inviting the practice of unrestrained vigilantism.
A. THE LANDLORD'S PERSPECTIVE: HOW TO RESPOND
TO INCREASED LEGAL STANDARDS
The tort, public nuisance and forfeiture laws discussed in this
article were designed to provide incentives for landlords to police
their tenants' use of the property so as to reduce crime. Landlords
might respond to these incentives positively or negatively They
may attempt to comply with the responsibilities imposed by these
standards, either by policing current tenants or by screening poten-
tial tenants to detect and avoid those who pose risks of criminal
activities. On the other hand, landlords may seek to avoid these
responsibilities by avoiding contact with leased premises and ten-
ants, by contractually shifting the risk of criminal conduct or by
changing to investments that pose a lesser risk of liability Unfortu-
m the position to secure common areas, [and therefore] he has a duty to protect against
types of crime of which he has notice and which are likely to recur if the common areas
are not secure." Frances T. v. Village Green Owners Assoc., 723 P.2d 573, 578 (Cal.
1986).
555. See Johnson, supra note 134 (discussing inconsistencies of current legal standards
concerning landlord liability for criminal activities).
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nately, this last option is the easiest, and likely to lead to even less
investment in properties in high crime areas.556
1. Meeting the Responsibility- Policing Tenants
In creating landlord responsibilities for criminal activity, the
courts and legislatures hoped that landlords would respond by
undertaking measures to police their property and tenants. For this
hope to be realized, the landlord must be able, legally and practi-
cally, to monitor and control their tenants' conduct. Further, the
incentives provided must be sufficiently clear and predictable so
that landlords will be able to know the degree and kind of preven-
tive measures necessary The current legal standards, however, meet
neither of these essential prerequisites.
a. The Landlord's Right to Control Tenants
Landlords might opt to exercise control over tenants through
explicit lease terms increasing the landlord's right to inspect the
premises and to implement behavioral rules enforceable via summa-
ry eviction. However, just as landlords possessed only a minimal
common law duty to control tenants, so too the landlords' rights to
control tenants have been traditionally restricted.
Historically, leases were considered conveyances of a property
interest between strangers; therefore, the landlord had little control
over how the tenant used the property 557 Apart from the law of
waste,558 the common law provided that the tenant was free to
use the property as if he were the owner.559 While some illegal
556. Disinvestment and abandonment remain the only alternatives for landlords who are
unable to raise rents to cover increased costs of liability. See Johnson, supra note 134,
at 250; Haines, supra note 514, at 351; Comment, The Landlords Energing Responsibility
for Tenant Security, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 275, 297 (1971). But see Frederick C. Tuonu,
Troubled Assets Must be Dealt with in 90"s, 32 NAT'L REAL EST. INVESTOR 48 (1990)
(suggesting rehabilitation of distressed properties may be very profitable if management
can take control of crime problems).
557. See generally ROBERT S. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TEN-
ANT § 4.1 (1980) (discussing the historic landlord-tenant relationship and absence of con-
trol prerogatives).
558. Waste occurs when the tenant reduces the value of the landlord's reversion interest
by damaging or altering the property. See 4 GEORGE W THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON
THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1270 (1981). Generally, the law provides the
landlord a statutory remedy of forfeiture for such waste. See John A. Humbach, Landlord
Control of Tenant Behavior: An Instance of Private Environmental Legislation, 45
FORDHAM L. REV. 223, 258 n.i15 (1976).
559. See, e.g., People v. Scott, 258 N.E.2d 206, 208 (N.Y 1970) (recognizing that the
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uses of the property rmght rise to the level of waste, a common
example being illegal drug laboratories," most illegal uses of the
premises endanger the tenants' personal property or safety rather
than the physical integrity of the structure. Admittedly, the tenant's
behavior can harm the landlord's goodwill; however, such harm is
not necessarily actionable under the waste doctrine.56
Arguably, the ancient doctrine of forfeiture of leases for felo-
rues562 carries over into the modem leasing situation. In early
times, some jurisdictions recognized this doctrine of forfeiture563
while others rejected it.564 Even in those jurisdictions that recog-
rzed the doctrine, a crucial issue arose as to the nature of the
forfeiture. If the forfeiture was automatic, as a possibility of revert-
er,565 the landlord would not be required to give notice to the
lease grants the tenant the right of exclusive occupation and the tenant may therefore act
as an owner would). See generally Humbach, supra note 558, at 232-33 (examining com-
mon lease provisions and noting the prevalence of restrictive provisions which prevent the
tenant from using the property as he wishes).
560. See, e.g., Wade Lambert and Richard Hudson, Allstate Is Told to Pay to Clean
House Damages by Drug Dealers, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 1989, at B4. (awarding landlord
$28,500 for damages caused by methamphetamine lab in leased property due to the fact
that "[t]he cooking of the drug leaves a sickly sweet smell that permeates the dwelling
and is difficult to remove. [and because] the dwellings must be left uninhabited until
chermcal residues are removed."); see generally Geraldine Gardner, Illegal Drug
Laboratories: A Growing Health and Toxic Waste Problem, 7 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 193,
210-11 (1989) (discussing the landlord's role i cracking down on illegal drug laborato-
ries).
561. See generally Humbach, supra note 558, at 247-48 (explaining that, while a
lessee's actions can harm a lessor's "reputational" interest, such harm is difficult to prove
if unaccompanied by physical waste). But see Martin v. Medlin, 59 S.E.2d 519, 521 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1950) (implying that damages for harm to a property's reputation would be re-
coverable against tenant using rooming house as a "house of assignation").
562. See, e.g., Resek v. Alaska, 706 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1985) (discussing the history of
criminal forfeiture from English common law where "traitors and felons automatically
forfeited all their real and personal property to the crown").
563. See, e.g., McNeece v. Wood, 267 P 877, 880 (Cal. 1928) (refusing to order forfei-
ture based on sublessee's illegal bookmaking and possession of alcohol); Murphy v.
Traynor, 135 P.2d 230, 232 (Colo. 1943) (denying forfeiture on basis of single felonious
act by lessee's agent); see also REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 12.5 cmt. c
(1977) (noting that forfeiture valid only where illegal activity has continuity - one illegal
act is not sufficient to justify a forfeiture).
564. At common law, the lessee does not forfeit his lease by using the premises for
illegal purposes unless there is an express lease provision to that effect. See, e.g., Moore
v. Kirgan, 250 S.W.2d 759, 767 (Tex. Ct. App. 1952); Wood v. Ingram, 275 S.W. 397
(Tex. Ct. App. 1924).
565. A possibility of reverter acts to terminate the interest in land extended upon the
occurrence of some specified event. For instance, where the leasehold interest was deemed
valid only for a specified period of time, upon the lapsing of that period, possession
automatically reverts to the landlord. E.g., Keuroglian v. Wilkins, 88 A.2d 581, 583 (D.C.
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tenant or to use legal process to evict. Rather, the landlord could
treat the tenant as a trespasser and peacefully remove him with
umpunity.m
In most jurisdictions today, however, the landlord's right is a
right of entry under which the landlord must give the tenant notice
of intent to evict.567 In fact, some jurisdictions have held this no-
tice requirement to be a matter of due process.5 Nearly all ju-
risdictions prohibit self-help evictions and threaten landlords who
take such measures with trespass damages, fines and orders for
tenancy restoration.569
Nonetheless, many jurisdictions have passed legislation that
expressly authorizes landlords to terminate tenancies where the
tenant's use of the premises is unlawful.570 Most of these statutes
permit forfeiture only for certain specified illegal uses, such as
prostitution, illegal substances and gambling.57' For uses not spe-
cifically enumerated in the statute, courts strictly construe the pro-
vision against the landlord. 572 Indeed, isolated incidents of alleged
Mun. App. 1952) (requiring that no notice to quit need be given upon expiration of the
term); Trottor v. Lewis, 45 A.2d 329, 333 (Md. 1946) (holding notice unnecessary where
tenancy for a definite period of time and landlord may resume possession at once).
566. But see Gilbert v. Peck, 121 P 315 (Cal. 1912) (holding that tenant's previous
unlawful use did not give the landlord the right to remove the tenant's belongings).
567. See, e.g., United States v. Olsen, 245 F Supp. 641, 644 (D. Mont. 1965) (three
day notice required); In re Jay-Norm Corp., 174 F Supp. 866, 868 (D. Cal. 1958) (three
day notice required); Kohl v. Pool, 613 P.2d 1078 (Or. App. 1980) (eviction invalid for
lack of notice by lessor).
568. See, e.g., Anderson v. Denny, 365 F Supp. 1254, 1260 (W.D. Va. 1973) (holding
that the due process requirements of the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments must be satis-
fied and that eviction from low income housing is "state action").
569. See, e.g., Shaw v. Cassar, 558 F Supp. 303, 315-16 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (awarding
tenant compensatory and punitive damages for landlord's violation of "anti-lock laws" and
"fair housing laws"); United States v. White, 541 F Supp. 1181, 1183 (D. Ill. 1982)
(ordering restoration of tenancy where landlord exercised self help remedy by changing
locks); Herrell v. Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, 491 So. 2d 1173, 1175-76
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (requiring compliance with statutory requirement that action for
possession be filed); Deroshia v. Union Terminal Piers, 391 N.W.2d 458, 460 (Mich.
App. 1986) (holding that landlord may not dispossess tenant by resort to self help);
Friends of Yelverton, Inc. v. 163rd Street Imp. Council, Inc., 514 N.Y.S.2d 841 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. 1986) (stating that, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, self-help evic-
tion without judicial sanction must be avoided).
570. See generally 49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlord and Tenant § 1044 (1988) (discussing ef-
fects of legislation and lease provisions specifying forfeiture for tenant's commission of an
illegal act).
571. Id.
572. See, e.g., 400 West 58th Street Properties Corp. v. 400 West 58th Street Owners'
Corp., 542 N.Y.S.2d 579, 580 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989) (holding lease termination mappropn-
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misconduct are generally insufficient grounds for eviction.5' 3 Fur-
thermore, these statutes typically provide tenant defenses, such as
voluntary cessation of the illegal conduct by the tenant or waiver
and estoppel by the landlord. 74
For example, m Roseman v. Day, the landlord brought a de-
claratory judgment action seeking approval of his termination of a
lease on the basis of the tenant's illegal drug sales on the prenis-
es.' 5 While a Massachusetts statute specifically provided for for-
feiture when leased property was used for various illegal activities,
the sale of drugs was not one of the vices listedY.5 6 Although
there was also evidence that the tenant had violated the state liquor
laws on the premises, an act of forfeiture enumerated in the statute,
the Roseman court held that the landlord's prior indifference to
these violations and acceptance of rent in spite of them constituted
a waiver and effectively estopped the landlord from terminating the
lease on flus basis.5 7
Besides these statutory bases for evicting tenants, landlords
could also create a right of eviction through lease provisions con-
ate where tenant illegally occupied portion of building); Harar Realty Corp. v. Michlin &
Hill, Inc., 449 N.Y.S.2d 213, 218 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982) (refusing to sanction dispossession
of tenant where no substantial injury occurred and where only minor breach of lease was
involved); Akos Realty Corp. v. Hixon, 334 N.Y.S.2d 915, 916 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1972)
(holding that negligent use of washing machine, absent contrary agreement, does not justi-
fy eviction); Kaufman v. Hammer, 268 N.Y.S.2d 80 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1966) (stating m
dicta that one or two acts of vandalism do not justify forfeiture where the lease provided
for termination for tenant conduct which the landlord deems "objectionable").
573. See, e.g., Truncali v. Kusstatscher, 306 N.Y.S.2d 174, 176 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct.
1969) (requiring landlord to demonstrate a course of conduct posing a threat to the safety,
health, and peaceful enjoyment of other tenants); Moss v. Hirshtritt, 303 N.Y.S.2d 447,
451 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1969) (holding that forfeiture provisions are to be strictly con-
strued and that violations must be more than trivial to justify eviction); Valley Courts,
Inc. v. Newton, 263 N.Y.S.2d 863, 865 (Syracuse City Ct. 1965) (holding that tenant's
activities as a "busy body" do not support eviction); Twin Elm Management Corp. v.
Banks, 46 N.Y.S.2d 952, 953 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1943) (holding that piano practice during
reasonable hours did not support eviction).
574. See 49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlord and Tenant § 1043 (1970) (stating that a past il-
legal use cannot support a present eviction); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY,
§ 12.5 cmt. d (1977) (explaining that a landlord who fails to assert lus or her termination
rights promptly upon becoming aware of tenant's illegal use, may forfeit those rights);
Annotation, Lease Provisions Allowing Termination or Forfeiture for Violation of Law, 92
A.L.R. 3d 967, 993-1066 (1979) (stating that a landlord's failure to enforce termination
provisions of a lease where tenant violates the law generally constitutes a waiver of the
right to terminate).
575. Roseman v. Day, 185 N.E.2d 650 (Mass. 1962).
576. Id. at 652.
577. Id. at 654.
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taming use restrictions permitting termination on very short no-
tice.578  However, as with statutory eviction provisions, courts
generally construe such use restrictions narrowly and allow de-
fenses such as waiver and estoppel 79 Thus, unless these re-
strictive lease provisions are carefully drafted and consistently en-
forced, the landlord's rights remain unclear.
Indeed, even where tenants engage in flagrantly illegal conduct,
clearly prohibited by a statutory or lease restriction, and the land-
lord has neither ignored nor tolerated the violation, difficulties in
proving that conduct further limit the effectiveness of such restric-
tions. If the tenant-perpetrator is a reputed drug dealer, witnesses
are often intimidated and unwilling to testify against the tenant.
Fear of the tenant may also discourage landlords from aggressive
action. As one landlord commented, "I was afraid to keep [the
house from which she had evicted tenants] because these drug
dealers do such wild and woolly things they might try to get back
at me. ' 580
Moreover, to promote consistent enforcement, landlords must
have the ability to police tenants for illegal activities. While land-
lords are not subject to constitutional restrictions on their policing
activities,5"' there are limits on the extent to which landlords may
intrude upon tenants' privacy and quiet enjoyment. 512 Unless the
landlord has reserved the right to enter the premises during the
term of the lease, the tenant retains the right to bring a trespass ac-
578. See generally, Annotation, supra note 574 (discussing the judiciary's treatment of
lease provisions which provide for forfeiture upon the use of the leased prenuses for
illegal uses).
579. See generally, Annotation, Waiver of Statutory Demand-for-Rent Due or of Notice-
to-Quit Prerequisite of Summary Eviction of Lessee for Nonpayment of Rent, 31 A.L.R.
4TH 1254 (1991).
580. Gregory S. Reeves, Landlords Unwittingly Rent to Crack Dealers, THE KAN. CITY
STAR, Nov. 26, 1989, at IA. (describing several owners who are selling inner city prop-
erties after discovering drug-related activities on the property).
581. See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 350-51 (2d ed. 1988)
("By their terms the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amend-
ment, like provisions of the fifteenth amendments restrict only government action.").
This, of course, assumes that the landlord is a private citizen and that there are no
"state action" implications.
582. See generally Thomas A. Lucarelli, Application of the Avoidable Consequence
Rule to the Residential Leasehold Agreement, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 425, 430 (1988)
(discussing the landlord's duty to protect a tenant in his quiet enjoyment of the premises);
George E. Stevens, Intrusion into Solicitude and the Tenant's Right to Privacy, 16 REAL
ESTATE L.J. 324, 324 (1988) (analyzing recent cases considering whether a residential
tenant has an interest in solitude that is actionable against a landlord).
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tion against the landlord for any entry to which the tenant has not
consented."8 3 Thus, under current law, the landlords' rights to
control tenants are not commensurate with their evolving duties to
police tenants.
b. Disincentives to Exercise Control
Even if the law regarding the landlord's right to police tenants
was clear, there are several reasons why a landlord might be un-
willing to undertake this obligation of control. First, the incentives
created by the law depend on the probability of successful enforce-
ment. Enforcement of tort actions has been notoriously unpredict-
able, leaving incentives unclear." 4 Likewise, nuisance actions de-
pend on political factors 85 and forfeiture actions depend on prop-
erty value.586 In some jurisdictions, the incentives are contradicto-
583. See Mendes v. Johnson, 389 A.2d 781, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that a
landlord desiring to terminate a month-to-month lease must resort to statutory procedures
and may not resort to self-help measures without incurnng tort liability).
584. The uncertainty of tort liability is significantly related to the flexible standards used
to assess liability ("reasonableness" and to determine damages ("pain and suffering")
which in turn leaves broad discretion to juries, whose actual decision-making process
remains a mystery. When landlord liability is at issue, the risk increases that the out-
come will be affected by jury attitudes and assumptions about rental housing, landlords,
and tenants.
585. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model
of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 227 n.25 (1983)
("Although the public prosecutor lacks any profit motive that might lead him to bring
weak or marginal cases for their nuisance value, a prosecution can be motivated by ideo-
logical, political, and careenst motives and it is an open question as to which set of
perverse incentives is more dangerous."); Margaret Rosso Grossman & Thomas G. Fischer,
Protecting the Right to Farm: Statutory Linits on Nuisance Actions Against the Farmer,
1983 Wis. L. REV. 95, 157 (1983) (noting that, as rural areas are developed, the non-
farming community may exercise their increasing political influence to ensure the adoption
of nuisance ordinances that will control the location and activities of agricultural opera-
tions); Mark Sagoff, The Principles of Federal Pollution Control Law, 71 MINN. L. REV.
19, 35 (1986) (arguing that even traditional environmental nuisances such as smoke and
dust, as opposed to those created by swift technological advances, may raise both political
and technical issues with which the common law is not equipped to deal). But see Crom-
well v. Jackson, 52 A.2d 79, 94 (Md. App. Ct. 1974) ('[I]n nuisance cases, what is a
proper place is not a political question, to be determined by political pressure or accord-
ing to the political views of inhabitants, but a judicial question, dependent upon. the rela-
tive convenience and inconvenience to inhabitants.").
586. See, e.g., United States v. One 1980 Rolls Royce, VIN #SRL39955, 905 F.2d 89,
91 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that any increase in property value from the use of drug
money is forfeitable); Ian A.J. Pitz, Letting the Punishment Fit the Crune: Proportional
Forfeiture Under Crmninal R.LC.O. 's Source of Influence Provision, 75 MINN. L. REV.
1225, 1251 (Apr. 1991) (proposing forfeiture of the percentage of the property value used
as a source of influence over the enterprise).
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ry For example, in those jurisdictions whose tort doctrines depend
on the landlord's voluntary undertaking of a program of secun-
ty,587 a landlord offering any security measures actually increases
his risk of liability by undertaking less than extensive policing pro-
grams.88 This creates an incentive for landlords to refrain from
offering any security programs.
In addition, controlling tenant conduct is costly and, in those
situations in 'which control will most likely operate to decrease
crime, that cost is least likely to be able to be passed on to the
tenants. Thus, in many instances, landlords simply cannot afford
the necessary control.
2. Meeting the Responsibility- Screening Trouble
Given the difficulties in policing tenants currently in posses-
sion, landlords might attempt to screen prospective tenants to elimi-
nate potential "criminals." As in the policing context, however, the
landlord's legal right to screen tenants is limited and contradictory
and is blocked by significant disincentives.
Once the landlord decides to implement screening measures, he
must determine the form and scope of the screen. One approach to
screening tenants is to identify certain characteristics as predictors
of trouble. However, as indicated by the vast range of tort cases
brought against landlords for tenants' criminal activities, it is diffi-
cult to select predictors that neither intrude on a tenant's privacy
nor discriminate against certain classes of tenants." 9 Moreover,
many predictors entail potential liability under the Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988 ("FHAA"). 59
The FHAA prohibits discrimination in housing, including rental
transactions and applies to all public or private landlords except for
a few enumerated exemptions.5 9' The FHAA protects classes de-
fined by characteristics such as race, color, national origin and sex
as well as classes that create a disparate impact. 92
Even screening tenants for drug addiction sets up potential
liability under the FHAA, which specifically prohibits discrimma-
587. See supra text accompanying notes 73-94.
588. See supra text accompanying note 95.
589. See supra text accompanying notes 150-89.
590. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1988 & Supp. 1 1989).
591. Id § 3603(b).
592. Id. § 3604.
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tion of handicapped individuals.593 A person with a past record
of impairment due to drug use or addiction or with a reputation as
a drug addict would qualify as "handicapped." 5" The only drug
users expressly excluded from coverage are those involved in the
"[c]urrent, illegal use of or addiction to a controlled
substance."595 Because of these provisions, a landlord may ask
only whether the prospective tenant is a current drug user/addict or
has been convicted of manufacturing or distributing illegal
drugs.59' Further, this inquiry must be made of all applicants, not
just selected individuals. 597
With the desirability of tenant screening has come the develop-
ment of tenant screening agencies which, in turn, have raised the
issue of the applicability of the fair credit reporting acts and other
consumer protection statutes. Following the design of credit report-
mg agencies, tenant screening agencies are compames formed to
report information on prospective tenants, such as whether the
tenant has ever filed a complaint against a landlord.598 The Fed-
eral Trade Commission has taken the position that the Fair Credit
Reporting Act ("FCRA")599 applies to tenant screening servic-
es.6' ° Consistent with this position, in Cisneros v. The U.D. Reg-
istry, Inc., an unreported decision, a California lower court held a
tenant screening agency liable for a number of violations of the
FCRA.6°' There, the agency began operating in 1977, accruing
more than 500,000 landlord inquiries per year and more than one
million items of tenant information (mostly concerning evic-
593. 24 C.F.R. § 100.202 (1991).
594. See id. § 100.201 (defimng "handicap").
595. Id.
596. Id. § 100.202(c).
597. Id.
598. See Janlon Goldman, Where the Public Draws the Line: Consumers are Learning
They Can Say 'No' to Invasions of Privacy, COMPUTERWORLD, Apr. 15, 1991, at 25 (dis-
cussing landlords* use of computer information systems to track potential tenants); Mer-
chants of Data, 56 CONSUMER RPTs. 356 (May 1991) (discussing landlords' and
employers* use of computenzed databanks).
599. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681(a)-(t).
600. See David Pallack, California Trial Court Restricts Tenant Reporting Agency's
Practices: Cisneros v. The U.D. Registry, Inc., CLEARINGHOUSE REV., June 1990, at 88,
90 (discussing the FTC's position that the FCRA applies to tenant information).
601. Cisneros v. The U.D. Registry, Inc., No. C645123 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cty., Apr.
27, 1987) (Cleannghouse No. 42,584). For a discussion of this case, see Pallack, supra
note 600, at 90-95.
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tions).6° The Cisneros court held that the agency violated the
FCRA by refusing to delete unverified information, to disclose
reported information to tenants and to maintain a public office.' 3
Increased use of these services and increased tenant screening by
landlords is likely to bring more of these suits to the fore.6°
Even if screening of tenants were relatively risk free, the same
costs and disincentives accompany screening measures as accompa-
ny policing activities.
3. Avoiding Responsibility- See Nothing - Do Nothing
Another option for the landlord is to ignore the incentives
created by the legal standards discussed in this article. Landlords
may simply take the risk of being subject to nuisance or forfeiture
proceedings for illegal activity on the premises and may conclude
that refusing to provide security is the best means of avoiding tort
liability At least one large apartment management company has
taken this approach, disclaiming all security responsibilities.6°5 In
Houston, DMC Management, which owns and manages 12,000
apartments in Texas, New Mexico and Florida, trains its staff to
tell prospective tenants that "security is the responsibility of the
tenant and [the] local police. ' 6°6
The problem with this approach is that the risk of liability still
remains. Landlords simply cannot afford the risks created by this
avoidance strategy, especially landlords leasing smaller buildings,
thereby placing the entire building at risk of forfeiture or closure
on the basis of a single tenant's activities.6°7
4. Avoiding Responsibility- Shifting Risk of Crime
Another option for the landlord is to reduce or evade the risk
of exposure by shifting the risk to others. Landlords might shift the
risk back to tenants through lease provisions requiring tenants to
indemnify landlords for the tenant's own criminal activities,
602. Id. at 89.
603. Id. at 90, 92, 95.
604. See generally Robert R. Stauffer, Tenant Blacklisting: Tenant Screening Services
and the Right to Privacy, 24 HARv. J. LEGIS. 239 (1987) (discussing policy concerns with
the use of tenant screening services).
605. William Celis III, Tenant Suits May Broaden The Liability of Landlords, WALL ST.
J., May 20, 1988, at 27.
606. Id. at 27.
607. See supra text accompanying notes 387-89.
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through waiver clauses excusing the landlord from responsibility
for the criminal acts of third parties (even if the landlord's negli-
gence enhanced the risk of crime), and through security deposit
provisions financing security measures and defraying liability stem-
muing from the tenant's actions."as However, the validity of ex-
culpatory lease provisions is questionable. Several courts reviewing
these clauses in the context of tenant suits against landlords for
criminal activity on the premises have held these clauses void as
against public policy 6 Others have held that the clauses are of
limited validity and require strict construction against the
landlord.610 Still others have upheld and enforced these provi-
S u.611
sions.61
Another means to shift risk is to insure against the potential
liability 612 But, the unpredictability of court decisions makes in-
surance difficult and, while there is no public policy disfavoring
such insurance, many insurance compames may exclude this type
of exposure from their coverage options. Moreover, insurance is
only feasible if the cost can be absorbed effectively by landlords.
Once again, in those areas where the risk is highest, the landlord is
least likely to be able to afford to insure.613
608. See, e.g., Cooke v. Allstate Management Corp., 741 F. Supp. 1205, 1208 (D.S.C.
1990) (suggesting that an express lease exculpation clause could release the landlord from
liability).
609. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. United Homes Corp., 486 P.2d 1093, 1097 (Wash. 1971)
(holding that to give effect to a landlord's exculpatory clause would violate both tort
liability rules and public policy); see generally William K. Jones, Private Revision of
Public Standards: Exculpatory Agreements in Leases, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 717 (1988)
(discussing the ability to modify rights and duties through the use of exculpatory clauses).
610. Smith v. General Apartment Co., 213 S.E.2d 74, 76 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975) (holding
that exculpatory lease provision was effective for ordinary acts of negligence but not for
willful or wanton activity).
611. Zurich Gen. Accident & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Mut. Mortgage & Inv. Co., 113 N.E.2d
134, 137 (Oluo Ct. App. 1953) (refusing to hold landlord liable for theft of tenant's car
from the premises due to a binding and enforceable exculpatory clause); Wright v. Ster-
ling Land Co., 43 A.2d 614, 616 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1945) (enforcing lease provision which
relieved landlord from liability for theft of tenant's car because of waiver of liability re-
gardless of landlord negligence was plainly expressed in the covenant).
612. See, e.g., Wade Lambert and Richard L. Hudson, Insurer to Pay to Clean Drug-
Lab House, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 1989, at B2. (reporting that a judge ordered an insur-
ance company to pay landlord for $28,500 damages caused by methamphetamme lab on
leased property).
613. See supra text accompanying notes 120-32.
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5. Avoiding Responsibility- Shifting Investment Strategies
Given the difficulties and disincentives in the potential landlord
responses, the most likely response, especially for landlords in high
crime areas, would be simply to sell or abandon the property 61 4
In Kansas City, Missouri, for example, several property owners
notified by the county prosecutor's office of suspected illegal activ-
ities by tenants responded by evicting the tenants and selling the
property 615 Even more counterproductive is the increasing phe-
nomenon of abandonment of apartment buildings in high-crime ar-
eas.616 The result has been an increase in property ownership and
management by the government and a decrease in the availability
of affordable rental housing.1 7
B. SOCIAL POLICY PERSPECTIVE: PLACING DUTY
ON LANDLORDS TO POLICE TENANTS IS NOT
GOOD SOCIAL POLICY
From the perspective of landlords, the increasing duty to police
leased premises provides uncertain incentives at best. For areas
where crime is prevalent, the clearest incentive is likely to be to
sell or abandon the property or to use it for purposes other than
rental housing. From a broader societal perspective, an increase in
landlord liability for criminal activities has questionable value as
well. Further, there are significant risks involved in the delegation
of policing responsibilities to private parties. Proactive responses by
the law, such as enforcing minimum standards of property mainte-
nance and providing economic support for rebuilding communities,
combined with effective public law enforcement are the best means
614. See generally Roger A. Cunningham, The New Implied and Statutory Warranties of
Habitability in Residential Leases: From Contract to Status, 16 URB. L. ANN. 3, 138-53
(1979) (reporting that due to increased maintenance costs that cannot be passed on to
tenants in the form of higher rents, studies show that landlords are likely to abandon
property when the tenants' right to habitable housing is enforced).
615. Reeves, supra note 580, at 12A.
616. Andrew Duffy, A Stark Lesson for Metro New York's Festering Housing Mess,
TORONTO STAR, Feb. 10, 1991, at B1. Of course, one cannot attribute the entire trend of
property abandonment to the increased costs of landlord responsibility for criminal activ-
ities. The more unmediate causes are declining property values and increased property
taxes due to the loss of the industrial base in many parts of the country. Id.
617. In 1991, New York's Department of Housing Preservation and Development owned
more than 70,000 apartments in 7,000 buildings that were either abandoned by the prior
owner-landlords or seized by the city under forfeiture provisions. Id
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of battling crime.
In one sense, the increase in private responsibility for the crm-
mal activities of others represents an increased "deputization" of
the populace. Americans have always been attracted to the direct
participation of private citizens in law enforcement. The feeling of
local control and the efficiency of direct action are especially allur-
ing to citizens in crime ridden neighborhoods."" Yet as one com-
mentator reviewing the history of American vigilantism movements
noted, "we must remember that the actual practice of vigilantism is
often at variance with the virtuous vigilante of American folk-
lore."619 The private enforcement of criminal laws is not the
same as citizen cooperation in fighting crime; rather, private indi-
viduals are given both the power and the responsibility to directly
control the conduct of others. Under the pretext of criminal law
enforcement, vigilantism entails significant risks of discrimination
and overreaching.
The trend of increasing the. responsibility of landlords to police
their properties encourages this private approach to crime fighting.
From 1969 to 1990, the value of private security industries rose
from about $2.5 million to $18 billion annually, and the number of
employees grew from fewer than 300,000 to nearly two
million.620 Currently private security service personnel outnumber
public law enforcement personnel by more than two to onel.62
Despite this growth, private security personnel are virtually unregu-
lated and are generally less trained than their public
counterparts.6'
There is direct evidence that landlords have responded to crime
with vigilante-type, private security measures. For example, in
Brooklyn, private police forces are "lured by landlords to oust drug
dealers when the police cannot The company's tools are the
same ones employed by its adversaries: violence and intimida-
tion."6  In one federally subsidized apartment complex, the Fed-
618. See WILLIAM TUCKER, VIGILANTE: THE BACKLASH AGAINST CRIME IN AMERICA
341-42 (1985) (discussmg community-based methods of fighting crime and the safer feel-
ing derived from these united, participational efforts).
619. Timothy Lenz, Republican Virtue and the American Vigilante, 12 LEGAL STuD. F.
117, 133 (1988).
620. Terrence J. Mangan & Michael G. Shanahan, Public Law EnforcemenV/Private
Security: A New Partnership?, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Jan. 1990, at 18, 19.
621. Dennis Hevesi, Crimnologists Disturbed at Private Police Growth, N.Y. TIMES,
June 17, 1991, at B7.
622. Id.
623. Chris Hedges, In Brooklyn, Private Police as Violent as Their Enemy, N.Y. TIMES,
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eral Housing and Urban Development Office authorized rent levels
high enough to pay $655,200 annually to one such security compa-
fly 624 These security services effectively operate to rid dangerous
and drug-infested properties of crime. 625 However, the cost of this
effectiveness is unrestrained power in the hands of private citi-
zens. 626 As one guard commented, "If they spill one pin drop of
our blood, we spill gallons of theirs The cops have to play
by the rules But no one knows what we do."627
Even public enforcement of nuisance and forfeiture laws is
more characteristic of private enforcement than is enforcement of
other criminal laws. Using public nuisance statutes and state and
federal forfeiture statutes as justification, many local prosecutors
have begun to formally notify landlords of arrests for or suspicions
of criminal activities on leased premises. In Kansas City, Missouri,
for example, the Jackson County Prosecutor's Office has adopted a
policy of notifying landlords upon receiving information that the
rental property is being used for drug transactions.62 The office
sends the landlord a letter, headed with a bold print statement that
"THIS LETTER IS YOUR OFFICIAL NOTICE. READ CARE-
FULLY," and stating that the "Police Department provided this of-
fice with reliable information alleging that (address of leased pre-
mises) is used for the illegal use, keeping or selling of controlled
substances."'62 9 The letter further requests, again in bold print,
that the owner "Please take immediate action to prevent illegal use
of the above described premises" 63° and is accompanied by cop-
ies of the Missouri nuisance abatement63  and forfeiture 632
statutes. One hundred and thirty-five such letters were sent in
1989 633 This notice procedure has proven effective as the Mis-
souri Court of Appeals held it sufficient proof of owner knowledge
to justify a padlock order against a leased commercial property that
June 16, 1991, § 1, at 1.
624. Id at 22.
625. Id
626. Id.
627. Id
628. Interview by author. Copies of letters on file with author.
629. Id
630. Id
631. MO. ANN. STAT. § 195.130.
632. Id § 513.607.
633. Reeves, supra note 580, at 12A.
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had been used as a massage parlor.6
Most landlords do not fight these intimidating letters. Instead,
they respond by evicting tenants or settling legal actions.635
Nonetheless, a number of states use these letter procedures.636
They provide an extremely potent, yet relatively hidden, means of
coercing landlords to evict tenants suspected of engaging in illegal
activities."3' However, against those who truly are assisting
criminal enterprises, these letter procedures are virtually useless
since the owners can simply transfer title63' or relocate opera-
tions.
6 39
Interestingly, when faced with tort claims against landlords for
the criminal activities of tenants, courts more readily recognize
risks of overreaching and invasions of privacy o In the tort con-
634. State v. Irving, 700 S.W.2d 529 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
635. In Portland, Oregon, settlements "almost always require the eviction of all the
tenants involved in the activity that created the nuisance, along with improvements to the
property. Often the city demands the right to review future tenants." Now Cities Hit Drug
Suspects Where They Live, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1991, at B16 [hereinafter Drug Suspects].
Similarly, in Suffolk County, New York, "[e]ight owners received a second threatemng
letter. But that's as far as it went because each time a reply indicated the landlord at-
tempted to evict the tenant or promised to 'abate the problem.'" Young & Slackman,
supra note 483, at 5.
636. See Drug Suspects, supra note 635, at B16 (noting that "[m]ost cities' nuisance
laws are similar to the one used by Portland, Oregon").
637. When criminal law enforcement efforts focus on vice activities, visibility is espe-
cially important as the inducements for police corruption - large sums of money, public
ambivalence toward the targeted vice activity, and relatively concealed activities - are
promment. John Dombrink, The Touchables: Vice and Police Corruption in the 1980's, 51
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 201 (1988).
638. Young & Slackman, supra note 483 (describing the ineffectiveness of the Suffolk
County, New York, nuisance letter procedure due to the fact that targeted owners react by
transferring title). But see G'& E Business Servs., Inc. v. Warner Robbms, 251 S.E.2d
149 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that transfer of title to adult bookstore after nuisance
abatement proceedings had begun did not void the subsequent judgment and right to ap-
peal).
639. For example, in People ex rel. Van de Kamp v. American Art Enters., Inc., 177
Cal. Rptr. 776 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982), rev'd, 656 P.2d 1170 (Cal. 1983), a landlord was
prosecuted under a Red Light Abatement Act for using the property to operate a business
specializing in the publication and distribution of sexually explicit photographs. In re-
sponse to the action, the landlord relocated and leased the premises to an innocent tenant.
Id. at 777. Fueled by its frustration with the landlord's avoidance by relocation, the trial
court ignored the traditional nuisance remedy of eviction, which would effectively operate
against the innocent tenant, and instead fined the landlord an amount equal to one year's
rent. Id. at 777-78. The appellate court affirmed this assessment. Id. at 778. While
the California Supreme Court did not agree that the statute authorized a fine against the
errant landlord, it did not dispute either the fact of the landlord's relocation or the justifi-
cation for the lower courts' frustration. American Art, 656 P.2d 1170.
640. See supra text accompanying notes 167 and 180.
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text, courts have rejected the assumptions that landlords can effec-
tively control or screen tenants and that a tenant's illegal drug use
necessarily increases the threat of violence by that tenant.64' Iron-
ically, these rejected assumptions form the very basis of nuisance
and forfeiture proceedings.
At best, forfeiture and nuisance actions simply relocate crime.
Forfeiture, in particular, is not an effective mechanism since it
merely transfers management responsibility for the housing to gov-
ernment agencies which may be immune from the policing
responsibilities placed 'upon private landlords. 2 Moreover, forfei-
tures of residential buildings pose a significant risk of displacement
of innocent tenants. 3 In addition, property seizures are expensive
to conduct. Illustrative of this, the U.S. Marshals Service, which
maintains properties forfeited under the federal acts, has implement-
ed a policy prohibiting seizure of real property with equity of less
than $50,000.6 4 Even seizure may not resolve the problem, how-
ever, since seized properties are eventually resold, often to the
same types of investors who were unwilling to maintain the prop-
erty so as to discourage crime or unwilling to take action against
criminal tenants.645
More important than the failure of laws aimed at landlords is
the existence of a better alternative approach. Indeed, some of the
most effective citizen crime fighting tactics involve increasing
home ownership by increasing the availability of affordable hous-
641. See supra text accompanying notes 162-83.
642. Whether immunity will indeed attach depends upon the capacity in which the gov-
ernment purports to act. "It has long been established that municipalities and other public
entities remain immune from negligence claims ansing out of the performance of their
governmental functions, including police protection." Joseph Kelner & Robert S. Kelner,
Muncipal Liability for Inadequate Security, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 26, 1991, at 3. However,
"[w]hen the state acts in a propriety landlord capacity, it is subject to the same principles
of tort law as a private landlord." Id. at 3.
643. For instance, where the government seizes an entire property where only a portion
has been used for illegal activities, those tenants lawfully in place are necessarily dis-
placed. See, e.g., United States v. 141st Street Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 880 (2d Cir. 1990)
(ordering 41 unit apartment building forfeited where 15 units were used for narcotics);
United States v. Littlefield, 821 F.2d 1365, 1369 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding entire building
subject to forfeiture if portion used for illegal purpose).
644. See Young & Slackman, supra note 483, at 26.
645. Id. at 27 (noting that absentee ownership causes neighborhood deterioration but that
local policies often encourages absentee ownership as "homes that are seized because of
foreclosure or tax liens tend to be sold to speculators '[who tend to] rent to peo-
ple of devious character or people in dire straits who are prey for those of devious
character").
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mg.646 Far more important to fighting crime than the enforcement
of standards requiring landlords to police tenants has been the
rigorous enforcement of building codes against landlords, the
growth of informal "crime watch" groups6' and the increase in
youth activities. 64"
These pro-active approaches to neighborhood revitalization,
while lacking the dramatic and retributive aspects of actions against
criminals, are much more effective in decreasing crime. In fact, the
condition of the premises itself is the factor most closely linked to
a high likelihood of crime. Local anti-crime groups and public
housing managers alike indicate that keeping property in good
physical repair is the best method to prevent properties from be-
coming targets for drug dealing, vandalism and other crimnal
activities. 9 As one commentator noted, "Half of all urban crimes
occur in about 3 percent of a city's patrol points. Crime rates rise
significantly in areas where street lights and windows are broken,
where streets and vacant lots are strewn with refuse and where
graffiti artists prevail. The moral: clean it up.,'650 Yet, iroically,
while forfeiture of property hosting illegal activities is available
under a variety of federal, state and local statutes, similar provi-
sions for forfeiture of property due to neglect and disrepair are
considered novel.651
CONCLUSION
This article has outlined the trends in the law making landlords
646. A program in Hartford, Connecticut has been singled out by the National Crime
Prevention Council as "one of the great success stones in the [United States'] fight
against drugs." John Picton, Ordinary People Pitch in to Fight Crime, TORONTO STAR,
July 14, 1991, at A6. The director of the program urges, "[Y]ou must make housing
more affordable and schools more accessible and create more summer jobs for the young
and make police more sensitive to the communities." Id.
647. These community-based crime groups are composed of volunteer efforts of neigh-
borhood residents and are supported by local cooperation and monies. Elizabeth Ross,
'Fed Up' with Crime and Grune, Inner-City Dwellers Take Charge, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Mar. 12, 1991, at 9 (citing Miami's "Coalition for a Drug Free Community"
and Kansas City's "Ad Hoc Group Against Crime" as successful community-wide pro-
grams)-
648. Id
649. Rick DelVecchio, HUD Aide Praises SF Public Housing Projects, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE, June 6, 1991, at A19.
650. Morganthau et al., supra note 1, at 35.
651. Cf. Pamela MeClintock, Council Targets Negligent Landlords, THE WASH. TIMES,
Feb. 13, 1991, at BI (describing the innovative "Housing, Improve It or Lose It Act of
1991" enacted by the Washington D.C. Council).
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increasingly responsible for criminal activities on leased premises.
That trend began with the landlord's tort liability for injuries to
tenants caused by the premises' physical condition and has extend-
ed to landlord liability for tenant injuries caused by a third party's
criminal activities on the premises. Today, in virtually every juns-
diction, landlords have some duty to protect their tenants from the
criminal activities of strangers.652
With that step taken, the next logical progression was to make
landlords liable for criminal activities of tenants that victimized
other tenants. While courts have severely restricted the situations in
which a tenant's dangerousness could be readily predicted, they
have adopted the general principle establishing a landlord's duty to
police tenants.
In addition to these purely private tort duties, increasingly
landlords are being held to quasi-public standards for tenants' cnm-
mal activities, such as those based on state nuisance abatement
laws and state and federal forfeiture laws. Although both of these
types of statutes offer criminal liability, the more efficient in rem
civil proceedings are a more attractive possibility for landlord lia-
bility Public nuisance statutes provide that if tenants are engaged
in certain illegal activities on leased property, the courts can order
the nuisance abated and the property closed for up to one year.
While jurisdictions differ on the extent to which a landlord must
be "innocent" of the criminal activity to avoid a closure order,
posting a bond in an amount equal to the property's value provides
the only s.re remedy against the possibility of an ex parte seizure
order by which a landlord may be deprived of income-producing
property while battling a nuisance action.
Primarily used against illegal drug activities, forfeiture statutes
provide a vehicle whereby title to property may be forfeited out-
right to the government. Real property may be subject to forfeiture
if it has "facilitated" illegal drug transactions or if it represents the
proceeds of such transactions. While the federal drug forfeiture
statute provides an innocent owner exception, courts vary in their
652. See generally KEETON et al., supra note 20, at 442-43 (5th ed. 1984) (stating that
"[a] growing number of courts have imposed duties of reasonable protection upon
landlords to protect their tenants from cnminal attack, provided that such assaults are
reasonably foreseeable"); Haines, supra note 514, at 354 (reviewing court decisions on thus
point and concluding that "landlords should have a duty to use reasonable care to protect
tenants from foreseeable criminal acts committed by third persons on the leased prems-
es-).
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interpretation of the meaning of "knowledge or consent" required
by that statute.
Overall, the law's development has represented a philosophical
shift in how courts and legislatures view the landlord-tenant rela-
tionship. Previously, the landlord-tenant relafionship was viewed
individualistically as one of strangers; currently, however, landlords
are held to a more communalistic responsibility to protect and
police tenants. To make this shift seem less drastic, courts have
used various rhetorical devices such as applying historical analysis,
employing the legal fiction of "offending property," and redefimng
traditional doctrinal labels to make the new liability seem well-
established.
Tis legal trend and inherent philosophical shift are both un-
wise and ineffective. Because of the high costs of discharging their
duty and the numerous possibilities for exposure to other forms of
liability, landlords are likely to abandon the landlord business rath-
er than meet the increased responsibilities. Moreover, landlords
who do undertake these private policing responsibilities present an
undesirable risk of unrestrained vigilantism.
Ironically, the laws creating this trend of treating landlords as
cops have been drawn from standards developed to deal with struc-
tural conditions. Unlike landlord policing duties which have not
been proven to be effective crime fighters, improving the
community's structural and economic bases have proven effective.
Yet such responses have been rendered impotent by a system that
imposes the costs of enforcing standards designed to encourage
these responses on those least likely to be able to take action.
Thus, treating landlords as cops is not the answer to crime control,
but creating incentives for landlords to be responsible property in-
vestors and managers may be.
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